ISBN: 0-9761034-4-3
Pages: 280

Forewords; photos; maps; color plates; Glossary and guide to abbreviations; Chapter Notes; Bibliography; Acknowledgements; Index

Appendices: OBs; Luftwaffe aircraft losses; Structure of the Luftwaffe; Structure of the VVS; Rank Equivalents; Highest Military Awards

   It has been a long and winding road to the third volume of Christer Bergstrom's Black Cross, Red Star series. The first two installments were published by Pacifica in 2000 and 2001 respectively, and both featured Andrey Mikhailov as co-author. After a hiatus of five years, the third volume has been released by a new publisher, without Mikhailov, and with two new co-authors teaming with Bergstrom.
   Volumes one and two met considerable critical acclaim and market success, including "Top Ten" selections by visitors to this site back in the days when we conducted annual voting to determine the most popular books of the year.
   After so many months waiting for the new book, we were anxious to have a look and see how it stacked up. In that regard, it's important first to keep in mind that no history of the air war on the Russian Front—not even a serious, multi-volume account such as Bergstrom's—will ever approach the level of detail found in books like Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook, Fighter Command War Diaries by John Foreman, Bomber Command Losses by W.R. Chorley, or works by Chris Shores such as 2nd Tactical Air Force. All those books and their ilk feature information that digs down to day-by-day, mission-by-mission, and practically pilot-by-pilot levels, including in some cases complete records of victories claimed and aircraft lost. That kind of air-weenie nirvana simply isn't available for either side in the Great Patriotic War.
   Instead, it's more realistic to compare BCRS to more-or-less similar approaches to air war on the Russian Front. For example, over the years some of the standard sources on that topic have been The German Air Force versus Russia series by Plocher, Red Phoenix by Hardesty, The German Air War in Russia by Muller, The Soviet Air Force in World War II by Wagner, etc. In every case, Bergstrom and his boys blow the competition out of the sky.
   How do they do it?
   With more of the same old BCRS approach. Given that the first two volumes were highly regarded award winners, that's a good thing. And, if anything, the new book contains more data, more detail, and more interesting stories.
   Volume three provides large doses of strategic/operational information about progress of the war in the air. As always, the authors balance their coverage of the Luftwaffe and the VVS, and as much as possible offer the perspective from both sides for all the operations and events. Here's an excerpt from the chapter on operations in the Caucasus:

   Fliegerkorps VIII indeed routed the Soviet aviation over Stalingrad, but only at the expense of reducing its forces in the Caucasus beyond what could be considered as acceptable. As a consequence of the concentration of Luftwaffe forces to the Stalingrad area, Fliegerkorps IV was no longer able to provide German Army Group A with the air support that was necessary to continue the offensive from the Terek River against Grozny and the Baku oil fields in southern Caucasus. On the other side, a large number of German Army documents from the Caucasus in this period underscore the important negative effect that Soviet air attacks had on Army Group A's ability to continue its advance.
   At the same time, the alleged Soviet numerical superiority in the air in the Caucasus in the fall of 1942 is a German misconception. Each side mustered between 200 and 250 operational aircraft in the Caucasus in September 1942; the Germans enjoyed a considerable superiority in the number of reconnaissance planes while the Soviets could field the largest number of bombers. The Soviets indeed possessed larger reserves than the Germans in the rear area, but on the other hand Luftflotte 4's Kampfgruppen that normally flew over Stalingrad could be rapidly deployed to the Caucasus, as they often were.
   Instead, a rational use of the limited Soviet aviation forces in the Caucasus is a key explanation to the German ground troops' impression of an overwhelming Soviet air superiority in the Caucasus starting at the end of August 1942. General-Mayor Konstantin Vershinin, commanding 4 VA in the Terek sector, managed to achieve miracles with his badly mauled aviation. 4 VA had taken heavy losses in the past months and could muster less than 150 combat planes on the Terek - Grozny front. But by sending worn-out units to rest and re-equip in the rear area and concentrating all aircraft to those units who had suffered least during the retreat in July and August, Vershinin could rebuild his 4 VA into an effective striking force during the latter half of August. By that time, he also received a handful of new units which were equipped with either old aircraft such as the 1-153 biplane, or new La-5 fighters. Large amounts of British and American military equipment also flooded into the USSR via Iran which had been occupied by the Allies in August 1941, under the Lend Lease agreement. Much of this arrived directly at the front in the Caucasus starting with Bostons for 219 BAD from August onward.
   Since Vershinin placed the emphasis of 4 VA's operations fully on tactical support, the German troops found themselves constantly bombed or machine gunned by all kinds of aircraft including medium bombers, ground-attack planes, fighter-bombers, fighters, and even old reconnaissance biplanes. This had an accumulated moral, if not always material, effect. And each night old biplane trainers turned into light bombers, tormented the Germans and deprived them of their sleep. Among the nocturnal harassment units active in this area was the all-women 588 NBAP, equipped with U-2s. The courage displayed by these women soon earned them the respectful nickname "night witches" on the German side.

   Bergstrom and his wingmen also dive into tactical matters.

   At 2200 hours on 23 October, VVS ChF's 5 GMTAP, 40 BAP, and 62 IAP struck the antiaircraft artillery and searchlights at the airfield and the railway station with nine Il-4s, two SBs, and two I-15bis. Hans Ellendt, who served as an Unteroffizier and pilot with II./JG 52 at Maykop, has a vivid memory of that night: "We were sitting and smoking cigarettes at our billeting, about two miles from the airfield, when we saw an R-5 glide past us with its engine shut down, and then it dropped fragmentation bombs. Soon another glided in, also dropping some fragmentation bombs at a safe distance."
   Apparently, Ellendt misidentified the rather unusual I-15bis biplanes for R-5 biplanes in the darkness. What Ellendt and his comrades saw next completely stunned them: "Then our searchlights were switched on, and in the middle of the searchlight beam we could see a huge aircraft. And out of this huge aircraft popped parachutes, a considerable amount of paratroopers."
   Covered by the attacking aircraft, a PS-84 and a TB-3 arrived, carrying 40 paratroopers commanded by Kapitan A. M. Desyatnikov. The TB-3 received a direct AAA hit in the fuel tank and crashed to the ground. Nevertheless, most paratroopers managed to jump.
   Hans Ellendt clearly remembers that the paratroopers wreaked havoc on II. /JG 52 before withdrawing. According to the official German report, only one of II./JG 52's Bf 109s and two Ju 52s were destroyed, after which a swift counteraction by German motorcyclist troops forced the Soviet commando force to retreat. But according to Ellendt, the Soviet paratroopers had run along the nicely parked Bf 109s, shooting them up or heaving hand grenades into their open cockpits in a quick and skillfully conducted raid. In this manner, they destroyed at least a dozen Bf 109s. Fortunately for the Germans, all of II./JG 52's pilots escaped the fury of the attack, since they were billeted far from the airfield.
   Soviet night bombers were even more successful during their strike against Hauptmann Rudolf Henne's II./KG 51 Edelweiss at Armavir Airdrome on the night of 25/26 October. Historian Wolfgang Dierich wrote:
   "The flames spread rapidly and caught fuelled and bomb laden aircraft. Since the airfield had several units on it having a total of more than 100 Ju 88 and He Ills, there was no lack of combustible material. Only one of the II. Gruppe aircraft survived without damage. The unit was hastily withdrawn to Bagerovo on the Kerch Peninsula to acquire more aircraft."
   Returning from an inspection tour to the Terek front, Generaloberst von Richthofen found that Soviet bombers had entirely burned down his sleeping quarters in Baksan, destroying five of his six staff liaison Fi 156 Storchs on the field.
   But the Soviets definitely took the heaviest numerical punishment in the aerial encounters. On 25 October, Leutnant Walter Krupinski of 6./JG 52 was rammed by an I-16 shortly after the German ace had achieved his 53rd victory. Krupinski survived whereas his opponent, 88 IAP'S Mladshiy Leytenant Pavel Lazyuka was killed in the ramming. Four days later Krupinski was awarded with the Knight's Cross, while Lazyuka was awarded with the Order of the Red Banner posthumously. 131 IAP'S Kapitan Dmitriy Sigov had increased his score to fifteen victories (nine personal and six shared) when his La-5 was attacked from above by Hauptmann Siegfried Simsch and Unteroffizier Kortenhaus, both of 5./JG 52 during Sigov's landing approach at his own airbase on 26 October. Sigov's aircraft was set ablaze and the pilot was killed. On 29 October, 236 IAD'S Podpolkovnik Dmitriy Kalarash, an ace credited with eleven individual and six shared victories on 262 combat missions, was killed in combat with Bf 109s near Goytkh in the Tuapse sector. During the air fighting in that sector on 29 October, II./JG 52, claimed ten Soviet fighters shot down which included the Gruppe's 1,000th victory. In addition, Croatian pilots of 15./JG 52, Natporucnik Ljudevit Bencetic and Zastavnik Slavko Boskic claimed one LaGG-3 apiece. On the last day of the month, Oberfeldwebel Josef Zwernemann of 7./JG 52 reached his 100-victory mark by knocking down a LaGG-3 in the Terek sector.
   5 VA claimed over 50 German aircraft shot down through October 1942, more than four times the Luftwaffe's actual combat losses in 5 VA's operational area. Meanwhile, 217 IAD alone registered fifteen LaGG-3s and La-5s lost in air combat. JG 52 recorded five aircraft shot down in air combat over the Caucasus through October 1942.

   Despite the title of volume three, this kind of blending of strategic, operational, tactical, and in-the-cockpit information covers the entire front for the second half of 1942.

• Situation in the spring
• Operation Blau
• Arctic front
• Leningrad front
• Advance to Stalingrad
• The Caucasus
• Air operations against Arctic convoys
• Battle of Stalingrad

   The last part of the book, "Conclusions," proves especially strong. Bergstrom reviews the victory claims for each side and compares the numbers to actual losses. As might be expected, all fighter pilots over-claimed. Even so, the figures make it clear that the Soviets suffered staggering losses in the air in 1942, far more than the Luftwaffe was losing. Not only that, but a relatively small number of German fighter experts were, even allowing for over-claiming, racking up incredible numbers of victories. Nevertheless, in the second half of 1942 the Soviets were gradually beginning to assemble more of their own air aces—although the victories they accumulated couldn't compare to the leading German aces—and, perhaps more importantly, massed formations of Shturmoviks began to make themselves felt, despite heavy losses. Among other topics in the last chapter, the authors also dissect what might have happened had the Luftwaffe attempted to conduct true strategic bombing operations against Soviet production centers and other facilities in the deep rear. Due to a variety of problems, they conclude such an offensive could not have been effective.
   Throughout the book, the authors include color profiles of aircraft, excellent OBs, tables of losses, and other supporting materials. The text is fully footnooted and provides a very strong bibliography. To top it all off, the physical production measures up to the highest standards of Eagle Editions
   As with the first two volumes, it should be mentioned that the text contains a few quirks and idiosyncracies, sometimes reading as though it might not be written in the author's first language (which seems to be the case), and it occasionally yields a malapropism. While nothing really prevents comprehension, reading speed might be slightly impaired.
   Despite that minor caveat, Bergstrom, Dikov, and Antipov have performed a commendable job of producing an engaging, highly informative account of the air war on the Russian front. The series continues to lead the way in that regard, and Everything for Stalingrad can be highly recommended as one of the best books of the year.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Eagle Editions.
   Thanks to Eagle Editions for providing this review copy.