ISBN 2-915239-50-9
192 pages

Foreword; maps; photos; maps; diagrams; tables; documents; color profiles; Epilogue; Acronyms and Abbreviations; Acknowledgments

   Somewhere inside this coffee table volume there's a serious book struggling to get out.
   As with many publications from Histoire & Collections, the pages of Dragoon are crowded, some might say overcrowded, with photos, maps, diagrams, documents, and more, so much so that the eye-candy almost overwhelms the text. Just finding where the narrative leaves off in mid-sentence in one column and continues in another column—maybe on the same page, or maybe not—can prove to be a chore, and the constant barrage of visual distractions can easily lead the reader astray. Most of the images (save the rather puffy looking reenactors in their repro costumes) are individually quite good and add a great deal to the book. Unfortunately, despite the value of each individual image, the overall design fails to respect the author's text, as though the Art Department decided his paragraphs were of decidedly secondary importance.
   For anyone who can focus on the words instead of the images, Paul Gaujac actually has quite a lot to say. Gaujac has already done some nice work with his L'Armee de la Victoire series (in French), and his craftsmanship here proves to be entirely competent, while the translation from French to English seems imperfect but completely serviceable.
   For those reading the paragraphs from beginning to end, the author tackles the entire story of the invasion of southern France: the planning, the landing vessels, the German defenses, the airborne operations, the amphibious landings, beach-by-beach action, and the drive to Toulon and Marseilles. While it's true that Gaujac devotes some extra time and attention to the role of Free French generals and units in the invasion, the author doesn't skimp on the Americans. He also devotes a chapter to German preparations.
   The first third of the book, divided into five chapters, sets the stage by describing the background, the strategic decision-making, the planning, the difficulties with shipping and air transport, and the defensive arrangements in southern France.

   Since the Allied forces were to operate in France under different supreme commanders, two zones were defined for airborne operations, the commitment of special forces, and future land operations. The 'borderline' between the London-based SHAEF and the Algiers-based AFHQ passed through the city of Lyons, then continued around the Eastern side of the Massif Central, and finally included much of the region around Toulouse. In the Southeast, the target area of Anvil was limited to the Rhone River valley, the Hautes-Alpes and the Italian border, while the landing area stretched from the Maures to the Esleiel massifs.
   During the early stages of planning, the Allied headquarters had rejected the coastline between Marseilles and Sete for a number of reasons: swamps, risks of flooding, poor landing possibilities, absence of important ports.... The beaches west of Toulon were out of range for planes based in Corsica and those between Cannes and Nice were rejected as well, because there was no possibility of advancing directly inland. The choice was thus limited to the coastline between Cannes and Toulon.
   The consequence was that the latter port became the primary target and would be the only logistics base before the capture of Marseilles. But the beaches of Hyeres which were ideal in all other respects were in the direct line of fire of the coastal batteries on the Giens peninsula and the adjoining islands, and especially within range of the heavy artillery of the fortress of Toulon, particularly the 340s in Saint-Mandrier. Moreover, the narrowness of the roadstead would make naval bombing and mine dredging between the continent and the islands difficult.
   So the choice available to the planners of the Seventh Army and the Eighth Fleet was finally reduced to the sector comprised between the bay of Cavalaire and Antheor cove.

   The next six chapters cover the airborne and amphibious landings, reviewing each beach of each sector.

   The first-wave landing boats had been circling around 'Queen' since 0600. They left eighteen minutes later and were followed at more or less regular intervals by the next four waves. Then the Duane, travelling at five knots, headed for 'Charlie,' with the landing craft trailing behind. She was in position at 0752. A few minutes later a Thunderbolt fighter suddenly hit the water: its pilot had bailed out and was rescued by PC 1169.
   At 0750, as wave No 4 had just passed 'Charlie' ten minutes ahead of schedule, the six LCT(R)s from the Royal Navy 22nd Fleet opened fire. Soon the LCM(R)s and the LCS(R)s followed suit. Until H-hour, as the LCF and LCG 4 flailed the coastline with their gun's fire, rockets continued to fall on the shore. That short-range support, coupled with the guns from the fleet and the aerial bombings, created a devastating effect. The seashore was hidden behind a curtain of fog, smoke and dust. Two landing craft ran into each other, and rockets from LCT(R) 167 fell short into the water....
   Then a German machine gun rattled on Cap Cavalaire and an 88-mm gun took direct aim at the LCF. A screen of smoke soon stretched along the west side of the approach channels.
   The rest of wave No 1 was following: two LCTs, each one carrying two DD tanks, the two LCM(Smoker)s, two formations of four groups of LCVPs piloted by an SC or an LCC, five CVPs carrying the demolitions units who would clear the beaches and approach lanes of any remaining obstructions.

   The final three chapters are devoted to the arrival of French forces and the capture of Toulon and Marseilles.

   On the south side the two groups of tabors had finished isolating Marseilles by occupying the Chateau de la Gelade and the crossroads south of La Bedoule. The only way out of Marseilles for the Germans was the road to Martigues. But the Seventh Army knew that Generalleutnant Schaeffer, commander of the 244. Infanteriedivision, had been assigned by the Fuhrer to command the Festung Marseille and that he would remain in the city even after the port installations were destroyed, which took place on the 22nd.
   In the morning, Truscott and De Lattre had been informed, by a 'secret source' that the 11. Panzerdivision was west of Aix. Each general reacted accordingly, De Lattre by placing the two combat commands of the Task Force Du Vigier south of the Durance River to cover the left flank of the Americans and protect Marseilles. The progression of the 3e DIA into the outskirts of Marseilles was therefore not to his liking, because it involved part of the tanks on which he had counted to combat the German armored division. He was all the more furious because General de Larminat, present, had approved Monsabart's decision to penetrate into the center of Marseilles.
   From the information he was receiving from the center of the city, it appeared that it was premature to attempt an entry. The troops risked being drowned among the crowds of people in the streets and obliged to fight house-to-house combats, whereas a progressive encircling with all available means—including the 1re DMI which was scheduled to arrive as soon as it had reached the eastern suburbs of Toulon—might lead to a battle outside the city center.

   The book with which Dragoon most bears comparison, the US Army official volume Riviera to the Rhine by Clarke and Smith, is in many ways the polar opposite of Gaujac's work. Clarke and Smith produced for the US Army a tidy and focused volume with ample maps and some tasteful black and white photos, but not much else besides six hundred pages of dense text (of which about 150 pages cover the same territory as Dragoon). Besides the obvious visual differences, the restrained and authoritative tone adopted by Clarke and Smith also contrasts with Gaujac's more energetic but comparatively undisciplined approach. Gaujac tends to wander slightly beyond the "official" view of the proceedings and he sometimes focuses on minutiae without providing complete context, such as his description of Truscott's tense luncheon with de Lattre. In a broader sense, Gaujac has a tendency to write about separate episodes without providing a wider view to tie events together into a larger whole. Of course, that same unofficial approach also gives Gaujac ample opportunity to more fully explore topics he finds most interesting and to inject his own opinions when necessary.
   Writing styles aside, Riviera to the Rhine can't compete with Gaujac's ornamentation. Some of the images in Dragoon seem unnecessary (such as "the distinctive insignia of the 36th Reconnaissance Troop," more or less random examples of French identification documents, pictures of "invasion money," and similar ephemera). Other graphical elements are much more worthwhile (including some excellent maps, landing diagrams, and reinforcement schedules). Harking back to the way the sheer volume of images sometimes overwhelms the text, there is also sometimes a disconnect between the narrative and the illustrations. For example, in his chapter on the Camel landing sector, the author writes several paragraphs under the heading "Green and Yellow Beaches" and several more under the "Red Beach" heading; unfortunately, the only map in the chapter—discounting the "German signals net" schematic—fails to identify the location of Yellow beach, omits names of towns mentioned by Gaujac when describing unit movements, and totally ignores all terrain features.
   Although Gaujac makes a commendable effort to improve our understanding of the campaign in southern France, and although he strives to overcome the barrage of eye-candy surrounding his every paragraph, the author also stumbles a bit—or perhaps this was a decision made by the publisher—when he fails to include source notes, bibliography, or index. Going zero for three in those important departments won't encourage anyone to take the book very seriously. Coupled with the highly visual approach of the designer, it's going to be too easy for some potential audiences to mistakenly dismiss Dragoon as simply another coffee table photo book. That would be a shame, because there's some significant information here, even if its tiny font size means it needs to be winkled out from all the hidden nooks and crannies amongst the crowd of images.
   For those who like a visual feast, Dragoon will be a big hit. For those who prefer books where words remain the centerpiece of most pages, Dragoon might almost require too much effort to enjoy.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Histoire & Collections or its US distributor, Casemate.
   Thanks to Casemate for providing this review copy.