ISBN: 0-8262-1658-7
Pages: x + 279

Acknowledgments; Introduction; tables; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index

   For a neutral nation during World War II, or at least a non-belligerent, Spain has certainly generated a great deal of ink concerning the period 1939-1945, with ample volumes in English as well as Espaņol on the Spanish experience, including Franco, the Falangists, international relations, the Blue Division, and more. Wayne Bowen ties all the latest threads of scholarly research into a broad tapestry—all those topics plus many more, including, for example, Spanish film making during the war years—in his nicely done overview of Franco's state.
   Right from the beginning, the author demonstrates his grasp of nuance, noting in the Introduction that, although the fascist Falange was the sole legal political party in Spain, the Spanish government was not actually a fascist regime. Instead, Spain was "...an authoritarian, nationalist, and Catholic dictatorship under the personal command of its dictator, Generalissimo Francisco Franco."
   Bowen also notes, agreeing with historians like Paul Preston and Norman Goda, that the possibility of Spain's entry into the war on the side of the Axis was not as unlikely as some other writers have indicated. For example, Raymond Proctor, writing in 1974, took the line that Franco simply planned to obfuscate, procrastinate, and avoid joining Hitler. Bowen suggests otherwise. "More recent scholarship argues that Spain's neutrality was not the product of clever maneuvering by dictator Francisco Franco, but of mistakes and insensitive negotiations by Nazi Germany."
   Furthermore, looking back to the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, Bowen explains how some historians, including Stanley Payne, believe "...the revolutionary Left—Spain's Communists, Socialists, and Anarchists—had already abandoned constitutional and democratic legitimacy in the months before the Nationalist rebels rose against the Republic in July 1936." Thus, the Nationalist coup in that view amounted to a counterrevolution against the Left's illicit revolution.
   Those kinds of nuances, views, and counter-views—often quoting leading scholars from Spain and elsewhere—appear throughout the book, which is organized thematically:

• Foreign policy
• Domestic politics
• The economy
• Culture and leisure
• Women
• The Catholic Church
• The authoritarian state and the opposition

   All decisions about entering the war, according to Bowen in the opening chapter, were ultimately in the hands of Franco. Whether because of or despite that authoritarian decision-making, the author claims that Spanish foreign policy was a story of "bumbling and uncertainty" and he reiterates that only luck kept Spain out of the war. The first chapter follows key points in the road from the end of the civil war through the beginning of WWII, including support for the Italian invasion of Albania, joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, withdrawal from the League of Nations, and a somewhat dismayed response to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the German invasion of "Catholic Poland." In September 1939 the British declared a blockade of Spain in order to prevent war materials from being transported to Germany. Despite proclamations of neutrality, as a whole Spain seemed relatively pro-German and many Falangists were ready to enter the war on Hitler's side. Of course, all Nationalist factions in Spain excoriated the Soviet Union when the hated Bolsheviks invaded Finland.

   The Nazi invasion of France in May 1940 transformed Spain's strategic position. Within a few weeks, by early June 1940, there were German troops heading for the Spanish border, and there was no guarantee that they would stop there. Despite an insistence that Spain would continue in its "strict neutrality," the Caudillo was already reconsidering the strategic position of his nation. Worried about the changing circumstance, but also hoping to take advantage of the new situation, perhaps to gain some of France's North African territories, on June 3 Franco sent one of his top generals, Juan Vigon, to meet with Hitler. Vigon's mission was to find out what the Germans were willing to give in exchange for Spain entering the war. Hitler was not yet interested, however, as his hands were full of defeating the French, and he kept Vigon waiting in Berlin for six days after the Spanish general's arrival on June 10.
   In the meantime, the French armies collapsed and Italy entered the war on June 10. Two days later Franco, in a show of affinity for the Axis, declared Spain's nonbelligerency and support for Germany and Italy. Italy had declared its own nonbelligerency in September 1939 before entering the war in 1940, and most observers saw this move by Franco in the same light: a prelude to war. Even the Spanish press agreed with this assessment, declaring that the nation could not remain indifferent with the entry of Italy and the spread of the war to the Mediterranean. Spain's press called for "victory for those who have resolutely wanted and aided in her victory," a phrase which could only refer to the Axis states. While Franco at that moment did not enter the war, he did allow German submarines to use Spanish waters and encouraged cooperation with Nazi intelligence agencies, despite official denials of both actions. It seemed only a matter of time before Spain joined the Axis.

   At that moment Hitler was not interested in gaining a destitute ally—even though, according to Bowen, the Spanish Army was during the summer of 1940 drawing up plans for invading French Morocco—but soon the situation would shift. Likewise, although Spain never invaded French territory, Franco did occupy the internationally controlled city of Tangier and allowed Germany to open a consulate there. At the time, in many circles belief existed that the next Spanish strike would be against Gibraltar. The new British ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, exerted every effort keep Spain out of the war and prevent seizure of the Rock, including bribery of "influential military figures."
   Meanwhile, Ramon Serrano Suner, Franco's brother-in-law and soon-to-be Foreign Minister, travelled to Germany to renew discussions about Spanish entry into the war. Again, Bowen characterizes these as serious negotiations with Franco perfectly willing—under the appropriate circumstances—to join the conflict. However, in Serrano Suner's opinion the Germans proved unable to negotiate seriously while tactlessly demanding concessions for bases on Spanish territory.
   The climactic meeting between Franco and Hitler at Hendaye in October 1940 Bowen describes in less than two pages. Franco made great demands. Hitler promised nothing. No agreement emerged, and neither side expected the other to change its position. According to the author, Hitler had already decided that Spain's cooperation was not worth the cost, while Franco realized he had little to offer and little leverage. Soon afterwards, Franco finally determined once and for all to stay out of the war. This perspective differs from the more familiar story of the Caudillo, having already decided to stay out of the war, simply making outrageous and impossible demands at Hendaye to keep Hitler at bay. Unfortunately, this is an example of a certain lack of depth in some parts of Bowen's relatively slender book, neglecting to compare and contrast different interpretations of Hendaye and failing to explain how the scholarly view of the meeting has evolved over the years. Similarly, of the role of Admiral Canaris, chief of the Abwehr, in dealing with Spain—some suspect Canaris secretly advised Franco to avoid entanglement with Germany—Bowen has almost nothing to say.
   In any event, the first chapter concludes by repeating that during much of 1940 both Franco and Hitler wanted Spain as an actively belligerent military ally of Germany, and such an alliance failed to materialize due to the Fuehrer's unwillingness to make serious promises to Madrid rather than the Caudillo's rejection of Berlin's offers.
   The second chapter continues the story of Spanish foreign policy from the invasion of the Soviet Union through the end of the war and beyond.

   With the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the strategic position of Spain transformed overnight. For one thing, it was no longer likely that the Germans would invade Spain, or pressure it to allow for an assault on Gibraltar, no matter how frustrated they were with Franco. For another, the Nazi return to anticommunism was tremendously popular. Spontaneous anticommunist demonstrations, encouraged by members of the regime, erupted throughout Spain at the news. For many Spaniards the invasion was more than just an extension of the existing conflict—it was a "war for the cause of Europe" and a "total European enterprise" against the "virus" of communism. While Falangists, Alfonsin monarchists, Carlists, Catholics, and those with business interests may have had major political differences, they shared in hatred for communism and anger at the Soviet Union for having assisted the Second Republic. Franco appears to have briefly considered declaring war, at the request of Germany, but Spain's economic dependence on Great Britain made this action unlikely. While Spain did not enter the war after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi betrayal of Stalin began the greatest period of open collaboration between Franco's Spain and Hitler's Germany, a collaboration that would cause serious damage to the Spanish economy as well as to Spain's international image and its practical interests.

   To demonstrate its "moral belligerency," Spain recruited a division of volunteers—the Division Espanola de Voluntarios, or Blue Division—dispatched to the Russian Front to serve as a formation of the German Army. Bowen briefly outlines the service of the Blue Division, quickly noting that the British took considerable exception to such a violation of Spain's neutral status, to the extent that Churchill nearly ordered an invasion of the Canary Islands. Following American entry into the war, the Allies began a program of squeezing Spain with economic sanctions designed to prevent Franco from moving any closer to Hitler. In the wake of the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942, the Spanish Army underwent mobilization, but at the same time Franco realized Spain's strategic position had been entirely transformed. At this point the Generalissimo began to succumb to Allied pressure, gradually limiting or ending various concessions previously offered to the Axis, such as refueling facilities for U-boats. (Bowen does not otherwise address the issue of U-boats and German supply ships in Spanish waters.) The fall of Mussolini in the summer of 1943 also gave Falangist leaders pause as they considered how rapidly their comradely regime had collapsed.
   In October Franco announced that Spain was shifting its policy from non-belligerency to neutrality. A few weeks later the Blue Division was withdrawn from the Russian Front. In addition, Spanish workers were gradually recalled from Germany. By the time Allied ground troops in France reached the Spanish border, permanently isolating Spain from Germany, Madrid's realignment to strict neutrality was almost complete, and "...the Franco regime made every effort to get on the good side of the Allies."
   Bowen introduces one very interesting and little-studied aspect of Spanish diplomacy in the last months of the war (see also Florentino Rodao) when Franco nearly joined the Allies by declaring war on Japan and proposing the dispatch of Spanish troops to the Pacific.

   One more time before the end of the Second World War, Spain stood on the brink of entering the conflict. This time, however, Franco briefly considered joining the Allies. The precipitating event was an attack on Spaniards by Japanese troops evacuating Manila in February 1945, which occurred in the context of larger Japanese atrocities against Philippine and foreign civilians. Ignoring Spanish neutrality and the positive reception many Spaniards had given to the initial Japanese occupation in 1942, on February 12, 1945, several hundred Japanese soldiers fired on Madrid's consulate in Manila, and also set several buildings on fire, in an attempt to strike at the more than one hundred people taking refuge there. The Japanese even fired at those trying to escape from burning buildings. The previously friendly relations between Spain and Japan, including Spanish recognition of a pro-Japanese collaborationist as the president of the Philippines, made no difference. Even Germans in Manila received the same brutal treatment by the retreating Japanese.
   Fifty Spanish priests, monks, and nuns and 250 civilians died at the hands of the Imperial Army and Navy troops. Property damage was also severe, as the attack damaged the Universidad de Santo Tomas and completely destroyed the convent of Lourdes, the convent-churches of San Nicolas, Santa Isabel, San Agustin, the Catholic high school and church of San Marcelino, the residence and hospice of San Jose, the high school of Concordia, and the Spanish-owned tobacco factory "La Yebana." All told, the Japanese destroyed 80 percent of the urban property of Spanish citizens or institutions. More than six hundred Spaniards, out of a colony of only seventeen hundred, were killed or injured as a result of this assault, victims of what the Spanish press called "the fury of Nippon." A Catholic priest, Father J. Tejada, was decapitated by a Japanese army colonel when he tried to protest the killings. Another Catholic priest, Father Jose Fernandez, was bayoneted by Japanese soldiers as he tried to administer Last Rites to the dying.
   The Spanish government reacted angrily when it learned of the Japanese attack and immediately withdrew its diplomatic protection over Japanese assets, which it had been monitoring on behalf of Tokyo in Allied nations. Spain also lodged a very stern diplomatic protest at the Japanese embassy in Madrid, demanding moral and financial satisfaction for the crimes committed against Spanish citizens and property. In addition, Spain protested at the accompanying massacre of more than three thousand Filipinos, some employees of Spanish institutions. Japan did not have answers for Spain, and so on April 12, Franco broke diplomatic relations between the two nations, stating that the Japanese atrocities against Spaniards were "incompatible with the maintaining of normal and friendly relations."

   Despite these last-minute changes of policy, Spain was excluded from the United Nations and the Spanish people were encouraged by the UN to rid themselves of the Franco regime.
   That attitude from the victors of WWII was understandable and grounded in the reality of Franco's role in the conflict. In the last three pages of the second chapter, Bowen recapitulates his views that Franco truly was ready to actively join the Axis at war in 1940, and only German incompetence prevented it from happening. According to the author, that was a lucky stroke for Spain, because the Axis would have nevertheless lost the war, leaving the nation in an even worse condition.
   Bowen next turns his attention to Franco's domestic politics, pointing out that the Caudillo wielded more power than any previous ruler of Spain, including its kings. Given Franco's ability to rule by decree, politics basically involved his steps to preserve his own power. If his foreign policy reflected "bumbling and uncertainty," his domestic political agenda appeared considerably more astute with a balancing of the Falange, the armed forces, the Catholic Church, and the monarchists, all of whom he played against one another. At each internal crisis, Franco was apt to shift the make-up of his Cabinet to alter the balance of those competing interest groups. Similarly, any military officer who appeared to be a rival, such as Munoz Grandes of the Blue Division, was promptly transferred or retired.

   In September 1943, ten of Spain's sixteen lieutenant generals—the highest rank in the army—suggested that Franco should reinstall the monarchy and dismantle the Falange and totalitarian dimensions of the government. In private meetings with Franco, however, all the generals recanted, except three—Kindelan, Orgaz, and Ponce. Instead of confronting Franco as a body, the generals had agreed to meet individually with the Caudillo, which allowed him to pressure them by arguing that the international situation was too delicate or by offering plum assignments to those willing to withdraw their signatures.

   Whatever Franco's innate political skills, economic problems proved far more difficult to redress. Despite dependence on Allied sources of foodstuffs and petroleum, Franco chose to isolate Spain from the international economy as much as possible, and moreover he abolished the free market. Bowen devotes a solid chapter to the Spanish economy, including statistics related to imports, exports, budgets, gold reserves, prices, wages, etc. Readers are informed, for example, that "an adult male in an urban area in early 1944" was entitled to a monthly ration of, among other items, one hundred grams of chocolate, but no meat was available except "bacon or fatty pork" in very small quantities. Unemployment was rampant, and even when rationed foodstuffs were available, prices soared beyond the reach of ordinary Spaniards. Under those circumstances, the black market flourished. Spain also faced serious shortages of electricity and petroleum. According to Bowen, Franco's economic policies only exacerbated all these problems. Had the Caudillo's foreign policy decisions led his nation into the world war, Spain's economic suffering would have been greatly magnified.
   The following chapters move farther and farther away from war-like topics. "Culture and Leisure" deals with publishing, architecture, sports, theater, and film during the war years. Chapter Six examines the role of women in Spain, and Chapter Seven looks at the Catholic Church.
   Chapter Eight returns more or less to domestic politics with "The Authoritarian State and the Opposition," discussing in particular police, security, and intelligence services. The remnants of Anarchists, Socialists, and Communists—as well as separatist Basques and Catalans—suffered harsh repression, and for the most part only exiles were able to actively pursue those causes. In time-honored fashion, "[t]he government continued to use fear of a renewed civil war as a powerful inducement to gain support," and newspapers publicized purported Communist plots while asserting "... [only] Franco could prevent these plans." In fact, few threats remained in Spain, because most of the opposition was dead, in prison, or in exile. Thousands of Spanish refugees in France were forcibly drafted into French labor units when war broke out in September 1939. Approximately 10,000 of those labor troops were captured by the Germans, and—denied POW status—shipped to Mauthausen and other concentration camps as political prisoners. Only about 2000 of them survived the war. Another 40,000 Spaniards in France were forced into German labor units. A further 100,000 refugees subsisted in France until the end of the war. Many of those men participated in the Resistance, and some returned to Spain after 1944 to turn their talents against Franco but without success.
   Bowen's "Conclusion" nicely sums up Spain during World War II, and three paragraphs in particular are worth quoting here:

   This book was an effort to recover and represent the experience of Spaniards during the Second World War, not just as spectators to the global conflict then occurring, but as subjects of a poor country struggling to survive under repression, internal political infighting, and the challenges of constructing a new government and economy after the ravages of a civil war and economic depression. Adding to the significant burdens of the time was the ambivalence of the Franco regime itself, which did not have a clear vision for Spain beyond preserving authoritarianism and destroying the enemies of the state—its rivals during the Spanish Civil War.
   Spain during the Second World War was a nation beset by many troubles and much suffering: a corrupt and inefficient regime, a soured economy, a population divided and mutually hostile, and the machinations of external powers, each interested in manipulating Spain and its leaders to their own ends. At the top of this mess was the dictator, Generalissimo Francisco Franco, whose decisions determined the fate of millions of Spaniards. Although his rule depended on the benign neglect of the Axis and Allied powers, neither of which directly brought World War II to Spanish territory, Franco nonetheless was responsible, and claimed responsibility, for much that happened in Spain during this period.
   Although not always well considered or based on empirical bases, Franco's decrees moved Spain in many directions. It was his policies that established Spain as an authoritarian dictatorship with one legal, although toothless, political party. It was Franco who embraced autarchic economic policies, preventing Spain from modernizing and rebuilding more rapidly in the post-civil war years. Finally, it was Franco who implemented policies that kept one-half of Spain permanently hostile to, and suspicions of, the other half, through his punitive measures against those who had supported the Republican government during the Spanish Civil War. Characterized by his own pragmatism and narrow vision, the regime achieved little success during the Second World War beyond its own preservation.

   Despite all the superlative effort put into the book, the early chapters on foreign policy prove a bit disappointing. Perhaps because so much ink has already been expended on the subject, Bowen does not dig too deeply in that ground, limiting himself to a cogent but relatively brief treatment of the latest thinking on major foreign policy issues but leaving some aspects untouched (such as U-boat refueling, Allied overflights, planning for an assault on Gibraltar, etc). Likewise, this is not the place to find detailed information about the Blue Division on the Russian Front. On the other hand, the book takes a much broader view of Spain during the war years than most works of this nature, and Bowen offers considerably more information on topics such as women and leisure than any readily accessible English-language tome. How many other books provide commentary on the relative costs of producing a feature film in Spain during the war as opposed to importing Hollywood fare and dubbing it into Spanish? Readers with a taste for more detail about diplomatic and military matters will probably find the book slightly disappointing, but those interested in a broader view of Spain's wartime experience will be very satisfied with Bowen's tapestry.
   Ample footnotes. Extensive bibliography. Modest index. No photos or maps. An admirable, scholarly study, but not likely to be a runaway blockbuster best seller. Recommended.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from University of Missouri Press.
   Thanks to UMP for providing this review copy.