ISBN 1-85367-460-5
256 pages

Photos; maps; Index

   In 2000 Greenhill Books and Stackpole Books co-published Fighting the Invasion: The German Army at D-Day, a compilation of post-war reports by German officers while they were POWs or working for the US Army's historical branch. This year the same two publishers released Fighting in Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage, which follows the same format and continues the accounts chronologically through the middle of June 1944. Both titles are edited by David C. Isby, and it seems entirely possible they were originally intended to be published as a single volume.
   Whatever the original intention, the second volume is missing a critical element: Isby's explanation and disclaimer, which appears only in the first volume. In the "Editor's Introduction" to Fighting the Invasion, Isby diligently points out the nature of the material in his book brings with it some unique strengths and weaknesses. Those same strengths and weaknesses are equally apparent in Fighting in Normandy, but the publishers have omitted Isby's explanation:

Editor's Introduction

   This volume seeks to show, from the viewpoint of the German Army, one of the most decisive operations of the Second World War - the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, and the events leading up to it. These views were represented in a range of military studies written for the US Army by senior German Army officers after the war, and these documents have provided the source material for this volume.
   The documents have been used as source material in all subsequent writing on Normandy, especially that in the English language. Taken together, they represent the most detailed German account of the fighting. As has often been pointed out, however, they all have to be used with caution. The earlier reports were compiled when the authors were prisoners of war, the later ones when they were paid employees of the US Army. Most of them—especially the earlier reports—were written largely without reference to war diaries, wartime maps (although the US Army provided the authors with reference maps) or official papers. Moreover, although they were written by participants (many of whom never wrote their memoirs or other accounts in any language) while their memories were still fresh, their immediacy is not matched by attention to detail (for example, dates and places are sometimes wrong or inconsistent) or by their impartiality.
   In some cases, the threat of prosecution for war crimes was hanging over, if not the authors themselves, then at least their subjects. Blumentritt's admiration of his boss, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, was doubtless genuine. But it is not difficult to see his account as a message of special pleading that von Rundstedt should not be subjected to prosecution for war crimes (in fact he was not, on grounds of ill-health). Von Rundstedt's knowledge (and explicit approval) of a broad spectrum of atrocities simply did not get included. Nor was this atypical of these documents. A more charitable interpretation would be that, in operational accounts, the authors felt that issues such as complicity with members of the Nazi regime, who ordered atrocities against the French Resistance or Canadian prisoners and the shooting of vast numbers of German soldiers after drumhead courts martial, were simply off-limits.
   In even the more reliable of these documents, the authors find it easier to talk about their successes than their setbacks, and to point fingers to establish blame rather than look in a mirror. No one has a good word to say about any of the ten "Ost" battalions recruited chiefly from former Soviet prisoners of war that were in the German order of battle in Normandy. Yet before D-Day someone obviously had enough faith in them to put vast stretches of the invasion coast in their hands. Looking at the record, these units often fought as well as the Germans could expect.
   The authors do not expend much ink on introspection and self-revelation. General Feuchtinger, of the 21st Panzer Division, was well known for taking off—without leave—from his command and for failures of nerve (which led to his relief and court martial). General Geyr, of Panzer Gruppe West, was apparently—and understandably—shell-shocked after his headquarters was destroyed by Allied bombing. But the reader will not learn these facts from them. However, this shortcoming is partially offset by our inclusion of comments from other authors who reviewed the completed documents....

   So long as readers keep those caveats firmly in mind, Fighting in Normandy is a valuable book, packed with information and insights from the actual participants. Those participants include some of the most important and well-known German generals in Normandy, as well as some lesser-known officers who were well-placed to see and report the action. (Again, the first volume contains a list of "Contributors to this volume," but the second book doesn't.) Here's a partial list for the second volume:

General der Infantrie Gunther Blumentritt
Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger
General der Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg
Generalmajor Fritz Kramer
Generaloberst Heinz Guderian
General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von Luttitz
Generalleutnant Max Pemsel
General der Flakartillerie Wolfgang Pickert
Generalleutnant Joseph Reichert
Generalleutnant Karl Wilhelm von Schlieben
Major Percy Schramm
Generalmajor Gerhard Triepel
Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann

   Reports by these officers are divided into nine chapters: one for each day from 7 June through 13 June inclusive, one titled "Summary: Panzers in Normandy," and one titled "Summary: The Reasons for the Defeat." Each chapter has a short introduction by Isby. Most chapters contain roughly a dozen reports, and the same writers usually appear over and over again with reports in multiple chapters. Here are titles of a few of the reports:

LXXXIV Corps Counterattacks on 7 June
III Flak Corps Moving Up to Normandy
Situation When Panzer Gruppe West Assumed Command
346th Infantry Division Attacks
Faulty Tactics of the German Command
2nd Panzer Division Prepares to Attack from the March
352nd Infantry Division Fighting North of St Lo

   Each report runs anywhere from a few paragraphs to a few pages, and many of them end with a critique of the report by another German officer. The structure of the book is such that it can be read chronologically from chapter to chapter, or the reader can skip from one chapter to the next to read all the reports by a single writer. Either way, the effect is a bit of a montage. Some events are covered by more than one contributor while some aren't mentioned at all, making this a rather pointillistic composition. Here's an example of a fairly typical report:

The 711th Infantry Division on 8 June
by Generalleutnant Joseph Reichert

   The night of 7 June passed without any special events. On 8 June, at about 1100 hours, I had reached the command post of the regiment of the 346th Infantry Division—Varaville—where the newly brought up infantry battalion, its vehicles still standing on the road, had arrived a short time ago, when four fighter-bombers attacked with bombs and aircraft armaments. At the time of the second air attack the necessary dispersal, which otherwise would have required a considerable effort of voice, had already been achieved by itself. The actual success of the air attack was not large. It caused a few being wounded, a few dead horses and two burned-out ammunition trucks, but for the inexperienced battalion this had been quite a shock. I can no longer remember where the battalion was employed at that time, whether for closing the gap near Gonneville or in the direction of Bavent, where parts of the Russian battalion of the 71Gth Division were said to be still holding their position. In any case, the battalion was not involved in any serious engagement on that day. The new artillery battalion arrived considerably later. At any rate, we had now at least sufficient forces for holding the line gained.
   On the evening of 8 June the commander of the 346th Infantry Division arrived, and informed me that on the night of 8 June he was going to cross the Seine with all the remaining portions of his division and that he had been ordered to eliminate the enemy bridgehead east of the Orne, with his division and the subordinated portions of the 21st Panzer Division, which had tried to wipe out this bridgehead from the south.
   Thus the portions of the 346 Infantry Division which had hitherto been subordinated to the division were placed again under the command of their own division, after having subordinated—according to the orders from Corps—the reserve battalion of the 744th Infantry Regiment, which together with an artillery battalion of the 346th Infantry Division had been employed to attack the enemy-held Orne bridgehead from Sallenelles from the north.

   Although the reports occasionally contain comments by US Army editors, the original text remains almost entirely unadorned and unannotated. Isby simply rounds out the collection with photos and a few maps.
   As Isby warns in his Introduction to the first volume, the German writers often have their own axes to grind. He notes in particular that none of the reports speak favorably of the Ost battalions in German service in Normandy.
   It can be an entertaining exercise to compare some of the German reports with accounts of the same events written from other perspectives. With Isby's note about the Ost battalions in mind, here's what General Joseph Reichert has to say, in part, in the first chapter:

711th Infantry Division Counterattack, 7 June
by Generalmajor Joseph Reichert

   On the morning of 7 June the 744th Infantry Regiment reported that an enemy reconnaissance patrol had felt its way forward along the Varaville-Periers-en-Auge causeway through the flooded sector of the Dives as far as the Dives bridge near Periers-en-Auge. This was only possible if, in the meantime, the Varaville strongpoint of the 716th Infantry Division had been taken by the enemy.
   As the carrying out of the attack, as ordered, against the Orne bridge depended on the possession of Varaville, the commander of the 744th Infantry Regiment was ordered to recapture Varaville with the Reserve Battalion of the regiment, which was once more placed under his command for this purpose. Thereupon a strong assault detachment was committed by the regiment to attack Varaville from Periers-en-Auge and advanced with two companies along the Cabourg-Varaville road. After a short fight the enemy, about one platoon strong, evacuated the Varaville strongpoint and withdrew in a westerly direction.
   After the report had come in that Varaville had been cleared again of the enemy, I drove there with the regimental commander of the 346th Infantry Division and gave him detailed information about the assembly area. In the strongpoint, Varaville, a terrible confusion prevailed. There were parts of uniforms lying about, steel helmets, cooking utensils, ammunition and the like, but not one corpse of the former strongpoint garrison (a Russian platoon)—which very likely had been suddenly attacked while sleeping and had been taken prisoner or had gone over the enemy.

   This can be contrasted with a couple of other readily available accounts. This is from Victory in the West, the British official history volume by Major L. F. Ellis:

   The advance company of Canadians with some sappers of the 3rd Parachute Squadron blew the Varaville bridge and attacked the nearby headquarters in a chateau defended by a 75-mm gun in a pill-box and surrounded by weapons pits, mines and wire. The chateau was cleared, the gatehouse taken and the pill-box closely invested, and three sections of enemy infantry who had tried to reinforce it were killed or captured; but the Canadians had considerable casualties and the pill-box was not taken before daylight came.

   And this is from one of the Canadian official history volumes, The Victory Campaign, by Colonel C. P. Stacey, about the same incident:

   The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion likewise performed its tasks successfully. "C" Company destroyed a bridge over the Divette east of Varaville and, after a prolonged fierce fight, captured a strongpoint west of the village which threatened the brigade dropping zone. "B" Company reached the Robehomme bridge without the engineers who were to demolish it, except apparently for one sergeant; it was successfully blown all the same. The company held Robehomme hill overnight, and on 7 June withdrew to the battalion position at le Mesnil.

   Had Isby proved willing and able to offer context, clarifications, and corrections to these reports, his book would have been much improved. However, despite its limitations, this remains a valuable collection of important accounts which, if utilized with those limitations in mind, can only serve to assist those doing serious research on this topic. Recommended especially to those who appreciated Fighting the Invasion: The German Army at D-Day or the similar The Battle of the Bulge: The German View (edited by Danny S. Parker and also published by Greenhill and Stackpole).
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Stackpole Books in the US and Greenhill Books in the UK.
   Thanks to Stackpole for providing this review copy.