

Legal Strategies to Revoke the Corporate Charter
by Thomas Linzey
In accordance with the strict legislative control exercised
over corporations who sought the privilege of incorporation and following
in the path of centuries of English commonlaw (case made law), the states
codified (made into written law) the power to revoke the charters of corporations
who "misused" or "abused" their charter powers. The
English foundation for these statutes can be traced to the theory of quo
warranto, which literally means that the state is asking the corporation,
"By which grant of right do you exercise the powers you are exercising?"
The extensive history of quo warranto theory to revoke charters adds credence
to its contemporary use.
In addition to this common-law theory, the states codified the law, and
in most states, granted the power to revoke the corporation's charter for
misuse or abuse to the Attorney General of the state. Forty-nine states
have adopted quo warranto statutes. Some states offer even stronger protection,
allowing for revocation of corporate charters in specific situations, such
as when the corporation has engaged in a conspiracy (Washington) or when
the corporation has engaged in bid-rigging or anti-trust activities (Pennsylvania).
In addition, state courts addressing the issue of corporate charter revocation
in cases from 1900-1950 uniformly have held that a legislative repeal of
the quo warranto statute would not have the effect of extinguishing the
charter revocation remedy. Courts have stated that the common-law theory
of quo warranto exists independently of the state statute. In effect, this
prevents a backlash from the state legislature (who would seek to repeal
the statute) if the corporate charter revocation remedy is invoked. This
long common-law history is similar to that found in the tort areas of nuisance,
battery, arson, murder, etc. These crimes existed long before the advent
of state statutes that defined the crimes. Even if the statutes were taken
"off the books" or repealed, a cause of action would remain because
these crimes are so thoroughly anchored in centuries of case law as it has
developed from English origins.
The Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF) is currently researching
the opportunities presented by the existence of these quo waranto statutes.
Specifically, CELDF has explored the possibility of revoking CSX Transportation's
charter in West Virginia, WMX Technologies' charter in Delaware, Weyerhauser
Corporation's charter in Washington, and Union Carbide's charter in New
York. The WMX Technologies' case is furthest along in the process. CELDF
has apprised the Attorney General of Delaware of the existence of the corporate
charter revocation statute and has sent him a communication that details
the consistent history of environmental statutory and anti-trust violations
that have been committed by WMX and its subsidiaries. CELDF has also located
potential plaintiffs in Delaware that would be willing to participate in
a lawsuit to revoke WMX's charter.
One of the problems is that the quo warranto statutes give only the Attorney
General the power to bring a corporate charter revocation action. Many times,
the state statute gives the Attorney General the discretion to bring such
an action. The language is usually couched as "the Attorney General
may" initiate proceedings to revoke the corporation's charter. This
"may" is very difficult for citizens to enforce because it grants
broad discretion to the Attorney General that the courts are reluctant to
enforce. To attempt to force the A.G. to take action in this situation is
a losing proposition unless a massive citizen movement can be launched that
convinces him/her that his/her political future rests upon his/her decision
to take action against the corporation.
In legal terms, to force the A.G. to revoke a charter under this "may"
language, the citizen lawyer would be forced to jump two hurdles. First,
the courts have been leery of forcing the A.G. to prosecute; in other words,
they are hesitant to impose their will on an area called "prosecutorial
discretion." The second hurdle is the standard that the court would
impose even if they did decide to review the A.G.'s decision not to bring
charter revocation proceedings. The citizen lawyer would have to prove that
the decision not to bring a revocation suit was "arbitrary and capricious."
This standard of review is the standard used in cases in which the court
has been asked to review an agency decision. This standard is tough to prove
in most situations because the courts will usually uphold a decision by
the Attorney General as long as it is "rational" and supported
by some evidence.
That's the bad news. The majority of states have the "may" discretionary
language lodged in their quo warranto statutes. The good news, ironically,
is that Delaware, that king of corporate moguls, has the strongest quo warranto
statute of any state that the CELDF has researched. Under Delaware law,
the Attorney General "shall" bring a charter revocation suit if
requested to do so by a "proper party." The statute, therefore,
is not discretionary, but mandatory. This area of the law offers a new opportunity-a
lawsuit that requires the issuance by the court of a writ of mandamus-this
type of law is used to force state employees who have refused to take a
non-discretionary action. CELDF believes that this gives citizens the necessary
opening to force the Attorney General to bring a corporate charter revocation
lawsuit against a corporation that has "misused" or "abused"
its charter powers. Courts are much more willing to force the Attorney General
to act in a "shall" situation than a "may" situation,
because the legislature has specifically spoken about the activities that
they wish the A.G. to pursue.
How does a corporation "misuse" or "abuse" its charter
powers? One needs to look to prior case law to discover what activities
fall into this category. Obviously, illegal activity falls outside of any
charter powers that could be granted by the state. In Delaware law, as with
many other states, corporate charter revocations were commonplace until
around 1950. The drop-off of charter revocation actions can be blamed on
the rise of the "regulatory state," in which regulation in the
corporate area was passed to administrative state agencies established for
these purposes. These revocation cases have defined "misuse" and
"abuse" as a consistent history of statutory violations that caused
public harms. CELDF believes that many of the largest U.S. corporations,
including WMX Technologies Corporation, Weyerhauser Corporation, Monsanto
Corporation, Union Carbide Corporation, and CSX Transportation Corporation
fall into those categories of companies that have misused and abused their
charter powers.
This brings us to the current situation. CELDF has drafted a fourteen-page
letter that delineates the past fifteen years of WMX violations and outlines
Delaware case law that would support an action to revoke a corporate charter.
This is the second letter that has been drafted to the Attorney General
of Delaware. The first was sent directly from CELDF, but the second will
be sent from a "proper party"-an environmental organization headquartered
in Delaware. This will set into motion the process by which citizens will
begin to regain control of these corporate monoliths that have been allowed
to grow into immense, bloated shapes.
The reason for the letter? A legal doctrine called exhaustion of administrative
remedies, demands that all avenues for action be explored by the plaintiff
prior to the bringing of a lawsuit to force this type of action. A span
of time will be granted to the State to allow them to initiate charter revocation
proceedings. If they fail to initiate the proceedings, then CELDF will file
suit to force the action on the part of the Attorney General. If we are
successful in this action-forcing mechanism, then CELDF will file as an
"intervenor" to the litigation, which means that we could stand
in the shoes of a co-plaintiff during the revocation proceedings. We would
take this action to ensure that the Attorney General would not settle the
lawsuit without approval or input from us. As an intervenor, we could continue
to litigate the case even if the Attorney General bows out.
It is our hope that injunctive relief would be granted by the court which
would freeze the assets of the corporation during litigation and prevent
the corporation from re-chartering in the event that it is dissolved. These
actions are essential to the revocation lawsuit because without them, we
have done nothing except to force the corporation to transfer their assets
into other holding corporations.
That is the plan on the legal front. What is needed in conjunction with
legal action, is a movement that convinces the judiciary, the legislature
and the politicians that a "re-thinking" of the corporate form
needs to take place and that citizens need to regain their sovereignty over
these artificial beasts. It is our hope that others begin "Rethinking
Corporations," as they have in five other states. It is essential that
others accept this challenge and begin working together to formulate a new
future in which citizen sovereignty serves as a cornerstone, because these
concepts are part of every battle, whether an environmental organization
is fighting against wellhead contamination, highway construction, landfill
liner leakage, hazardous waste incinerators, cogeneration plants, or (for)
workers' issues. It is this solidarity that offers the greatest hope-as
persons of differing causes join together for this great adventure.
-excerpted from the Mendocino Environmental Newsletter, Summer 1995. Thomas
Linzey is CEO of The Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund. For further
information, contact CELDF at 2244 Lindsay Lot Rd., Shippensburg, PA 17257,
(717) 530-0931.
MAY 2, 1996 CELDF UPDATE
CELDF received a grant from the Fund for Wild Nature to pursue a corporate
charter revocation legal action against Waste Management. CELDF located
several environmental activists to serve as plaintiffs and traveled to that
state to speak with them. They eventually declined, citing the legal strategy
as "too radical" and were afraid that the case would cause a backlash
that could make situations worse.
CELDF then approached a small waste-hauler in Delaware who was already involved
in a suit against WMX for a breach of contract. This company eventually
turned us down also as a plaintiff, and were afraid that if the strategy
was successful against WMX, that it could then be used against them. CELDF
then began to concentrate on bringing a charter revocation action within
Pennsylvania. WMX is the parent corporation to the company that has been
awarded a contract to pursue the citing of a low level radioactive waste
dump in Pennsylvania. CELDF has already sued the state over the LLRW statute,
and is two weeks away from updating the WMX compliance history to allow
us to mail a letter demanding revocation to the Pennsylvania Attorney General.
Two months after these letters are sent, CELDF intends to file in Commonwealth
Court to revoke WMX's "certificate to do business" that was granted
to them to do business here in Pennsylvania.