ISBN 1-58545-106-1
iv + 123

Photos; maps; TOEs; Footnotes; Bibliography and Sources

Appendices: TOE of Mixed Cyclist Company of the Chasseurs Ardennais; Organization of a Belgian Chasseurs d'Ardennes Division, 10 May 1940

   What seems at first merely an oddity proves after all to be a fascinating and very enjoyable pair of short accounts of tactical combat—almost at the man-to-man level—set at the opening of the German blitzkrieg in the West in May 1940. Instead of the perspective of the all-conquering panzers, however, these twin accounts recreate the battle through the eyes of the Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais who tried to delay the German advance.
   Georges Hautecler penned these as two separate works for the Historical Section of the Belgian Ministry of Defense, apparently in the mid-1950s, using archival documents, surviving war diaries ("campaign journals"), and recollections of Chasseurs who were on the scene. As he indicates on many occasions, at the time of writing the battlefield still looked much the same: it displayed many unhealed scars and yielded some grim reminders of the clashes in 1940. That kind of freshness and immediacy—along with the soldier by soldier, moment by moment detail—gives the book a vivid style worth reading.
   In the first part of the book, mostly the engagement at Chabrehez and the surrounding events, the author prefaces the battle scenes with some fairly unremarkable sections about German and French plans, but adds extra measures of information about Belgian plans and dispositions of the Chasseurs. The latter material is seldom covered in equal depth in English-language works. Among them, one of the best is The Breaking Point by Doughty which briefly discusses some of the actions reported here. As might be expected, Hautecler's topics are also included in both the French and Flemish editions of de Fabribeckers' book on the operations of Belgian forces during the invasion.
   Of course, after Hautecler's introductory material, the real excitement commences on 10 May when the panzers thrust across the border into Belgium and began racing through the Ardennes to cross the Meuse and head for the Channel coast. The panzers were supported by small groups of airlifted infantrymen (Operation Niwi) who caused considerable confusion among the Belgians. Hautecler follows the German advance, but keeps his eye mostly on the Belgian reaction. The fog of battle is evident on both sides, and it seems in many cases the Germans were nearly as inexperienced in combat as the green Belgian troops.
   In this case the Belgians were facing Erwin Rommel and his 7th Panzer Division, so any lack of experience among German troops was quickly remedied by their commander during his nearly constant stints at the front. The Belgians were out-gunned and out-fought—at Chabrehez the Chasseurs had no tanks, no artillery support, and no anti-tank weapons—but despite those shortcomings their withdrawals were relatively orderly affairs rather than panic-driven flights. On the road between Les Tailles and Chabrehez the Belgians halted the German advance and threatened to upset the timetable for crossing the Meuse.

   Catin, positioned behind a large pine tree, called to him one of the fusiliers in order to send a report to the company commander. The German bullets hissed through the woods, and approaching the officer, the man was hit in his hand and the chest and fell screaming. Suddenly the men of the combat group in the edge of the woods, seized with panic, abandoned the position and started to flee. The platoon commander faced them, revolver in hand, and screamed, "One more step and I fire!"
   Happily, the German fire was directed towards the village and the bullets struck well beyond the first line. Faced with the very real danger of their commander's pistol and the distant enemy fire, the soldiers stopped.
   "Return to your foxholes!" They obeyed like automatons and soon disappeared into their holes.
   "Stick your heads out!" Slowly they risked looking in the direction of the enemy, who continued to fire too high.
   "Take up your weapons and fire!" The automatic weapon fired a burst. All the other weapons of the first line soon fired. The crisis had passed and the men fought up to the end.
   All this small action did not last more than a few seconds. The German tank that withdrew was the target of rounds than bounced off its armor. It took refuge in the court of a farm known as Le Fond, 140 meters from the small bridge. Despite the violent fire of the Belgian line, a German motorcycle with sidecar came towards the farm. All the Belgian weapons concentrated their fire on the motorcyclist, who dumped his motorcycle and disappeared into the ditch, to the great joy of the chasseurs.
   From the first shots, the company commander, Lieutenant Lejeune, followed by the hors-rangs platoon and a combat truck carrying ammunition, had left the Roufignon Farm to install themselves anew in the forester's house 1,400 meters from Chabrehez, on the Laroche highway. From this position, it was not possible for him to see what was occurring beyond the village. The woods blocked his view.
   ....
   At Chabrehez, under a steady fire of the Chasseurs Ardennais, the German Heilbornn Company deployed and endeavored to take the valley. The effort to turn the southern flank was checked by the fire of Cremer's platoon. The squad of grenade launchers of Catin's platoon fired at 400 meters in the direction of the German tank and a grenade damaged its track, while a second set a farm afire. A German machine gunner took the squad under fire, but the chasseurs responded with rifle and machine gun fire and silenced him. The machine gun section of Sous-lieutenant Gourmet, which had a magnificent field of fire, greatly impeded the German progress. Unfortunately, one gun stopped and could no longer fire, except by single shots. Gourmet sent a runner to the Roufignon Farm in order to advise the company commander.
   The Belgian defense proved to be very strong and Major Steinkeller, commandant of the 7th Panzer Division's advance guard, estimated the progress of the first day was sufficient and decided to await the arrival of all units and for reinforcements to arrive to permit them to attack in strength at dawn of 11 May.

   Fortunately for the Germans, Rommel promptly arrived at Steinkeller's CP, and he had different plans entirely. Hautecler discusses Rommel's impact on the German spearhead, then returns to the conduct of the action at Chabrehez for another nine or ten pages. Renewed frontal pressure pinned down the Chasseurs while a flanking movement soon took the defensive position in the flank and rear, opening the road for the advance.
   Some time later, Rommel himself wrote a paragraph about the action at Chabrehez. It doesn't appear in Hautecler's book, but it seems worth quoting here:

   Fighting in the woods near Chabrenes [sic] was relatively drawn out, until the heavy company was able to join the fray. The motorcycle battalion accompanying the armoured company was only able to contribute a few tanks to the fight. Also, the battery was not yet in action. My opinion was that all these units could have been effective if the junior officers had actually concentrated on the hardest waypoints, quickly using their strength to close off the positions. For the artillery and the tanks these positions posed little obstacle. They could operate in groups. In retrospect I have the impression that the commander, independently calling a halt to the advance, failed to realise that the division he was supporting was continuing its pursuit of the retreating Belgian border troops. In the end the motorcycle battalion succeeded by applying the necessary force.

   The first part of the book encompasses about seventy-five pages. The second part, "The Combat at Bodange," occupies a further forty pages and also includes related actions at Martelange, Strainchamps, and Fauvillers. Structured and written in much the same manner as the first part, the narrative describes other elements of the Chasseurs Ardennais engaging Guderian's panzer corps in the vicinity of the Luxembourg border on 10 May. Again the mission of the Chasseurs was to undertake pre-planned demolitions, delay the Germans, and then fall back by bounds to new delaying positions.

   Sergeant Renauld positioned himself with the automatic rifles and opened fire, followed quickly by the rest of the weapons of the 5th Company. The Germans were surprised by this unanticipated avalanche of fire, subjected to fire of seven automatic weapons from a position they thought undefended, and fell back, carrying away their wounded. They made another probe in the direction. Kielmannsegg wrote [in a wartime German account]: "The advance was stopped before Bodange, where the bridge over the Sure had been destroyed. It appeared that the enemy had established his first line of resistance there. The defense was supported by well-camouflaged and reinforced positions. Deep and wide entanglements of barbed wire were everywhere. The roads were blocked without exception. It was not possible to detour around the obstacles so we were forced to move frontally against them."
   Kirchner's [CO of 1st Panzer Division] report relates about the same: "The enemy reinforced his defense in the first line of resistance. Violent fire from automatic weapons came from carefully camouflaged and fortified positions."
   Lieutenant Autphenne added: "This first success gave my men total confidence in their weapons. Their morale was superb. During the afternoon, each member of the squad disputed the honor to fire automatic rifle or the machine gun." The west group of Doquier's platoon took the Germans who came out of Wisembach under fire and stopped the turning movement by the south. As nothing was moving in the valley, Renauld also oriented his automatic rifles in this direction.
   Soon the southern platoon was under violent fire form [sic] the heights that dominated the east bank (Feltz) and the pinewoods. German infantry was distinctly seen arriving from the direction of Warnach, but they were too far away to be taken under fire. The automatic rifleman from Talbot's group attempted to get to the heights, but the whistle of bullets coming from Feltz obliged him to remain along the road to Fauvillers.
   A motorcycle courier arrived at Commandant Bricart's position, carrying a written order from Major Agon to resist in place and an Ardennais ham as a gift from a butcher in Fauvillers.

   Here's how Robert Allan Doughty summarizes Guderian's eruption into the Ardennes in The Breaking Point:

   ...the companies of the Chasseurs Ardennais accomplished their mission in a distinguished fashion. The greatest restriction of German mobility occurred at Bodange where the Belgian obstacles were covered by fire. The willingness of the small Belgian force to fight and destruction of the road network on the Luxembourg border clearly affected the ability of the 1st Panzer Division to move forward rapidly.

   Nafziger, translator and editor of Hautecler's book, at the end offers a page of his own "Observations and Conclusions," noting, for example:

• the Belgians always destroyed their own communications networks during demolitions
• they usually failed to provide covering fire over demolitions when the Germans arrived
• the Chasseurs seemed never to have any artillery support despite ample juicy targets of German vehicles jammed together on narrow roads
• the few Belgian light tanks were wasted by being dispatched to hunt airlifted German infantry in the rear despite providing the only anti-tank weapons available to the front-line defenders

   Although Nafziger doesn't bring it up, one other especially telling point jumps off the page when Hautecler offers a final word about the carefully calculated defensive plans prescribed for the Chasseurs Ardennais. "The common Franco-Belgian defense of the Ardennes would not have been possible except in accordance with the minutely prepared preliminary agreement, as one does not improvise in the face of the enemy." Perhaps the Allies in 1940 were unable or unwilling to improvise in the face of the enemy, but against masters of improvisation like Rommel and Guderian, such inflexibility might have been a fatal flaw.
   Interesting as it is, the book has some weak points. The maps, practically illegible anyway, are nearly useless. The first one, showing the "big picture," doesn't even label the location of Chabrehez. The second one, a close-up of the Chabrehez battlefield, doesn't show some of the important locales (such as Roufignon farm) mentioned in the text. For the action at Bodange there is no map at all. The best way to follow along is to dig up the appropriate Michelin sheet. The text is also littered with typographical errors and/or dubious translations (such as "peddled" for "pedaled"). Furthermore, in some cases it appears Hautecler might be applying to the Chasseurs a veneer of bravery and devotion to duty that doesn't always seem entirely appropriate. These men certainly weren't cowards, but the book definitely emphasizes the most courageous acts and tends to put a favorable spin on Belgian actions.
   Despite those imperfections, Hautecler's dual accounts will certainly grab and hold the attention of anyone who cares to view the action in the Ardennes in 1940 from an out of the ordinary perspective. Recommended.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the Nafziger Collection.
   Thanks to Nafziger for providing this review copy.