ISBN 1-85367-473-7
432 pages

Glossary; Preface; Acknowledgements; photos; Postscript; Bibliography; Index

Appendix: RFC and RAF promotions and appointments, and medals and decorations

   Was there a more controversial senior military commander in World War II? Arthur "Bomber" Harris evoked strong emotions in those who knew him, created highly divergent opinions about the efficacy and properness of his all-consuming bomber offensive, and further stirred the waters with a pungent, opinionated book of memoirs. His authorized biography by Dudley Saward, written in the 1970s but not published until Harris' death in 1984, was highly favorable but for the most part relied on Harris' own views of his life and the events in which he was involved, and excluded everything Harris wanted left out. On the other side of the coin, many careful historians and authors have questioned some of Harris' goals and methods, as well as the accuracy of Harris' recollections.
   All this means we're lucky to have a new, fully-rounded and mostly balanced biography of Harris written by the distinguished British airman and historian, Henry Probert (who also wrote The Forgotten Air Force). Although in almost every instance Probert proves to be more sympathetic than critical of his protagonist, overall this is a very fine book and likely the best Harris biography we will ever have, blending as it does the firsthand accounts of those who knew him and worked with him, personal stories taken from interviews with his family, Harris' own papers, RAF documents, and the author's familiarity with the RAF and the war years.
   The book naturally enough covers Harris from birth. He grew up practically as an orphan in boarding school in England while his parents were in India. From school he headed for Rhodesia to make a career for himself, but ended up fighting Germans in East Africa in World War I. He returned to England to continue the fight against Germany (a task that was to occupy much of his life), entered the Royal Flying Corps (thanks to some timely nepotism), married (although his first wife and first family are not mentioned at all in Saward's biography), and took part in some of the earliest attempts at night fighter interception missions (against raiding German zeppelins over England). Harris also saw air-to-air combat above the trenches in France, an experience in which Probert sees much of the pattern of Harris' later work at Bomber Command.
   The following years found Harris on tours of duty in India, Iraq, Egypt, and Palestine where he made the acquaintances of many important army and air force officers who would variously aid his career and serve in key positions with him. Among his overseas experiences, the young airman helped pioneer the use of aircraft to deal with "native uprisings." Again, Probert detects the roots of much of Harris' later success in these early duties. During these years Harris was divorced by his first wife after a certain unmarried woman acquaintance "admitted misconduct" during the time Harris was stationed in Egypt and his wife remained with the children in England.
   Probert has more to say about Harris' second marriage, which followed not terribly long afterward, to a woman more than twenty years younger, but the focus still remains on the airman's rise through a succession of increasingly important jobs. In July 1939 he was ordered back to England from Palestine for medical treatment of a duodenal ulcer, a condition that was to plague him for years. When the war began, he insisted on returning to duty and was posted as Air Officer Commanding 5 Group.
   In the opening months of the war, Harris' squadrons were not heavily engaged, but he exerted much imagination and effort to prepare them for what was sure to come. Probert discusses his leadership of 5 Group, from explaining aerial tactics to youthful bomber pilots to his penchant for inviting pilots home for the weekend where be broke the ice by serving them "phoney beer" and seating them on whoopie cushions.
   The phoney war, if not the phoney beer, vanished in May 1940 when the Germans invaded France and the Low Countries. Confined to night operations due to heavy losses during daylight flying, Harris' squadrons began the first strategic bombing raids, including attacks on the Dortmund-Ems canal and mine-laying missions. In these latter missions in particular Probert shows Harris as surprisingly uncritical of actual results and accepting of claims for accurate and successful drops—if anything, he tended to exaggerate results—while clamoring for press coverage.
   In November 1940 Harris moved to London as Deputy Chief of Air Staff. After six months in that position, he sailed to America as head of the RAF purchasing delegation. In February 1942 he returned to the UK to assume command of the force with which his name is inextricably bound, Bomber Command.

   So what were Harris and Bomber Command being called on to do? Soon after his departure to the States the Air Ministry had sent his predecessor an important new directive. Dated 9 July 1941, this at last recognised that it was not practicable to find and hit precise targets in Germany by night and that the most cost-effective way of using the bomber force was to concentrate on 'area' targets, ie large towns and cities which by their nature would contain many installations of military and economic significance. Moreover such attacks would hit at enemy morale, increasingly seen as a worthwhile objective. The directive therefore stipulated that the main effort of the bomber force should be devoted to dislocating the German transportation system and destroying the morale of the civilian population as a whole and of the industrial workers in particular. Then on 14 February 1942 the instruction to conserve the force was cancelled, the value of the offensive in supporting the Russians was stressed, and its primary objective was stated simply as civilian morale, particularly that of the industrial workers. Attached was a list of 'area targets' for attack. This was the directive that Harris found on arriving at High Wycombe a week later
   Let it be clearly stated: the policy of area bombing was not conceived by Harris, as all too many critics have alleged. It was determined by the Air Ministry under Portal's direction, with the support of the other Chiefs of Staff and of the War Cabinet. Certainly Harris espoused it, as one would expect, for it needed a man of his convictions and temperament to carry it out. Certainly he interpreted the policy too single-mindedly for some, particularly towards the end. The ultimate responsibility for what was done, however, lay not with him but with those who undertook the higher direction of the war and decided that an area bombing campaign had an essential place in British strategy.

   As John Terraine ably sums up in A Time for Courage (published in the UK as The Right of the Line), in the new bombing directive, "...'morale' is a cosmetic word...[and] means either the threat or the reality of blowing men, women, and children to bits" while "there is no reason to suppose that [Harris] objected to this or any other part of the Directive." Although Probert never explicitly says as much, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that the directive, the job, and the man proved a perfect fit: had not the directive existed, Harris would have argued most vociferously to have it written.
   The middle chapters of the book leave aside the chronological progression of Harris' life and the bomber war to investigate various aspects of Harris as a man and a commander. These cover the workings of his headquarters, the public image of Harris and Bomber Command during the war, his relationship with his staff and crews, his approach to what we would call the technology of air warfare, and his relationship with the American air leaders who began arriving in England about the same time he took control of Bomber Command. Although he points out Harris' shortcomings in a few areas, Probert remains sympathetic to him and often explains away occasional lapses with remarks about the extreme stress of his position and the heavy weight he carried constantly.
   Throughout 1942 and 1943 Harris' star continued to rise, along with his single-minded commitment to bombing Germany, his tenacious efforts to ensure Bomber Command received first priority in all resources, and his willingness to press "discussions" with his boss, Portal at the Air Ministry, beyond where anyone else would reasonably push. In April 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff wanted to place Harris under the "direction" of Dwight Eisenhower (through Ike's deputy, Tedder) in order that Bomber Command could best support Operation Overlord. Harris mightily resisted diverting his force from its "real" targets. Only by means of much pressure and explicit direction was he brought into line.
   About this Harris himself says "Naturally I did not quarrel with the decision to put the bomber force at the disposal of the invading armies." However, this might well be one of the cases another historian had in mind when he wrote that certain passages in Harris' book "cause throbbing at the temples."
   Probert sees it this way:

   So Harris had his orders. However vigorously he might have opposed the transportation plan and doubted the ability of his bombers to achieve the extraordinary precision needed, that was now in the past. There was a job to be done and he would spare nothing in the attempt to do it properly. The first attack on the marshalling yards, at Juvisy, was launched the next night (18/19 April) and on the 20th Bottomley told him how well the Defence Committee had received Portal's report of the 'extraordinary measures' taken, including the special marking technique employed to ensure accuracy. The Prime Minister, he added, was greatly relieved to know of the care being taken to avoid heavy civilian casualties. And thus it continued, with some 60 attacks up to D-Day leading to two-thirds of the 37 targets being put out of action for at least a month and at a cost well below the 10,000 civilian casualties that Portal had hoped not to exceed. Unknown to Harris, Zuckermann later wrote in his diary: 'The amazing thing is that Harris, who was even more resistant than the Americans to the idea of RAF domination, has in fact thrown himself whole-heartedly into the battle, has improved his bombing performance enormously, and has contributed more to the dislocation of enemy communications, etc, than any of the rest.' Zuckermann's 'etc' was important too, for a variety of other 'tactical' targets were also most successfully bombed during the run-up to the landings.

   Probert concedes that not everything transpired quite the way Harris remembered, and shows that Harris managed to turn his subordination to SHAEF to advantage in the sense that he utilized the altered chain of command as a way of avoiding directives from the "panacea mongers" in the Air Ministry.

   Later Harris would say it had been obvious to him that the heavy bomber offered the only conceivable means of breaching the Atlantic Wall, a statement that hardly accorded with his previous and clearly stated reservations. Nevertheless his bombers certainly made major contributions, using maximum effort against coastal gun batteries, laying mines and carrying out deception operations on D-Day itself, and continuing afterwards with heavy attacks on railway and other targets as required by SHAEF. Within days, however, irritated at receiving Air Ministry advice on targeting, he curtly told ACAS (Ops) to address such correspondence to SHAEF. Then on 13 June he reminded Bottomley that requests for him to resume strategic attacks, specifically against oil production, should properly be submitted through Tedder. Now that Harris was working for SHAEF in no way was he going to allow the Air Staff to breathe down his neck. Yet on 20 July he felt impelled to protest again, this time to Evill, about continued attempts to instruct him about targets and priorities. As Eisenhower had confirmed, he wrote, the only proper way for him to receive operational orders was through Tedder, to whom he copied his letter. Evill took his point and from then on 'the proper channels' were observed. When Tedder later wrote that Harris co-operated most loyally, this was doubtless one of the aspects he had in mind - though he did add that Harris was at times irritated by delays in receiving targets.

   As with his earlier magnified claims about aerial mine-laying, Harris was not always perfectly forthright in his insistence for publicity and credit for his crews—who, to his mind, were carrying the biggest burden in the war. For example, Harris reported that in three months through the end of June 1944, Bomber Command had suffered 4587 men killed, British and Canadian ground forces 2736, and American ground forces 4868. "I feel," Harris wrote to Churchill with those statistics, "the RAF is not getting full acknowledgement of the brunt which it bears." Of course, those numbers really meant, since no ground troops had been engaged until 6 June, that BC had lost 4587 men in three months while the British and Canadian troops and lost 2736 in less than a month and the Yanks 4868 in less than a month.
   After being under Eisenhower's direction, Harris and Bomber Command were released from support of the invasion to return to strategic bombing of Germany, and ordered by the Air Ministry to give oil targets top priority, but—due to a number of factors, not least of which was Harris' own predilection against "panacea" targets— "...a mere 6% of its bomb tonnage was aimed at oil targets."
   Harris' strong views on this matter led to a lengthy debate—conducted mostly on paper—between the head of Bomber Command and his superior, Portal. Harris always resented receiving targeting directives from the Air Ministry, insisted that only he could adequately judge all the tactical and weather-related conditions involved in picking targets, and, unconcerned about oil, he "...remained worried lest the 15 major German cities that remained intact (one of them Dresden) were to be left intact. The completion of the city programme would do more towards accelerating the defeat of Germany than the armies had yet done or would do, he asserted."
   Probert quotes the exchange of letters between Harris and Portal in considerable detail, and Portal emerges as remarkably patient with Harris' fierce, nearly insubordinate arguments. In the end, Portal could not command Harris to agree that oil targets were most important, and he declined to insist nevertheless on more emphasis on hitting those targets, instead essentially leaving Harris to determine his own strategy, priorities, and targets. Probert then reviews the opinions of historians who have variously suggested that Harris should or should not have been dismissed under those circumstances. Not surprisingly, Probert believes Harris was doing the best job that he could under the circumstances, without ever saying if it was the best job anyone could do.
   Probert takes all this a step further by first noting that oil was indeed, as post-war study confirmed, "the one 'panacea' that actually paid off." Then the author points out that when Portal attempted to use "the irrefutable evidence of Sigint" to prove how critical oil targets were, he couldn't refer to Ultra, because Harris was never in the know on that critical secret. Left unstated, then, is the conclusion that Harris was free to run the air campaign as best he saw fit, but without the benefit of knowing how Ultra could help him better understand the successes and failures of his operations.
   Given all this, perhaps Portal would have been wise to use Harris' own words when the head of Bomber Command relieved a recalcitrant subordinate. Here is how Probert describes the scene when Harris fired 5 Group's Alec Corydon in 1943:

   What Harris could not accept were the perpetual and persistent disputes which had characterised their relationship.... 'I have repeatedly reminded you that it is for me to say what shall be done and when, and broadly how; and for you to accomplish it. The responsibility for the outcome is mine and mine alone...."
   Harris had done what he believed he had to. His top team could not work if one of its members was out of step....

   Portal, however, when faced with perpetual and persistent disputes with his subordinate, did not take the road Harris himself took when facing disputes with his own subordinate.
   The next topic covered in much depth is the fire-bombing of Dresden. According to Probert, the decision to undertake the mission was made by others, Harris went along reluctantly, the city was a legitimate target, and modern estimates put the death toll far lower than the original estimates. In this case Probert mostly takes Harris to task for some ill-advised words in the aftermath of the bombing.
   Probert devotes an entire chapter to reviewing the accomplishments of Harris and Bomber Command, measuring the overall effort (including mine-laying, support of ground offensives, Crossbow attacks, and so on), the strategic bombing against Germany itself, the area bombing campaign in particular, and especially the effort to break German morale from the air. He scrutinizes most of the important works on Bomber Command (Harris' Despatch, Harris' memoirs, the post-war strategic bombing surveys, the official history volumes of Frankland and Webster, Max Hastings, Richard Overy, etc), quotes both praise and criticism, and reiterates all the issues. Was the area bombing strategy justified? Did the campaign seriously affect German morale? Were the results worth the effort? After reviewing the evidence and opinions of earlier historians, Probert answers "yes" on all counts.
   Whatever the accomplishments of Bomber Command, Harris' men—unlike nearly everyone else in the British armed forces—were not granted a distinctive campaign award for their bloody efforts, and Harris himself—alone among the senior commanders—was not granted a peerage. On that second point, Probert reveals that despite all that has been said (or left unsaid, particularly by Harris) over the years, apparently Harris was quietly offered a peerage but refused because his men had not been awarded a campaign decoration.
   As with many other warriors, the transition from war to peace seemed difficult for Harris.

   Whatever doubts Harris may have had about leaving the RAF at the end of the war had therefore been rapidly dispelled; indeed, as early as May 1945 his superiors knew that he wanted to depart and were considering what arrangements to make for him. In conversation with Slessor, now AMP, he made it clear that he was ready to depart at any time but could not afford to do so without a job to go to, and on 17 May Slessor sent Sinclair and Portal his thoughts on the subject. Pointing out that the C-in-C had hardly any private means and was worried about his family's financial position, he stressed that as one of the war's great commanders Harris deserved special consideration, and while it would take time to work out the long-term solution there was an immediate problem. Harris was far from well, he was suffering from an understandable reaction after the years of pressure, and his staff were having difficulty in getting him to busy himself sufficiently in his Command's affairs now that the spur of active operations had gone. He should therefore be sent on leave and then, perhaps for a few months, on a special mission to South Africa or the USA before retirement. This idea found no favour, but in June Slessor was asked to comment on the possibility of Harris continuing in the Service as Inspector General. Slessor had no doubts about this one, as he told Portal. Harris would not look at it, and in any case would do more harm than good. He lacked the balance and judgement needed for such a post and could prove a pernicious influence. 'No one appreciates his qualities more than I do,' continued Slessor, 'but I don't consider the Service owes him anything.' He should retire and the Service should do everything possible to get him a suitable job afterwards - though his own 'violent and intolerant personality' was his worst impediment in that respect. While there were elements of truth in this slating assessment it was both overdone and unnecessary.

   Harris was actually offered, at least tentatively, the post of Military Governor of the British zone of occupation in Germany. He declined, and "[a]ll one can add here is that a less appropriate incumbent of the Germany post would have been almost impossible to imagine."
   Convinced rightly or wrongly that the new government was unwilling to help him find a suitable job, and even highly critical of the manner in which the RAF promoted him to Marshal of the Royal Air Force—the very summit of his profession—Harris left the service and took his family to South Africa to serve as managing director of a new shipping corporation. He resided part-time in New York, then returned in 1952 to England where he lived in retirement, but not always quietly.
   Probert, ever solicitous, nevertheless shows Harris growing increasingly cantankerous, caught up in letter-writing battles in The Times and repeatedly threatening legal action against enemies real or imagined, including those responsible for the official history of Bomber Command. Having refused to review the drafts before publication and having never read it afterwards, Harris nonetheless attacked the work, its authors, and their conclusions. Probert points out that most historians today consider those volumes to be remarkably fair and judicious. As in a number of incidents, Probert can only repeat sympathetically that this does not show Harris at his best.
   In fact, many events in this book, whether the author comments on it or not, show Harris other than at his best, but the Marshal of the Royal Air Force was by any measure the kind of forceful, single-minded leader (much like Churchill, Probert remarks) who emerges at a critical time to undertake a historic task with steely determination. Although the author at times fails to take the great man to task when he deserves a dressing down—a duty Harris himself would never have failed—this is absolutely one of the very best books of the year, and highly recommended to one and all.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Stackpole Books in the US or Greenhill Books in the UK.
   Thanks to Stackpole for providing this review copy.