ISBN: 0-7110-3095-2
Pages: 96

Acknowledgements; Further Reading; Introduction; photos; maps; diagrams

   In the film industry, the term "made-for-TV movie" usually implies low budget, second-tier cast, tired plot, and not enough time to do it properly. A similar phenomenon pervades the World War II publishing industry, where many editors attempt to boost sales by concocting an artificial series of books that can be cranked out in rapid, cookie-cutter fashion and appeal to the collecting instinct in book buyers. All too often that means an aspiring author gets the opportunity to come home from his day job, fire up word processing software, and paraphrase pages from earlier authors who have already worked exactly the same ground. Then the publisher slaps a catchy title on the package, adds a flashy cover, and pushes another increment of product into the distribution network with high hopes and heavy hype.
   Unfortunately, Pointe du Hoc—with its weak rehashing of old material inside a bright new cover—proves to be little more than the printed equivalent of a junky TV movie.
   The book covers formation and training of the Rangers (although almost half of that material is about British Commandos), planning for the assault, Ranger equipment, and German defenders and equipment. The assault itself comprises about thirty pages, of which photos take up most of the space.
   Although the back cover of the book notes the author served as editor of Soldier magazine, this volume supplies absolutely no evidence that Howard knows how to write. His clumsy prose is further hobbled by spotty copyediting. Apparently the editing process in this case meant something other than making the book readable, because too much of the book sounds like this:

   With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that only one fire service extension ladder could be used and in action, that must have seemed like a scene from an early black and white silent comedy movie. Had it not been so serious.
   . . .
   The scene re-created in The Longest Day film, showing the defenders doing their utmost to cut the ropes, gives a really graphic illustration of the problems for both sides.
   Fifteen men of Task Force A became casualties - two of them Lt. Kerchner's men, hit by enfilading (defenders firing along the lines of defence) machine gun fire. Feeling angry, the young officer picked up a dead Ranger's rifle in an effort to avenge his men - then realised his first task was to get to the top of the cliff.

   Howard resolves some of the problems with his weak prose by quoting extensively from Ambrose, Darby, Armed Forces in Action, and several other works. That approach does little to provide cohesiveness to the story.
   In addition, it's not always easy to rely on what Howard writes. For example, he describes General Lucien Truscott as an officer attached to Lord Louis Mountbatten's staff who went on command US 3rd Army after the war. For such a distinguished general, that consigns most of his WWII service—including command of 3rd Infantry Division, VI Corps, 15th Army, and 5th Army—to oblivion. More to the point, regarding the German guns at Pointe du Hoc which comprise the entire raison d'etre for the assault and Howard's writing, the book sometimes refers to them as 155mm and sometimes as 5-inch, which are not at all the same. Of course, the guns were not even emplaced when the Rangers made their assault, and that intelligence seems to have already been in Allied hands. Who knew the guns were not in place, and when did they know it? Given that the guns weren't in place, who was actually defending the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc and in what numbers? And, had the guns and their gunners been in position, would the assault have been completely suicidal? The book pays little heed to these kinds of questions.
   Furthermore, Howard never clarifies one of the key aspects of the mystery when the Rangers find and destroy a battery of howitzers parked in the woods near Pointe du Hoc. Were those guns an entirely different battery of field artillery that just happened to be in the area, or were they actually the guns that had been—or were going to be—emplaced in the concrete casemates? Were they even the right type of guns? Ample speculation exists elsewhere that the howitzers the Rangers destroyed in the woods had nothing to do with the concrete emplacements at Pointe du Hoc and would not have even fit into those mounts, but the author doesn't address any of those possibilities.
   So what does that leave us? It's a fairly handsome book with some interesting maps and photos, but—even though we're firmed convinced there's at least a small, specialist market for every book published—we can't recommend Pointe du Hoc to anyone except perhaps reenactors or those who salivate over the printed equivalent of made-for-TV movies. Whatever the truth about the guns, the Rangers performed an incredible feat of bravery to scale the cliffs, capture the ground, and hold out against German counterattacks. However, there are plenty of other, better books that tell the same story in a high quality, big budget, silver screen version.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Ian Allan or its US distributor, Casemate.
   Thanks to Casemate for providing this review copy.