Glantz, David M. and Harold S. Orenstein. (Translators and editors) Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. Carlisle, PA: Self-published by David M. Glantz, 1997.

No ISBN
363 pages

Editor's Foreword; Foreword; maps; tables; charts; diagrams.

Appendices: List of abbreviations; Key Soviet and German command personnel

Glantz, David M. Atlas of the Battle of Kursk. Carlisle, PA: Self-published by David M. Glantz, 1997.

No ISBN
74 pages

Introduction.

Colonel David Glantz is renowned among World War II historians in general and Russian Front enthusiasts in particular for the many books he has written and edited on the Russo-German war. He is almost certainly the foremost expert writing in the English language today on that subject. For all the work he has done to unearth and disseminate Russian/Soviet archival material, some would call him a national treasure.

In addition to his "mainstream" titles from University Press of Kansas and Frank Cass, Glantz recently began work on a series of self-published volumes designed explicitly for a rather narrow market segment. For his more general audience, these are almost certainly overkill. For serious military specialists, academic researchers, wargame designers and the like, these are priceless gems.

The first of the gems is the translated and annotated Soviet report on the Battle of Kursk.

   Prepared by the Red Army General Staff in 1944, it is a classified staff study of the battle, compiled on the basis of combat reports and other secret and top secret archival materials. It is an imminently [sic] practical document written to educate the Red Army in the intricacies of modern mobile warfare. Its didactic purpose underlays its often shocking candor and honesty.

The volume contains ten main chapters plus an eleventh Glantz has added from another Soviet staff study:

1. The fundamentals of the organization of the Kursk bridgehead defense
2. Preparation of the Kursk bridgehead defense
3. Brief characteristics of German operations in the July operation
4. The defensive battle for the Kursk bridgehead
5. Troop control during the defensive battle in the Kursk bridgehead
6. Protecting junctions in the defense
7. Artillery support of the Kursk bridgehead defense
8. Tank forces in the defense of the Kursk bridgehead
9. Air operations in the Battle of Kursk
10. Engineer support of the defensive operation
11. The maneuver of mobile antitank reserves in a defensive operation

Each chapter goes into considerable detail regarding what was done to prepare for and conduct the battle, with an emphasis on "what went right" and how the lessons of Kursk might be applied to conducting further successful operations against the German army. In particular, the staff study provides much information on the echeloning of defensive forces and positions at every level of command, the thickening of forces at such key positions as the shoulders of the salient, the tactical emplacement and employment of mines, barbed wire, and other obstacles, and the critical importance of massing antitank guns and artillery.

With this kind of material the study succeeds as a factual, straight-forward account and primer equally useful to Soviet general officers during the Great Patriotic War and researchers more than fifty years after the event. With material describing the actual clash of arms, some of the study appears -- intentionally or otherwise -- less reliable.

   The battle for Prokhorovka reached its culminating point on 12 July (see map 11). The enemy threw more than 600 tanks (up to four panzer divisions and one infantry division) against it from the west. Furthermore, all of the forces of the III Panzer Corps, three panzer divisions, were flung from the Novo-Oskochnoe region into the attack against Prokhorovka. On our side, the 5th Guards Tank Army took part in the battles for Prokhorovka.
   In the immediate vicinity of Prokhorovka, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army collided with the main German grouping consisting of the three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps and the 17th Panzer Division. The total number of tanks from both sides reached 1,200 - 1,300.
   As a result of the 5th Guards Tank Army's meeting engagement, the main German grouping advancing against Prokhorovka from the west suffered enormous losses, and, by the evening of 12 July, it was forced to assume the defense, having abandoned further attempts to resume active operations. The 5th Guards Tank Army also suffered comparable losses. Around 800 damaged and burned tanks of various makes and systems remained on the battlefield.

Fortunately, Glantz has annotated the text with explanatory footnotes and offers some cautionary advice in his Foreword.

   The volume, however, is not without fault and error. Either intentionally or coincidentally, while opening new horizons on the famous battle, the work also perpetuates myths. It does so by over-glorifying the scale of the Red Army's victory and by magnifying the grandeur of its accomplishments at Kursk. For example, long before the postwar histories did so, it overstates the scope and impact of the tank battle at Prokhorovka. In particular, like other classified studies and postwar works, it overestimates the strength of the Germans and understates or simply neglects the ultimate terrible cost of the victory. Therefore, while of immense value, the work must be weighed accordingly.

(See also Dunn's Kursk and Nipe's Decision in the Ukraine.)

The accompanying map volume, sold separately, contains a brief introduction and an assortment of 11"x17" maps charting the course of the battle. The maps come from different sources (both Soviet and German) and vary in quality and legibility. (Some have printed unit IDs, others handwritten.) In a few cases the reproduction process has not been kind to the material. In sum its an imposing if somewhat uneven compendium.

The maps are all black and white, and color is the one element which could have most improved the set. As Glantz states in his introduction, though, color reproduction would have been prohibitively expensive.

Which brings us to the final point. While Colonel Glantz has a wealth of successful military histories to his credit, his fine archival work has unearthed valuable material not likely to see the light of day if left to mainstream publishers or even specialty houses. For example, Brassey's in the 1980s published a pair of these Soviet General Staff studies (Battle for Stalingrad, edited by Rotundo, and Battle for Moscow, edited by Parrish) in hardcover, but was not able to generate sufficient interest and sales to extend the series. Similarly, even a specialty house with the reputation of Frank Cass seems to have decided against bringing the Kursk volume to print.

To his credit -- and our delight -- Glantz has undertaken the task of self-publishing these highly specialized volumes. The downside of this otherwise commendable effort is that the relatively minuscule number of copies he expects to sell has imposed production limitations to the extent that it is necessary to print these as photocopied desktop publications. Some small publishers would attempt to camouflage their limited production budgets and expertise with cheesy graphics and cut-rate "glitter". Glantz has rightly eschewed such ersatz hype in favor of unadorned, workmanlike volumes. They look like copy shop print jobs because they are copy shop print jobs and there's no reason to hide it, because that in no way detracts from the information being delivered. Avoiding hard covers and dust jackets and extra colors and bad artwork allows him to focus on the content and keep the prices to an absolute minimum.

And no, the prices aren't cheap. But anyone who has ever priced printing, assembly, and binding at a local copy shop for a 300-page tome knows why. Given his costs, Glantz will be lucky to recoup pennies per hour for the time he's spent translating and editing, let alone packing and shipping. "It may well be that this entire process is uneconomical, given the fact that I have severely curtailed my other work, including commercial publication. However, only time will tell, and at the end of this year I will review the entire project to see if it is economical enough to continue."

While it's not possible to whole-heartedly recommend these volumes to more than the audience for which they are intended, it is possible to hope that enough specialists will discover and acquire them to keep the project rolling. After all, even national treasures need to eat.

Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Col. Glantz.

Thanks to David Glantz for providing this review copy.