ISBN 0-7509-3006-3
191 pages

Introduction; Foreword; photos; maps; OBs; touring information; Further Research; Index

ISBN 1-84414-083-6
192 pages

Introduction; Acknowledgements; photos; maps; touring information; Index

   The Battle Zone Normandy series from Sutton and the Battleground Europe series from Pen and Sword both continue to expand. As the titles indicate, the Sutton series is more narrowly focused while the Pen and Sword series transcends Normandy (and even extends to conflicts beyond the Second World War). Nevertheless, there's quite a bit of overlap between the two, and over the past few months each series released a volume on the campaign in the Cotentin peninsula of Normandy and the capture of the city of Cherbourg: Battle for Cherbourg by R.P.W. Havers from Sutton and Cherbourg by Andrew Rawson from Pen and Sword.
   As Havers mentions in the suggestions for "Further Research" at the end of his book, there have not previously been a great many works written specifically about the Cotentin and the battle for Cherbourg. All the more reason, therefore, to have a look at these two recently published volumes on that important facet of the Normandy campaign.
   Both books cover the historical campaign as well as providing sections with suggestions for touring the battlefield. Outside of the information on touring, Rawson devotes 165 pages to operations while Havers writes 75 pages in his operational account. As far as those operations go, both books tackle more or less the same slice of time and geography. Rawson opens with ten pages of text and photos covering "Establishing the Beachhead" and six pages about "Sealing off the Cotentin Peninsula." Havers, adhering to the standardized approach of the Battle Zone Normandy series, begins with four pages on "The Strategic Context" and twenty pages on "The Opposing Forces" followed by eighteen pages covering "Cutting the Cotentin Peninsula." For the Battle of Cherbourg itself, that leaves Rawson with about 150 pages compared to about 50 for Havers. In sum, Rawson's book contains substantially more text about operations in general and Cherbourg in particular.
   That extra text means that in most instances Rawson provides more detail about the progress of the battle. Here's how Havers describes the attack of the 3rd Battalion of the US 12th Infantry Regiment on 22 June:

   This plan did not go smoothly. 12th Infantry Regiment made little progress against German defenders in the area of the Bois du Coudray, advancing only a few hundred metres at the very start of the US offensive. Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Thaddeus R. Dulin, commanding 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, was killed by a German sniper while leading his men in a bayonet charge up a steep incline in an attempt to secure the defensive benefits of higher ground. Only after this loss was some form of order imposed by the surviving American commanders. Even then, the battalion was isolated from the rest of the regiment and only heavily escorted patrols, with tanks, were able to replenish it. Command of the battalion devolved onto the executive officer, Major Kenneth R. Lindner at this point.
   Lieutenant Hay, from 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, detailed how his unit used tanks in support of its advance: 'Scout ahead to search the hedge rows for sticky-bombardiers and AT [anti-tank] riflemen; scouts motion tanks ahead, tanks proceed - spray next hedgerow generously and so on. When necessary, tanks sit quietly and remove obstacles with their 75s [75-mm main guns].' Source: 4th Infantry Division combat interviews; RG 407- 427, Box 24014, Folder 29, US National Archives.

   Here's how Rawson describes the same action:

   12th Regiment's advance had been brought to a sudden halt on 21 June by a series of strongpoints covering the Saire stream on the western edge of Bois du Coudray. At first light Colonel Luckett ordered his 3rd Battalion to find a crossing suitable for tanks so that they could outflank the German position. Heading north, Lieutenant-Colonel Dulin's first attempt to cross the stream failed in the face of heavy machine gun fire. At a second crossing two companies waded through the stream and charged up the far bank to find twenty German soldiers, many of them Labour Corps personnel, with their hands up. Although 3rd Battalion had established a footing on the far side of the stream, the Shermans were unable to cross; Dulin's men would have to go on alone. They had only advanced a short distance when a hidden strongpoint opened fire, splitting the battalion in half. Two companies were pinned down close to the German position and unable to manoeuvre around its flanks, while the rest of the battalion was lost in the hedgerows. By the time 3rd Battalion had grouped, it was growing dark leaving Dulin no option but to withdraw to safe distance and regroup. The GIs received a shock when they discovered that German troops had already occupied a hill to their rear, cutting the battalion off from the rest of the Regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Dulin gathered his men together to drive the enemy back, advancing up the slope in the darkness; Dulin was killed leading the final bayonet charge. Captain Linder rallied the battalion, driving the Germans from the hill. Tired, hungry and surrounded, 3rd Battalion's survivors dug in and waited for daylight; for a second time 12th Regiment had failed to shake itself free from Bois du Coudray.
   Later that evening Colonel Luckett sent tanks forward with his supply trucks, taking machine gun and mortar ammunition to 2nd Battalion. 3rd Battalion would have to wait for their supplies; Captain Linder was able to report that his men could hold their positions until the following day in spite of heavy casualties. 12th Regiment needed to push tanks across the Saire stream as soon as possible to stand a chance of advancing beyond Bois du Coudray. Throughout the night patrols searched for a way through the maze of hedgerows, only to return with bad news; many of the lanes had been heavily mined while others were too narrow for tanks. The search went on - a way across had to be found.

   For further comparison, here's what Roland Ruppenthal wrote in 1947 about the same action. (More about Ruppenthal in a minute.)

   The regimental plan on 22 June called for the 3d Battalion to attack north, circling around to the rear of the enemy opposing the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion moved up to the northern edge of the wood during the morning. The Germans, observing the movement, opened fire from the slopes above the creek and heavily shelled the draw formed by a small tributary of the river. The 3d Battalion replied with artillery and overhead heavy machine-gun fire. The axis of attack was shifted slightly to the right to avoid the interdicted draw. Companies I and L led out abreast at 1430, crossing the stream and proceeding up the opposite bank. With the first determined charge, the enemy broke and fled. About twenty were captured. Here the 12th Infantry identified some of the first miscellaneous units thrown into line by the Germans, such as labor service troops, which were found scattered throughout the Cherbourg area.
   Across the stream the battalion wheeled to the left to carry out the original plan, but Companies I and L, after advancing west almost to the Digosville road, were stopped by heavy fire. The Germans were firing from across a draw just ahead and were entrenched around the road junction. To the rear, continued interdiction of the draw had the effect of isolating the lead companies from the rest of the battalion for a while, although Companies K and M and battalion headquarters, on the first nose north of the woods, were only about 800 yards back. The rear companies were at last guided forward across the draw, suffering only a few casualties from enemy artillery.
   Reunited, the battalion tried to renew the advance, but enemy fire was so intense that the attempt had to be abandoned. Judging the forward position to be unfavorable, Lieutenant Colonel Dulin, the battalion commander, decided to move back to the ground occupied earlier by the rear elements. The battalion retraced its steps about 2100 and found Germans again occupying some of this ground. The battalion commander was killed in the sharp skirmish which followed before the area was cleared. By the time the new commander, Maj. Kenneth R. Lindner, established a defense, the Germans had infiltrated to the south and cut the battalion's supply routes. The ammunition supply was satisfactory, however, and Col. J. S. Luckett (commanding the 12th Infantry) promised additional supplies from Regiment in the morning.
   The whole situation between Gonneville and the Bois du Coudray was fluid. The 22d Infantry was already being supplied by tank-escorted convoys. The same solution was now indicated in the case of the 12th. Tanks were already attached to this regiment, but they had not participated in the attack because the infantry did not succeed in finding suitable routes for them. With the 3d Battalion cut off, it became vital to find a route the tanks could use. Regiment sent out a patrol four times before a satisfactory route was discovered. Over this route, at 0700 on 23 June, seven medium tanks loaded with ammunition and rations moved with infantry escort. They also carried orders for the day's attack which, except for the use of tank support, did not depart from the previous day's plan.

   As can be seen by those passages, it's easy for different authors to bring different perspectives to the same events and produce accounts that emphasize different aspects of what happened. That's also true about what Havers and Rawson put in and what they leave out. Havers, for example, quotes the order from Hitler to von Schlieben to hold Cherbourg to the last man, while Rawson quotes von Schlieben's last radio transmission to Seventh Army headquarters.
   Even some smaller scenes are played out in slightly different styles. Here's what Havers has to say about the surrender of Fort l'Ouest:

   In fact some of the forts in the inner and outer harbour continued to resist, in name at least. The harbour commander, a naval officer Fregattenkapitan (Commander, Senior Grade) Hans Witt, did not surrender, instead he ordered the wall along the docks to be sealed off and together with eight officers and 30 men crossed to the Fort de l'Ouest in a yacht and two small rowing boats. Once in Fort de l'Ouest he contacted his superiors at Naval Group West and informed them that he was ready to detonate the extensive minefields blocking the entrance to the western harbour. Witt's 'heroic' story was broadcast on German radio - and intercepted by the Americans who shelled the fort. Eventually, after three days, the fire control mechanism for the mines was destroyed and Witt surrendered.

   Compare that to what Rawson wrote about the surrender of Fort l'Ouest:

   Warships closed in ready to shell the seawall and while Major Johnson's men prepared to cross the harbour for a second time, General Collins arranged an attack by fighter-bombers timed to begin at 11:00 am. As zero hour approached soldiers began to emerge from Fort l'Ouest waving a white flag. It was too late to cancel the air strikes and as soon as planes appeared the Germans hurried inside. It looked as though an opportunity had been missed but as the dust settled, white flags appeared on the roof of Fort l'Est. An hour later Fort l'Ouest followed, bringing the battle for the seawall to an end.
   Company A's commander, Captain Glenn W Thorne, sailed across the harbour to Fort l'Ouest and as his men looked on, the garrison performed one final ceremony. Two ranks of German soldiers lined up and saluted their injured officer as he emerged from the fort. He later explained how a single shell splinter had pierced a gun aperture and damaged the fort's generator rendering the control device for the minefield useless; the same splinter had also caused his own injuries.

   While Rawson pens considerably more words in his chapters on maneuver and combat, Havers writes much more about touring the battlefield, matching up at 13 pages versus 60 pages. That's very much in keeping with the nature of all the Battleground Europe and Battle Zone Normandy books: the latter series emphasizes battlefield tours considerably more than the former. It should also be noted that Havers' touring section often reiterates and expands some of the information presented in the chapters on operations.
   As a physical product and visual package, the Havers book outshines Rawson. Besides being hardcover, Battle of Cherbourg contains better maps and features a more pleasing design with much greater utilization of color. Havers also includes some very nice Orders of Battle for both sides.
   Both books includes large numbers of photos, in some cases using exactly the same shots. Havers comes out ahead in this area as well, for a couple of reasons. First, the smaller physical dimensions of the Rawson book mean photos on those pages tend to be reduced in size. Second, Havers consistently provides significantly more informative captions. Here are some examples.
   Both authors use an identical aerial photograph of Cherbourg and environs near the beginnings of their books, but Rawson's version is both cropped and reduced in size, making it easier to pick out details in the Havers version. In addition, Havers numbers eleven different important features on his photo and provides a key with the identity of each feature and additional information.
   Similarly, both authors use the same photo of surrendering Germans. Rawson writes this caption: "Men of 314th Regiment round up prisoners from another underground headquarters." Havers gives this caption: "German soldiers emerging from underground positions, this time on 27 June (according to the official caption). This picture shows positions at the base of the Montagne du Roule immediately below the fortress itself. The open doorways in the background, beyond the heap of rubble and the surrendering German soldier, lead directly into the complex."
   In one final example, both authors use the same photo of wounded GIs. Rawson captions it this way: "Medics treat the wounded at a makeshift aid station." Havers' caption reads like this: "American wounded being cared for by US medics on 21 June. To the left of the vehicle, a captured German transport employed in a new role, is a makeshift dressing station in a Norman farmhouse. These soldiers were wounded during American efforts to secure a bridgehead across the River Douve."
   Each book contains an adequate index. Neither has footnotes nor endnotes. Neither provides a bibliography or list of sources, but Havers does write three pages concerning "Further Research" which mention about a dozen books, mostly of a very general nature. One of those volumes in particular, Utah Beach to Cherbourg by Roland Ruppenthal, is of some interest when comparing books about the Battle for Cherbourg, and we've included a quote from Ruppenthal alongside those by Havers and Rawson describing the attack by the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment on 22 June. (See above.)
   While Havers comments that Ruppenthal is "...a fine reference work but is not an easy read," it's worth noting that Utah Beach to Cherbourg, which contains around fifty solid pages of text (far fewer photos) specifically on Cherbourg, should not be ignored when investigating books on this subject. Ruppenthal also appears to have provided some inspiration for the newer books. Here are some excerpts about preparations for the attack:
   First, Rawson:

   As the infantry reports on the enemy fortifications protecting Cherbourg continued to flood in, General Collins was preparing a coordinated air and ground assault for the afternoon of 22 June. Although the availability and timing of the air strikes depended very much on the weather, planning still went ahead. In the meantime. General Collins explored the possibility of negotiating surrender terms and teams armed with loudspeakers broadcast messages in German, French, Polish and Russian throughout the night.

   Second, Havers:

   On the night of 21 June came the first act in the taking of Cherbourg. Maj Gen Collins sent a message to GenLt von Schlieben, the commander of the German ground forces. Collins candidly pointed out the position that von Schlieben was isolated from the rest of the German forces and surrounded by the Americans. Collins demanded that the German forces in and around Cherbourg surrender, with his ultimatum expiring at 0900 hours on 22 June. This message was also broadcast to the defenders and, in a reflection of the heterogeneous composition of the 'German' forces, was transmitted in Polish, French and Russian as well as German.

   Finally, Ruppenthal from 1947:

   On the night of 21 June General Collins sent an ultimatum by radio and messenger to the commander of the German ground forces, General von Schlieben. Pointing out that Cherbourg was isolated and the German position hopeless, he asked for the surrender of the port. The message was broadcast in Polish, Russian, and French, as well as in German, to the members of the enemy garrison. The ultimatum was to expire at 0900 on 22 June.

   Leaving Ruppenthal out of the equation, how do the new books on Cherbourg from Rawson and Havers stack up against each other? Havers gets the edge on visual appearance, maps, OBs, and captions for photos. Havers also decisively wins the competition for best information about touring the battlefield. However, Rawson clearly provides more text and greater detail about almost every aspect of the campaign. Prospective buyers who thumb through both volumes in a bookstore will probably lean toward Havers because his book is hardcover, more visually pleasing, and contains a competent account of the battle. Anyone interested in greater depth and detail, however, will probably lean toward the Rawson book because it significantly outweighs Havers in terms of text covering the actual operations.
   Whichever book you prefer, it's nice to see a pair of serious works about this important part of the campaign in Normandy.
   Both books are available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the publishers and/or their distributors.
   Thanks to Sutton and Casemate (US distributor for Pen and Sword) for providing these review copies.