ISBN 1-55587-885-7
295 pages

Prologue; maps; tables; Notes; Bibliography; Index

   In many ways this book resembles parts of Beyond the Beachhead by Joe Balkoski, The GI Offensive in Europe by Peter Mansoor, and Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell Weigley, but James Carafano focuses specifically on Operation Cobra and brings his own perspective and critical opinions to bear on the American method of making war.
   Carafano begins his book with the story of the risky carpet bombing attack which preceded Cobra and with harrowing descriptions of the bombs falling short among American troops waiting to launch the assault. The author then backtracks to explain what led the Allies, and Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's American First Army in particular, into Operation Cobra, taking in turn the strategic, operational, and tactical setting. Carafano briefly rehashes the debate about Montgomery's intentions and/or failures at Caen, ultimately concluding "No one has found a historical 'smoking gun' to resolve the debate to everyone's satisfaction, but the balance of historical argument seems to weigh against Montgomery."
   The opening chapter also offers a nod toward the German situation, including the controversy between advocates of a mobile defense in reserve behind the beaches as opposed to massing German firepower at the edge of the water. At the tactical level he reviews German defensive doctrine and American techniques for dealing with the terrain and the defenders. The Yanks, according to Carafano, were not fully prepared for the situation in which they found themselves, and he is not shy about assigning responsibility for that failure.

   General Bradley also knew from intelligence reports and terrain analysis the nature of the ground beyond the beachhead. Determining how the ground could be used to influence tactical engagements took no imagination; in fact, some of the training grounds used in Great Britain had similar features. If Bradley underestimated the capability of the Germans' use of the Norman terrain or discounted the threat because he hoped U.S. troops would be beyond the hedgerows in a matter of days, he had only himself to blame. The fact was that the operational requirements of the campaign had changed and U.S. forces were slow to respond.

   Chapter two explains the organization, TOE, doctrine, training, replacement system, abilities, and limitations of American forces in combat on the European continent in 1944. Again, while Carafano always adds his own thoughtful contributions, there are many echoes of Balkoski and Mansoor and Michael Doubler's Closing with the Enemy, including a reminder about the fundamental problem of firepower at the squad level.

   For squad firepower U.S. troops relied on the Browning automatic rifle (BAR), a weapon that was in essence an infantry heavy rifle. Like the MG42 the BAR was reliable and durable, and it even weighed four pounds less than the German machine gun. To increase their firepower infantry squads usually found a way to get a second BAR, and the practice became so common that the army eventually authorized each squad two weapons. Even with two BARs, however, the U.S. infantry squad could not match the German firepower, since the MG42 had a greater effective range and twice the BAR's rate of fire. In fact, the MG42 alone could almost match the rate of fire of every weapon in a U.S. infantry squad shooting at once.

   This review of firepower and doctrine goes on to carefully examine just how the American infantry was operating on the ground. While praising the ability of the Yanks to learn and improve—much like Mansoor in The GI Offensive in Europe and Doubler in Closing with the Enemy—Carafano points out some problems with Doubler's interpretations of American combat skills. In the final reckoning, he finds that the American army, despite its shortcomings, had by July marshalled its strengths and advantages and that its men were for the most part ready for their tasks. This section also includes some interesting material on U.S. First Army preparations for gas warfare.
   Carafano also offers much telling information about German planning and the relative balance of forces. "The whole force [General Hausser's German Seventh Army facing Bradley's army] totaled fewer than 35,000 men, equal to little more than two full-strength U.S. divisions and less than one-fifth of the forces available to General Bradley." This comparison of manpower is an important point not often made in accounts lauding the American success in Cobra.
   Next, Carafano studies Omar Bradley and his role in planning and shaping Operation Cobra with extensive material on Intelligence in general and Ultra in particular. Like Weigley, Carafano also profiles the leading personalities among the American leaders and investigates how they interacted during formulation of the plan. Finally, Carafano explains how Major General Joseph "Lightning Joe" Collins helped mold the plan, with the author taking issue with analysts such as Weigley and Martin Blumenson who give Collins considerable credit for the final version of the plan.
   The following chapter discusses the manner in which Bradley massed firepower for the operation, covering both airpower and artillery.

   Of the two instruments for delivering a barrage of high explosives, U.S. artillery was given the supporting role. Normally for an offensive the U.S. Army allocated each corps its own slice of artillery, but Cobra was different. Bradley stripped the corps of most of their supporting guns and allocated the lion's share of the First Army's artillery (twenty-three battalions) to the VII Corps (this was in addition to the twenty-two battalions already in the divisions). Support for the VII Corps's attack totaled over 550 artillery pieces, not counting additional fire from other corps. In addition, Bradley assigned to the VII Corps six battalions of tank destroyers, not for antitank defense, but to further supplement artillery fire....
   The mass of artillery, though impressive, was not enough to ensure Cobra's firepower punch for the simple reason that there was not enough ammunition. It would have required more than a million and a half rounds—equal to what was expended in the 10-day preparation for the Battle of the Somme during World War I—to saturate the breakthrough point. The difficulties in supplying ammunition and the high rate of consumption precluded the Americans from building up anywhere near that volume of ammunition. Even if U.S. forces had had the thousands of tons of ammunition they needed, it would have taken days for the artillery to fire it all. The preparatory artillery bombardment for Cobra would have to be delivered in a few hours to achieve the quick, powerful strike General Bradley desired, but it was physically impossible.

   Thus, more than artillery, Carafano examines the nature of airpower and the evolution of Bradley's plan for carpet bombing. The author goes into considerable detail about the planning for air support, culminating in descriptions of the errant bombing that disrupted the assault troops and caused numerous casualties, including the death of Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair (whose story is told more fully here than in most other accounts). Carafano in this case is not reluctant to criticize Bradley and assign him much of the responsibility for the controversial bombing. The author goes even further to declare the "parallel" approach by the bombers, as requested by Bradley, would not have been much safer. It's worth quoting some of this material extensively:

   Although the seeds of disaster were sown by the lack of clear understanding between the ground and air commanders over the direction of the aerial attack, there is more to the story. Some of the most tragic short bombings were made by the supposedly more accurate fighter-bombers, and some of these planes had flown parallel, not perpendicularly, to the target and at an altitude of only 2,000 feet.
   In fact, neither the parallel bombing nor any of the other precautions General Bradley ordered had proved sufficient. The smoke markings actually worsened the situation. When the corps artillery fired red-smoke shells to mark the non-bomb line, the smoke clouds drifted north, obscuring the line. After the first bombs hit their targets, dust from the explosions mixed with the smoke, further exacerbating the problem. The panel markers placed in front of the friendly positions and white stars painted on the vehicles were equally useless. In fact, all the marking and coordination techniques employed by the Americans were inadequate, even for marking targets for the fighter-bombers. This was not a new discovery: these techniques had consistently failed to prove themselves earlier in the campaign.

   Furthermore:

   General Bradley had appreciated the necessity of closely integrating aerial bombardment with the other elements of the plan, but on this occasion he failed. All the U.S. military experience with employing close air support in World War II up to this point had indicated that known safety measures would be inadequate. Nevertheless, official inquiries into the bombing absolved senior air and ground commanders of any culpability. The reports catalogued twelve separate incidents (not including short bombing and strafings by the fighter-bombers), determining that the causes of the short bombings were human error or confusion and disorientation of pilots and bombardiers.
   The preconditions for the bombing disaster were the cumulative result of three critical failures: inadequate coordination with supporting air forces, inability to mark the forward positions of ground forces, and the lack of warning to and protection of the troops. But what the reports fail to fully emphasize is that none of these failings were beyond General Bradley's control. In particular, he had made the most important and tragic decisions about the bombing: how far the troops would withdraw from the no-bomb line and what precautions would be taken. Considering the Allies' history of problems in short bombings and strafings, particularly in Normandy, Bradley's failure not [sic] to pay more attention to the issue and work harder with the air commanders until the issue was fully resolved was inexcusable. The overall fire support plan was his initiative and it was seriously flawed.

   Although Carafano praises other aspects of Bradley's handling of Cobra, he is equally harsh when he compares Bradley's "disingenuous" memoirs with the historical record: "However, it is clear that whether due to a serious tactical misjudgment, intentionally assuming the terrible risk of killing and maiming his own troops, or unrealistic wishful thinking on his part, Bradley failed to adequately address the issue of protection for his ground forces."
   Even as friendly bombs fell among their positions, the lead elements of the offensive began to move forward on 25 July. The 119th Infantry Regiment of the U.S. 30th Infantry Division suffered an attack by Allied fighter-bombers, ran into a minefield, took heavy Germany artillery fire, and was held up by strongpoints manned by Kampfgruppe Kentner. Carafano follows the action battalion by battalion, company by company, and focuses on the junior leaders in the field, showing how the 199th in conjunction with the 120th Infantry Regiment eventually worked its way forward and the 30th Division finally captured the high ground on the left flank of the offensive and the key town of Hebecrevon.
   Succeeding chapters provide the same kind of detail about the entire American attack. As Carafano demonstrates, the battle failed to go as planned but gradually the American forces bulldozed—literally, in the case of the "rhino" tanks which broke through the bocage—the defenders out of their path. The field officers, the author concludes, showed considerable flexibility in taking advantage of tactical opportunities.

   This kind of war...was what real combat was like. The neat doctrinal manuals that envisioned the well-coordinated advance of three elements backed by supporting fires were useless on an actual battlefield. Battles were not fought by units, but by remnants of units, a hodgepodge of replacements following a few battle-weary veterans. Every advance was a pick-up game, carried forward on the shoulders of a few experienced and aggressive men prepared to meet the test of battle.

   Of course, the senior commanders had to take advantage of the successes of their subordinate officers and men, and Collins fed his armor into the battle to exploit the victory he thought they had won. According to Carafano, however, that decision was faulty and based on even faultier intelligence. Carafano disputes Weigley's claim that Collins managed the battle effectively, showing how Collins failed to appreciate the altered situation and its new opportunities, while Bradley better grasped the possibilities as early as 27 July.
   After D-Day takes the operation through the desperate German counter-attacks and the final Allied breakthrough, then concludes with a review of American generalship in the battle. Few of the Yank generals escape criticism, especially Collins, while Omar Bradley receives mixed grades. The author reserves most of his praise for the American junior leaders at the sharp end.

   In some respects, the battalion and regimental commanders in Normandy were the equivalent of Napoleon's marshals. They were the "on-the-scene commanders" who had to make the independent decisions that translated the general's intent into reality on the ground. The skill and judgment of field-grade leaders empowered the U.S. Army's operational capabilities and turned the course of the war in Normandy. They demonstrated clearly that for success in battle, operational skill and tactical prowess had to go hand in hand. The leadership of the field-grade commanders was essential for Cobra's success, even though their contributions have been perhaps the most neglected aspect of the operation.

   This is an excellent book. Anyone with an interest in Beyond the Beachhead, The GI Offensive in Europe, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, or other works of that ilk will be thoroughly pleased with Carafano's analysis and insights, even when he disagrees with some of their opinions. Highly recommended.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Lynne Rienner Publishers.
   Thanks to Rienner for providing this review copy.