Article 7 of 89

Subject:      Re: Fundamentals
From:         Sam Dodsworth <sam@aristos.demon.co.uk>
Date:         1997/02/18
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In article <01bc1d3d$df730940$LocalHost@m-586>, Russel Trojan
<metanoi1@ix.netcom.com> writes
>
>
>Joshua W. Burton <jburton@nwu.edu> wrote in article
><5eat2t$h7f@news.acns.nwu.edu>...
>> 
>> As several less casual observers in this group have noted, this is the
>> point that, while perhaps obvious to Lewis, is false.  The naturalistic
>> world that science hypothesizes is almost never deterministic in the
>> sense you and Lewis are looking for, even in the unrealistic limit of
>> maximal knowledge of initial conditions.
>> 
>The question at this point then is why not?  Is it not reasonable to expect
>that everything is the result of pure cause and effect if we exclude the
>possibility of a supernatural that might intervene every now and then?

        Reasonable is not the same thing as true. The best you can do
from this position is to demonstrate that non-Supernaturalist positions
are "unreasonable" - as long as we abide by your idea of what is and is
not "reasonable". 

>  Is
>not empirical science built on the assumption that all of nature follows
>predictable and eventually identifiable rules?  

        A rule can be predictable and identifiable without being
deterministic. What if we have a law that says "there are only two
possible outcomes in this situation, and there is an equal chance that
either will occur"? Or (and this is something that I think Lewis missed)
a law (like the Conservation of Energy) that doesn't define a cause-and-
effect relationship?


>My limited understanding
>tells me that if we take away the aspect of predictability, we eventually
>undermine all empirical science.  This conclusion seem inevitable
>regardless of what we observe or whether or not we ever identify all the
>natural laws.  You just cannot have empirical knowledge if you eliminate
>predictable cause and effect. And if you eliminate cause and effect in one
>area, what keeps it valid in any other area?
>
        We can have what seems to be empirical knowledge, but we cannot
know if it is true - but this is the same problem that leads us
inevitably to solipsim. If we rely on our senses for knowledge of the
world, and if our senses can sometimes be decieved, then we have no way
to verify that what we know about the world is true. This applies as
much to most Supernaturalist wordviews as to Naturalism.

Sam Dodsworth (sam@aristos.demon.co.uk)
"I think there should be more sex and violence on television, not less. 
 Both are powerful catalysts of social change, at a time when change is
 desperately needed."
                        -J.G. Ballard