ISBN 0-7006-1238-6
193 pages

Preface; photos; Chronology; Major Participants; Bibliographical Essay; Index of Cases; Subject Index

   Given the usual subject matter of Louis Fisher's books (including American Constitutional Law, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President, and Presidential War Power among many others of the same ilk), his latest work—sub-titled "A Military Tribunal and American Law"—might not seem like a strong candidate to be reviewed here. Even the title, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial, must be noted carefully, because the book is about legal proceedings, not about sabotage. We mostly cover books about military operations rather than military tribunals, while Fisher seems to prefer testimony to tactics. Nevertheless, the WWII setting and unusual topic make this book a fascinating change of pace from tanks and bombers and submarines.
   The basic story is short and simple. Eight English-speaking Germans who had previously lived in the US were recruited and trained in Germany for sabotage and espionage. They were landed by U-boat on the American east coast in June 1942. One team of four landed in Florida; the other team of four landed on Long Island where they were immediately met by an unarmed Coast Guard patrolman who allowed them to get away. One agent promptly contacted the FBI and by the end of the month all eight were in custody. A special military tribunal—neither civilian trial nor court-martial, but operating under rules seemingly devised by President Franklin Roosevelt to ensure conviction without muss, fuss, or uncertainty—convened and performed its duty as directed by FDR. All eight Germans were convicted and condemned to death in the electric chair. The sentences of two of the men were commuted to imprisonment.
   In telling the story, Fisher divides his book into five chapters:

School for Saboteurs

Misadventures in America

The Military Tribunal at Work

The Supreme Court Steps In

Rethinking Tribunals

   The first two chapters establish that these were an unlikely set of saboteurs, providing a biographical sketch of each.

   Heinrich Harm Heinck. At the military tribunal, defense counsel Col. Kenneth Royall described Heinck as "a fellow who follows orders" and stated that there was no possibility of him ever "originating anything" or taking any action on his own initiative. Born in Hamburg on June 27, 1907, Heinck worked in the machine shop at the Hamburg-American Shipping Company and also on the S.S. Westphalia as an oiler and machinist's helper. On a trip to New York in 1926, he jumped ship and entered the country without legal papers. Most of his jobs in America were as a tool and die maker, but he also worked in restaurants and hotels and as a chauffeur. In 1933, he married Anna Isabella Goetz, who lived in New York City.
   In 1934, Heinck joined the German-American Bund in New York City and heard Walter Kappe give speeches four or five times. Heinck's last job was with the American Machine Tool Company, a branch of a firm that made the Norden bombsight. In 1939, there was talk of all noncitizens having to leave the factory because of contracts the company had with the federal government. Heinck returned to Germany at that point and worked at the Volkswagenwerk factory in Braunschweig as a tool maker. He met Richard Quirin at the factory and also joined the Nazi Party. His wife accompanied him to Germany and lived in the south with her parents and young son.
   In October 1941, Heinck went to the Ausland Organization (AO) to check into the possibility of returning to the United States. Kappe came to the AO and addressed a meeting of men like Heinck and Quirin who had spent time in America. Someone at the factory asked Heinck whether he would be interested in going to the United States as part of a team to stop or slow down production at American factories. Quirin came to Heinck's house, and they talked about the proposal. Shortly after that, they received a typewritten letter from Kappe, telling them to go to the farm near Brandenburg.

   The erstwhile saboteurs apparently were chosen more for convenience than anything else, and all eight seem to have gone along with the program mostly because it was the easiest thing to do. No one, not even the two group leaders, displayed much in the way of leadership, initiative, or enthusiasm. George Dasch, who betrayed everyone to the FBI, certainly seemed to have no intention of carrying out any sabotage. It's also difficult to believe that any of the others could really have mustered the energy to conduct useful operations. That seems especially true given the limited, mostly theoretical training in sabotage the men received in Germany.
   In any event, as soon as Dasch went to the FBI, federal agents quickly captured the other seven men before they really had a chance to conduct any attacks. The fact that the saboteurs had been betrayed was withheld from the public (and Germany), generating that much more publicity and applause for J. Edgar Hoover and his men who seemed to have miraculous powers of detection. President Roosevelt also decided to withhold the judicial proceedings from the public. His order essentially meant that the entire tribunal would be conducted behind closed doors by officers answerable only to the President with a foregone conclusion in mind.
   Although FDR had prescribed the rules and mandated that the proceedings would not be subject to any outside review, one defense counsel at considerable risk to his military career took the matter to the Supreme Court. The nine justice, however, were not about to interfere in the tribunal during time of war, and essentially shrugged off claims that FDR had over-stepped the powers of the Executive branch of government. This permitted the tribunal to continue with its work, and all eight agents were duly convicted and sentenced to die. Two, Dasch and Ernest Burger, had their sentences commuted because of assistance they had provided to the FBI and the government. A number of friends, family members, and acquaintances of the saboteurs were also arrested—and mostly convicted—for aiding and sheltering the agents or else for simply failing to report them.
   Meanwhile, Fisher devotes a full chapter to the legal nuances of the Supreme Court's involvement and the manner in which the justices finally produced the "Quirin decision" which justified FDR's special tribunal and stands today as precedent in such issues. According to Justice Felix Frankfurter, it "was not a happy precedent," and in the book's final chapter it turns out to be one with more than mere historical curiosity.
   Fisher's tone throughout the book proves as cool and detached as one would expect from a constitutional scholar. He never quite seems to impress readers that the saboteurs had been instructed to kill innocent civilians, disrupt production, derail the American war effort, and help Hitler win the war. Similarly, his single paragraph about the six executions carries less emotion than the death of a family pet. If Fisher conveys any passion, it's for the legal maneuvering and arguments in the tribunal and the Supreme Court. Although all very understated and restrained, it's clear that as a scholar of constitutional law Fisher holds some serious reservations about the manner in which the tribunal was created and conducted.
   Finally, and perhaps controversially, Fisher closes his book with a chapter comparing and contrasting FDR's military tribunal order in 1942 with President George W. Bush's order—some of it a word-for-word copy—issued in November 2001. In a departure from his calm and detached demeanor regarding the situation during World War II, Fisher offers considerable criticism of Bush's order and John Ashcroft's testimony in which the Attorney General suggested criticism of the Administration's plans for military tribunals would aid terrorists. "Alternatives more in keeping with American legal values," the author concludes, "were available in 1942 and remain so today."
   While it's difficult to believe any other writer could lay out the basic facts of the story in a more clear and concise manner, it's also true that Nazi Saboteurs won't be winning any awards for edge-of-the-seat story-telling. Readers looking for excitement and suspense—let alone hyperbole and sensationalism— will need to try another book. Those who want a quick factual rendering with an emphasis on the legal aspects will be very pleased with what Fisher has to offer.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from University Press of Kansas.
   Thanks to UPK for providing this review copy.