Mallmann Showell, Jak P. What Britain Knew and Wanted to Know about U-Boats, volume 1. Milton Keynes, UK: Military Press, 2001.

ISBN 0-85420-042-8
104 pages

Introduction; charts; tables; index

   Jak Mallmann Showell has written and/or edited many books about U-boats, and the number continues to swell. This release from The Military Press in particular looks to be the first in a series of slim volumes that will cause Mallmann Showell's list of credits to grow even larger. Consisting of materials mostly from Royal Navy archives and partly from the U-Boot-Archive in Cuxhaven, this compendium mixes translations of captured German documents and intercepted broadcasts, RN commentary on those materials and other topics, and a few notes from the editor.
   The book is divided into about forty brief sections, dating from July 1939 through mid-1944, but all applicable in particular to the conditions and events of April 1943. The material ranges from "Secret Standing War Orders for German U-boats" to reports of interrogations of captured German submariners to an analysis of a public radio broadcast by Admiral Doenitz. As might be expected from the nature of the material and the manner of presentation, the overall result is somewhat uneven and perhaps even confusing, especially to anyone other than U-boat specialists.
   For example, the translations of captured German manuals and procedures can certainly stand on their own and can be relied upon to provide essentially accurate data. Similarly, reports about interrogations of POWs can be valuable sources, but—as the original authors sometimes remind their audience—they are not always to be completely trusted. On the other hand, parts of the book are wartime papers reporting what the Royal Navy knew, or thought it knew, about the U-boats. This paragraph from the editor's Introduction is especially instructive:

   Of special interest are the numerous small inconsistencies in the narratives. These days one cannot be sure whether these were injected on purpose to aid propaganda, whether they were untruths swallowed from the interrogations of prisoners or whether they were genuine mistakes. However, the numerous neat little jabs of carefully placed propaganda, belittling the other side, must have had a significant influence on the officers who were allowed to read these highly classified pages. It must be borne in mind that all of this material was produced during the war under a strict code of secrecy and much of it was plucked from "unreliable" sources. Therefore not everything with in [sic] these pages is true.

   Unfortunately, within the body of the book the editor's notes are quite limited, and he does not always comment on the accuracy of particular wartime reports or speculative passages. Nor does the book offer any indication that, for example, material printed without editorial commentary should be accepted as accurate. Thus, it's not always clear whether particular RN reports are to be accepted at face value, if they contain unintentional mistakes, or if they are intentionally embroidering the facts in order to cater to the wartime consumers of U-boat intelligence. This can be a bit frustrating when reading about unfamiliar events and information.
   Nevertheless, it's always fascinating to see the war through the eyes of those who were trying to make sense of it at the time, and What Britain Knew and Wanted to Know certainly scores on that count. In addition, readers especially interested in or knowledgeable about U-boat operations will probably find this book much to their liking.
   Future volumes, however, might be improved by a firmer editorial hand when it comes to distinguishing between facts and inaccurate speculation in the wartime reports.

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Munoz, Antonio. Goering's Grenadiers: The Luftwaffe's Field Divisions, 1942-1945. Bayside, NY: Axis Europa Books, 2002.

ISBN 1-891227-40-8
380 pages

Acknowledgment; Introduction; maps; sketches; photos; tables; charts; Epilogue; Color Plates; Select Bibliography

   Just as Jak Mallmann Showell has been closely associated with the U-boat war through the many books on that subject he has authored and edited, few writers are as closely identified with Axis combat formations—especially obscure Axis combat formations—as Tony Munoz. According to the jacket of his new book, "Antonio Munoz has been writing about the subject of WWII Axis military history for 25 years. He has published 14 other books on this topic and is considered an expert on the history of the Axis forces."
   Munoz is not just an author. He is also a researcher, an editor, and he runs Axis Europa Books and Axis Europa Magazine, both dedicated to publishing material about Axis forces. Over the years, titles published by Axis Europa have physically evolved from fairly crude softcover booklets to high quality, professional publications. It's certainly true that Goering's Grenadiers, based on the physical characteristics of the paper, binding, cover, and dust jacket, is by far the best package AE has ever released, substantially transcending Munoz's hobbyist roots.
   Goering's Grenadiers also shows tremendous improvement over Munoz's earliest works when it comes to citing sources. The author has always had the ability to unearth new information about the most unusual Axis units, but his skills as a researcher did not always extend to providing careful documentation about where all this information came from so that other researchers could verify his work. His new book is much more meticulous about footnoting all his data, and he provides an extensive bibliography including unpublished war diaries, microfilm from the US Army archives, and a wide assortment of secondary works.
   With all this improvement, it would be a pleasure to give Goering's Grenadiers an unqualified "thumbs up," but that unfortunately is not the case. Munoz's growth as a researcher and publisher has not been matched by his development as an author and editor. Munoz's style of writing—along with the plethora of grammatical mistakes, clumsy phrasings, and typographical errors—simply does not live up to his other abilities, and reading a typical page of text can induce an urge to run for the ibuprofen.
   That's too bad, because the material here is certainly worthy of better writing. Munoz's Introduction explains how the Third Reich came to foolishly create such unprepared formations, and in his twenty-two chapters the author covers each of the Luftwaffe field divisions. Given that these divisions were formed from excess air force personnel and thrown into battle without sufficient equipment, without suitable training, and without a hardened cadre of combat veterans, these are not chapters with happy endings. Munoz includes a great deal of very detailed information about TOEs, dispositions, commanders, and combat operations; indeed, his skills as a researcher shine through even when his words sometimes trip him up (such as writing "duplicity of command" when he almost certainly means "duplication of command").

   Plans had been written up during the spring and summer of 1942 that called for the elimination of the Oranienbaum pocket by German forces in the fall of 1942, but the military situation in southern Russia eventually prevented this from being carried out. The code name of the operation was "Unternehmen Bettelstab" (Operation Staff Rubbish). Had the Germans been able to raise sufficient units, air support, ammunition and other supplies to launch this attack, their military situation would have been greatly improved. However they neither had the resources for conducting this attack while they were greatly engaged in southern Russia, nor did the plan raise any real enthusiasm on the part of the Army Group commander and his staff. As a result, as 1943 approached, the bulge behind the front lines of Army Group North surrounding Leningrad remained. This pocket would eventually threaten the entire army group.
   In southern Russia, German armies were reeling after the 6th Army was surrounded at Stalingrad. They were also fighting to extricate themselves from the Caucasus- all the while Soviet forces were aiming to cut them off by taking Rostov. In the center and northern parts of the eastern front the situation was much the same- the Russians were aiming to keep applying pressure all along the front. German military reversals in southern Russia prompted the withdrawal of the divisions of 11th German Army. This army had only recently arrived in the Leningrad sector after its victory over Sevastopol and its defenders in the Crimea. It was the withdrawal of this army which General Govorov, commanding the Leningrad Front, and General Meretskov, commanding the Volkhov Front were waiting for. It was their chance to launch simultaneous attacks against the German 54th and 26th Army Corps.

   Looking for the best English-language compilation of hard data about the Luftwaffe field divisions? This is it, and anyone studying this topic could do far worse than to inspect the material Munoz has gathered, including his analysis of conclusions drawn by other writers. Looking for a few enjoyable evenings of pleasurable reading with an author who draws readers into his material and presents insights with style and clarity? That's not what Goering's Grenadiers offers.

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   Both of these books are available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the publishers.
   Thanks to the publishers for providing these review copies.