ISBN 0-89141-666-8
225 pages

Preface; Acknowledgments; tables; charts; photos; maps; Abbreviations and File Numbers; Notes; Bibliographical Essay; Index.

Appendices: Cumulative Personnel-Induced Training Time Losses; The Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: Colonel Dupuy Reconsidered

   The experience of the 88th Infantry Division, the first of the draftee divisions into combat in World War II, illustrates the means whereby draftees could, in fact, be quickly and efficiently converted into combat-ready units.... The 88th Infantry Division would mobilize, organize, train, and fight without unduly militarizing the soldiers from which it was made—a genuinely American response to the crisis of war.

   In the all-draftee division, 197 cadre officers came from the Regular Army and 12 percent of its manpower came from its "parent" division. The 88th's parent was the 9th Infantry Division, and the new division was fortunate. Instead of receiving rejects (an all too familiar problem), the 88th received a fair and equitable selection of talent—partly because of the long-time friendship of the two division COs and partly because the 88th's cadre officers carefully monitored the process. The remainder of the division was made up of raw draftees.
   Brown conducts a fascinating investigation of how the Army General Classification Test (for "raw" intelligence) affected distribution of those draftees, diverted high-scoring men into special programs (such as detachment to college), and caused considerable disruption of training by routinely culling the brightest individuals from their units. (Brown also notes as an aside how US airborne forces attracted unusually high numbers of low-scoring soldiers.) The 88th by sheer chance escaped the worst of these disruptive personnel problems.
   Likewise, the 88th avoided the worst effects of "stripping" (detaching trained men to serve as replacements in divisions shipping overseas). Again, this was just a lucky circumstance of the time period in which it was training.
   In terms of supply, Draftee Division considers in turn the 88th's experience with rations, clothing and personal equipment, table-of-organization equipment, petroleum products, and ammunition during its months at Camp Gruber. The conclusion? Although there were a few shortages, certainly none sufficed to compromise the division's training. Since September 1939 the nation's gradually increasing defense expenditures and preparations had brought the Army's logistical readiness to a higher state than generally realized. Surprisingly, the biggest problem stemmed from lack of trained mechanics.

   Of all the logistical problems faced by the new division, inadequate automobile maintenance was the most dangerous and required the most time, energy, and adjustment to resolve. The 88th fared relatively well, for all its deficiencies. In other divisions maintenance deficiencies proved even more severe.

   Brown reviews the rigorous, highly centralized training program undertaken by the 88th and every other new division. Although utilizing manuals and training films to an unprecedented degree, the blocks of basic training (17 weeks), unit training (13 weeks), combined arms training (14 weeks), and maneuvers (8 weeks) presented a tough physical and mental challenge. Formal basic training began on 3 August 1942. The 88th departed for maneuvers in Louisiana on 13 June 1943. There it performed so well it leapfrogged past other units in the "readiness" standings and became the first of the draftee divisions to move overseas.
   Thus, the division managed to go from activation to embarkation in 16 months. The only unit to beat that record was the 11th Airborne—which formed around a cadre taken from the 88th. In sum, the 88th activated, trained, and "graduated" more quickly and efficiently than most divisions. This Brown attributes partly to the abilities of the commander and partly to sheer luck and timing which allowed the unit to avoid the kinds of personnel disruptions that afflicted most other divisions.
   In the final chapter before the Blue Devils enter combat, Brown describes the seven months in which the division cycled through preparations for overseas movement, moved to Fort Patrick Henry in Virginia and then across the Atlantic, and arrived in Africa. By 27 December 1943 the entire division, shipped in multiple waves, had assembled there. By that time the division, which had performed so well in maneuvers, had clearly lost its edge due to personnel turnover and the long periods of preparation and transportation without opportunity for further training. General Sloan imposed weeks of intensive exercises outside Oran to regain the lost sharpness. "Unlike many other divisions, the 88th debarked into the combat zone within two weeks of intensive retraining." During the first three weeks of February the division sailed to Italy. There it was only due to Sloan's personal intervention with General Mark Clark that the division was not broken up as piecemeal reinforcements to other units already at the front. Thus on 27 February 1944 the Blue Devils began moving into the line and relieving British 5th Infantry Division in the Minturo sector.
   The second half of the book begins with the division in a static position facing the German Gustav Line. Brown explains how the unit gradually acclimated to the front; in March and April in particular they put their Camp Gruber patrol training to use and, now that they were actually in contact with the enemy, learned many new lessons. Although this was a period of relative inactivity, life at the front was not always quiet and boring.

   A record for close calls seems to have been set by Pfc. Marvin Blake. Within fifteen minutes he was knocked to the ground by an artillery shell, had his rifle shot out of his hands by a sniper, lost his helmet to a machine gun bullet, and had the seat of his pants set ablaze by a phosphorous mortar round.

   By the end of the "quiet" month of March, the division had suffered over 350 casualties. Non-combat casualties sent about 700 more men to the hospital. To replace losses, the 88th relied on individual soldiers funnelled through to them, green rookies joining unfamiliar faces right at the front. Brown singles out this replacement system as the biggest flaw in American personnel policies and combat practices during World War II.
   On 15 April the division, less its artillery battalions, rotated out of the line for "R, R, and R"—rest, recreation, and retraining. Among other exercises, the 760th Tank Battalion arrived to provide training with armored support. Brown considers this kind of relief and retraining to have been critical to the combat success of American divisions. When the Blue Devils rotated back into the line during the first week of May, they were ready to play their role in the upcoming Allied offensive. They had trained in theater after arriving from the States; they had been "baptized" in a quiet sector for six weeks; and they had withdrawn from the line for rest and further training before experiencing serious combat. Not every American division on every front was so fortunate.
   In May, when Operation Diadem was launched, the 88th attacked in its sector just to the west of the main thrust by the French corps. Brown does an excellent job of describing the minuet of squads, platoons, companies, and battalions attacking with artillery and armor support, gradually winkling German defenders from their prepared positions. In addition to the tactical details of battle, Brown, as always, analyzes the performance and its consequences.

   What, then, can one conclude from the first three days of the 88th's first big offensive? In the strictest sense, the draftees fulfilled the promise of their training. What they had trained well to do, they did well. Techniques they had mastered through practicing time and time again in training or on maneuvers remained mastered in actual combat. Unfortunately, the converse was also true. One could have predicted the strengths of the 88th by analyzing its training program; one also could have predicted its weaknesses by reflecting on that program's omissions.

   Following three days of attritional struggle, the Blue Devils had ejected the German defenders from their positions. For the next two weeks they pursued the retreating enemy northward, cutting off detachments and piercing defense lines before they were fully manned. This was exactly the sort of fluid warfare for which they had been trained, and Brown rates their performance very highly. Pinched out of the line by the headlong Allied advance, the 88th then spent three days mopping up the ground previously gained. Sloan's division then re-entered the race for Rome and claims (along with several other outfits!) to have been the first Allied unit to penetrate into the Eternal City.

   With the capture of Rome, the 88th came of age. It would fight as well in other battles—on the Arno, in the Apennines, along the Po, and through the Alps. It would fight, take losses, lose its edge, rest, retrain, and fight again in a cycle that continued until the end of the war. All of these later battles and cycles were of great importance. It was the events of May and June, however, that were particularly held by the nation's leadership, the War Department, the newspapers, and the draftees themselves to have proved the mettle of the draftee division. The toughness of the 88th Infantry Division was no longer a question.

   The last chapter of the book briefly surveys the record of the Blue Devils in the months after Diadem and Rome, but in considerably less detail. Brown also devotes several pages to comparing the records of the draftee divisions based on their training cycles and "gentle" insertion into battle. Not surprisingly, those units unable to retrain after arrival in theater and without a period of acclimation on a quiet front did not perform nearly as well. The author also includes an interesting appendix in which he discusses some of the flaws in Colonel Trevor Dupuy's comparison of Allied and German divisions.
   This is a fine, systematic approach to understanding not only the 88th Infantry Division, but the entire process by which the United States produced "assembly line" divisions in World War II. Recommended.
   Originally published by the University Press of Kentucky, this new softcover edition is available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Presidio Press.
   Thanks to Presidio for providing this review copy.