ISBN 0-7509-3286-4
x + 227 pages

Foreword; Acknowledgements; maps; photos; Sources; Bibliography; Index

Appendices: German Formations in the Great Mistake; Allied Orders of Battle

   Peter Beale has written an informative and idiosyncratic book about a lapse in Allied generalship during the drive from Normandy to the Rhine. In terms of subject matter, there have already been several books about the battle for the Scheldt and how it was necessitated by the initial Allied failure to secure the water approach to Antwerp. (In his account, Cornelius Ryan used the phrase "the great mistake" to describe the failure, thus providing this title.) In terms of approach, Beale's book is something of a novelty, with the author treating the episode almost like a medical problem that needs to be examined from every angle, carefully analyzed, and codified for diagnosing future cases.
   What exactly was the "great mistake"? On 4 September 1944 elements of British 11th Armored Division rolled into Antwerp. Although they quickly captured the vital docks and related facilities, the tankers failed to seize bridges over the Albert canal, advance a few miles to Woensdrecht, seal off the German 15th Army, and open the sea route into Antwerp. Had 11th Armored taken those steps immediately, all sources seem to concur the division could have easily succeeded against very light and disorganized opposition, and consequently rendered unnecessary the ensuing bloody campaign to open the route to Antwerp for Allied shipping. Beale quotes relevant paragraphs from books by several historians and generals to make his point. In particular, although Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey dispatched a warning, also on 4 September, that the Scheldt must be cleared, multiple layers of command failed to heed him. Beale includes a telling passage written by Liddell Hart:

   When the 11th Armoured Division raced into Antwerp on September 4 it had captured the docks intact, but made no effort to secure the bridges over the Albert Canal, and these were blown up by the time a crossing was attempted two days later, the division then being switched eastwards. The divisional commander, Roberts, had not thought of seizing the bridges immediately he occupied the city, and no one above had thought of giving him orders to do so. It was a multiple lapse by four commanders: from the top [Bernard] Montgomery [at 21st Army Group], then [Miles] Dempsey [at 2nd Army], [Brian] Horrocks [at XXX Corps], and [Pip] Roberts [at 11th Armored Division], four commanders who were normally alert to tactical opportunities.

   Here are Beale's own words:

   The 'Great Mistake', then, was the failure by the Allies to send whatever force could be mustered to seize a crossing over the Albert Canal at Merxem (as the Belgian [Resistance] White Brigade encouraged and implored them to do), and send an armoured column with all possible speed to the isthmus 2 miles west of Woensdrecht. This column would have had to be reinforced promptly to put in place a block to prevent the escape of the 15th Army. But had this been done, and then followed up once again very promptly with more troops, there could have been an opportunity to sweep up the Beveland peninsula during the very short period that existed until the resilient Germans reorganised themselves.
   The Great Mistake was to lose this fleeting opportunity.

   Why did this happen? Beale methodically studies all the evidence. First he quotes German situation reports, comments on those documents, and then reviews resources available to the Germans, including physical resources, organizational systems, and morale. Next Beale turns to "topography, weather, and civilians," again quoting various documents and reports and then commenting on their contents. Perhaps the most important of these factors, it seems the Allied commanders on the spot, notably Pip Roberts of 11th Armored, had no information about the effective Belgian resistance which could have offered valuable assistance with expert knowledge of local conditions.
   The next chapter sags a little with some general observations about the Allied command structure, the generals, and their relationships with each other, but it's part of Beale's approach to leave no aspect of the situation unexamined, and he makes some thoughtful remarks about, for example, the physical locations of various headquarters. The author goes on to define signals intelligence and human intelligence as a prelude to later chapters which delve into exactly what the Allies knew about the German situation and when they knew it. Interestingly, several pages are devoted to discussing the unavailability of suitable maps and lack of information about vital installations, and the author also quotes (from a seminar in 1984 in Belgium) part of a conversation between Pip Roberts and a representative of the Belgian government in exile, during which Monsieur Fayat describes a handbook he helped prepare for British Intelligence. Although Beale doesn't say so, that seems to be the Naval Intelligence Division's Geographical Handbook for Belgium, which shows a publication date of February 1944 and contains much of the information apparently not available to Montgomery, Dempsey, Horrocks, and Roberts about critical infrastructure in Belgium (although it's a bit obscured by page after page of material about tangential topics such as how fluctuations in the spice trade affected Antwerp). "Thus," concludes Beale, "the problem had been solved, but the solution had not been communicated to those who could have used it to very great advantage."
   Having previously defined various aspects of intelligence and command structures, Beale next begins to quote assorted intelligence estimates from SHAEF, 21st Army Group, British 2nd Army, and XXX Corps. Here's how he sums up the contents of those documents:

   Intelligence presented to senior commanders at the end of August and the beginning of September was incomplete, inaccurate and incautious. The impression given was that the Germans were in a state of complete chaos, and would be able to offer little systematic resistance before they collapsed entirely. As this Intelligence reinforced the mindset of the commanders, they were persuaded to make unbalanced and uninformed decisions. The Intelligence services have to take significant responsibility for the Great Mistake.

   Chapters Eight and Nine respectively deal with Allied strategy and German strategy following the breakout from Normandy, and in that regard the chapters look at issues rather larger than simply the situation at Antwerp. Chapter Ten finally begins an account of the actual operations around Antwerp, mostly taken from unit war diaries and regimental histories. Beale comments that the excerpts make it clear how higher headquarters displayed no urgency in crossing the Albert canal and advancing into the Netherlands while the Germans were too weak and disorganized to resist. The next chapter, the longest in the book, looks at the aftermath of Antwerp through November 1944 with almost thirty pages of discussion about the ramifications of the "great mistake," especially in regard to Operation Market-Garden, clearing the Breskens pocket, the Channel ports, and the Woensdrecht-Beveland-Walcheren operations.
   Chapters Ten and Eleven more than any other parts of the book cover combat operations rather than analyzing the factors affecting those operations. The next chapter returns to evaluating the situation and decisions. In particular Beale reviews "tempo and inertia" as they apply to the actions at Antwerp, using illustrations from a variety of other battles, including Waterloo and Balaclava. Afterwards the author goes on to enumerate all the specific issues contributing to the "great mistake." First, Beale reiterates how German strength along that part of the front was significantly greater than Allied Intelligence reported. (Beale, by the way, makes no mention of unusually large numbers of troops available from the Replacement Army as postulated by Walter Dunn in Heroes or Traitors: The German Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf Hitler.) In addition, local commanders had not been briefed on the importance of local Resistance units, and detailed handbooks about conditions in Belgium, although prepared and printed in advance, were not made available to Allied commanders on the spot. As to strategy, Beale claims that Dwight Eisenhower's directive to "enter the continent of Europe, and...undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces" was too broad for the circumstances in which the Allies found themselves after breaking out of Normandy. Because the goal seemed to be the heart of Germany, during the rush across France no one paid much attention to intermediate objectives such as opening the port of Antwerp. Regarding the Allied command structure, Beale places much of the blame for the episode squarely on the shoulders of Montgomery, partly for his prickly relationship with so many other officers and partly for failing to take advantage of opportunities in fluid and rapidly changing circumstances.

   When the command structure changed on 1 September, Montgomery was still in charge of the northern sector of the Allied armies. He was there, and he could make decisions to meet the changing circumstances. After the capture of Antwerp he could have ordered the exploitation north, the crossing of the Albert Canal and the advance to Woensdrecht. Only he can be blamed for the failure to act, and he had complete authority to do so.
   The change in command structure on 1 September, and the remote location of Eisenhower, were irrelevant to the Great Mistake. It was Montgomery who failed to grasp the opportunity.

   Quite different from the kinds of accounts of the campaign written by Moulton, Thompson, Whitaker, etc, Beale has instead practically performed a vivisection on all the salient elements of the "great mistake" committed at Antwerp. He makes especially good use of extracts from war diaries, after action reports, and unit histories, but in every case he comments extensively on those quotes rather then simply tossing them out. While his narrative sometimes wanders a bit (as when he brings Napoleon at Waterloo into the equation) and not everything he examines seems entirely worthy of his efforts, in sum this book proves entertaining and enlightening as well as unusual. A slightly offbeat but very interesting piece of work that should be enjoyed by many readers.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Sutton Publishing.
   Thanks to Sutton for providing this review copy.