ISBN 978-0-7603-3146-0
416 pages

Acknowledgements; Introduction; maps; photos; Glossary; Bibliography; Notes; Index

Appendices: Basic Divisional Order of Battle and Key Units; Table of Equivalent Ranks

   Harry Yeide is rapidly becoming one of the best-known and most prolific writers of World War II history working in the field today. This collaboration with co-author Mark Stout marks what probably qualifies as Yeide's most ambitious effort to date.
   Fortunately, Yeide and Stout refrain from using the term "forgotten army group" in the title of this history of US 7th Army and French 1st Army from the landings in the south of France to the crossing of the Rhine. Even so, the Introduction quotes Charles Whiting's term, "America's forgotten army," for the 7th and goes on to note the army group "...has languished in even greater obscurity." Rather than going with "forgotten" in the title, the book sports the slightly puzzling "First to the Rhine" tag. The Introduction ends with an explanation that might not completely satisfy veterans of 21st Army Group. "We recognize that British forces reached the Rhine delta at Arnhem, which sits above the Nederrijn in Holland below the point where the Rhine gives way to multiple smaller streams, during Operation Market-Garden in September 1944. We are discussing the real thing." That distinction might also seem a bit artificial to anyone who looks up the course of the Rhine, the Bijland canal, the Pannerdens canal, and the Waal and further notes that the latter, despite the change in name, carries approximately two-thirds of the river's flow. In any event, the authors award bragging rights to 6th Army Group and go on to erase whatever obscurity might have previously surrounded the unit.
   The first chapter looks into the planning for Anvil-Dragoon, deception schemes and softening up, the organization of Allied forces, and "the other side of the hill." The second chapter devotes about twenty pages to the landings. The authors emphasize the French contingent represented a major, critically important component of the Allied forces in the south of France. For example, the African Commando Group was the first outfit to land on French territory during the invasion.
   The following three chapters continue to give French forces their due in the capture of Toulon and Marseille and the pursuit up the Rhone valley to the southern edge of the Vosges battlefield. In mid-September command structures were rearranged. The Allied armies advancing from southern France were transferred from control of Jumbo Wilson's Mediterranean Theater of Operations to Eisenhower's European Theater, 6th Army Group became subordinate to SHAEF, and de Lattre de Tassigny's French headquarters was formally redesignated 1st Army. The authors explain all that reorganization as well as the process of incorporating French resistance forces into 1st Army and the so-called "whitening" that removed African troops from French colonial units.
   The Yanks are not ignored. Here's an example of how the book describes their operations:

   The 7th Infantry Regiment sprang Truscott's surprise at 1130 hours on 20 October and attacked northeast of Bruyeres toward Vervezelles. The kickoff was something of a surprise even to Truscott, because it started early. O'Daniel had ordered the troops to move out because they were taking casualties from German artillery fire hitting their bivouacs, and Iron Mike decided he would lose just as many men if they were fighting. Resistance from the surprised defenders was modest, and the Americans cracked the weak line of the 16th Volksgrenadier Division (the reorganized 16th Infantry Division) within the first twenty-four hours.
   The 15th Infantry Regiment struck north of Bruyeres on 21 October to exploit the hole opened by its sister regiment, while one battalion supported a thrust by the 179th Infantry Regiment to capture Brouvelieures. By late in the day, Truscott was increasingly optimistic that he had punched a hole through the German defenses, and he instructed the 45th Infantry Division to throw a regiment forward on the 3d Division's left flank. By the next day, the 3d Infantry Division was meeting scattered resistance, and a decrease in artillery fire suggested that the enemy was pulling back his towed artillery. O'Daniel told Truscott, "There is no doubt this thing is broken [open]."
   The 45th Infantry Division on 22 October was hung up along the small Mortagne River, which ran roughly parallel to the Meurthe. The 180th Infantry crossed the river but was thrown back to the west bank. Major General Eagles' men confronted not only difficult terrain but also the seasoned 21st Panzer Division. With that in mind, the division had attached to it an unusual amount of self-propelled tank destroyers, including its usual partner, the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, plus the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion and a company from the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
   Truscott ordered Eagles to move his 179th Infantry Regiment across the 3d Division's bridge, while Eagles planned a dawn crossing with the 180th Infantry Regiment. The second attempt by the 180th Infantry to cross the Mortagne succeeded, and a battalion pushed out against moderate resistance, joined by two battalions from the 179th Infantry.

   The second half of the book begins with the army group pushing into the Vosges. On 19 November French troops reached the Rhine. In honor of their arrival, they fired a few artillery rounds into Germany ("...the first French shells to land in that country in four and a half years") and dipped a flag in the river.
   The remaining chapters detail the hard fighting of the German Nordwind offensive, the Colmar pocket, and—eventually—the crossing of the Rhine. On all these pages, the bulk of the material covers the action from the Allied perspective, but the authors include a fair amount of information about German capabilities and intentions. Yeide and Stout also relate some telling incidents—the drowning of a general, the winning of a medal, bazooka shells bouncing off a Tiger tank—within the broader narrative.

   After a strong artillery barrage, Company B moved out in three waves across the open field followed by Company C. Company B's 1st Platoon led the way as skirmishers trudged through the deep snow with the 2d and 3d platoons in support. The 1st Platoon advanced some four hundred yards, almost two-thirds of the way to the raised roadway near the chateau's eastern wall. Suddenly all hell broke loose as Germans behind the far bank of the road unleashed machine-gun, rifle-grenade, and small-arms fire. Moments later, a panzer appeared on the road 150 yards to the south and opened fire on the American troops.
   The men had no cover whatsoever and were rapidly taking casualties. The Company B commander kept his head and rapidly realized that there was no place to go but forward. Following his lead, the GIs advanced, firing from the hip, and soon reached the comparative safety of the eastern bank of the highway, where they bunched together seeking to make themselves small. Just across the road not more than twenty yards away, German voices could be heard above the noise of the weapons. Behind them, the GIs could hear moans and cries for help from wounded comrades who had walked by their sides just minutes before.
   Company C was also having a hard time of it. The company commander was shot dead along with two other men. As German fire played across the field, twenty more men went down wounded. A lieutenant assumed command and pulled back the company into the Rothleible Woods.
   This left Company B all by itself hugging the eastern bank of the road as the Germans on the other side fired rifle grenades at the men. The panzer was now in position to fire directly at them as well. A private decided he was going to take on the tank. He fired two rifle grenades at it, but as he prepared to launch a third, the tank fired again with its main gun, killing the private and unleashing screams from several more soldiers wounded by the blast.
   With that, something just snapped in the mind of a Lieutenant Kerr. He rose and climbed up onto the roadway yelling at the GIs, "Let's go!" Electrified by Kerr's action, the rest of the company poured over the road after him, screaming at the top of their lungs and firing from the hip at everything that moved. The Germans on the other side were stunned by this sudden turn of events. Many dropped their weapons and gave themselves up on the spot. Others had to be routed out of their foxholes with grenades or killed at point-blank range.
   Company B's momentum swept it forward through the wooded area. In less than half an hour, the men reduced the outer perimeter defenses and, despite the fire of retreating Germans, reached the seven-foot wall surrounding the chateau grounds. The American artillery barrage had blasted holes in the wall, which enabled the Americans to work their way through. Once inside the wall, they encountered no organized resistance. Company B's desperate actions turned the tide. As it had surged forward, two bazooka teams had moved through the woods and gotten into position less than fifty yards from the troublesome panzer. The bazooka men soon drove it off, preventing it from making any attempt at another reversal of fortunes.

   For the most part, however, this is a tactical/operational account of battalions, regiments, and divisions maneuvering and attacking in conditions that always seem favorable to the defense. The authors most assuredly make it clear 6th Army Group was not lallygagging while 21st and 12th Army Groups were fighting farther to the north.
   Here's how the book sums it up, including very interesting thoughts about de Lattre acting in a manner that maximized the opportunity for the French to fight:

   The two armies of the 6th Army Group fought very different wars. The U.S. Seventh Army was simply one of several American armies fighting in a foreign land. The Americans viewed the war as a dirty business to be gotten over with as efficiently and quickly as possible so that they could go home. They did not share Churchill's strategic post-war vision or the apparent obsession of the French with symbolism and faded glory. The point of Operation Dragoon was to pin down Germans, put more troops into France to kill Germans, establish the logistic capability to kill yet more Germans, and end the whole unwelcome conflict.
   The French First Army was, in essence, the French army fighting on its own territory. General Patch and General Devers had the freedom to fight the war on the purest of military merits. General de Lattre did not have that option. Indeed, it would have been impossible for him to have done so, because de Gaulle would not have stood for it. Perhaps the French insistence on defending Strasbourg best exemplifies the political circumstances that so profoundly influenced the French First Army's behavior. To the Americans, this was French cussedness at its height. For their part, the French were no more willing to surrender Strasbourg to the Nazis, no matter what the military exigencies, than the Americans would have been to surrender Boston or Detroit.
   The decisions de Lattre made that subverted the spirit or violated the letter of the American-authored plans, as vexing as they sometimes were to American generals, were uniformly decisions that gave the French more opportunities to fight rather than fewer. French officers from lieutenants to corps commanders were often overly enthusiastic and eager to get straight into combat even when it was unwise or contrary to orders. Not surprisingly, the French resented the fact that many Americans manifestly held them in contempt.
   De Lattre also had to think about the future and the unity of his nation in ways that Patch and Devers did not. The First Army was the best foundation available for a post-war French army that would be able to defend the security of both France and the western democracies. The alternative was an army founded on the left-leaning and much less competent French Resistance. Would an army built on that basis have been able to defend France against Communist aggression? Would an army built on that basis and with heavy participation by the Communist FTP have wanted to defend France against Communist aggression?
   The 6th Army Group's achievements, and the precedent of Franco-American cooperation, should not be forgotten. It is worth recalling the day when the Americans and French fought a great crusade together, especially in times such as these, when the French prefer to ignore the preponderant American contribution to recovering their country (the Defense Ministry's website in 2005 offered a pictorial homage on the sixtieth anniversary of the Liberation‹and ignored the Americans except for the few units that fought under French command), and the Americans all but ignore de Lattre's army in education and literature about the conflict. The Americans stormed the beaches, and the French were first to the Rhine.

   Yeide and Stout do a good job with First to the Rhine. Although slightly uneven in a few places (probably due to a dearth of sources), the authors write a clear, easily comprehended account that covers all the important events and highlights a number of smaller incidents without becoming overwhelmed by the infinite minutiae of battle.
   That having been said, what other books, it must be asked, cover the same territory? While it's undeniably true that 6th Army Group operations aren't blessed (or cursed) with the same uncountable number of histories as the armies fighting in Normandy, it would be a mistake to call this the forgotten army group. In 1946 The Seventh United States Army Report of Operations appeared, and it was reprinted in 1988 by Battery Pres in two volumes totaling more than a thousand pages. The English translation of de Lattre's detailed History of the French First Army was published in 1952, amounting to 532 pages. As recently as 1993 the US Army published the Riviera to the Rhine volume of its official history series—in this case including the French—with more than 600 pages dealing with almost exactly the same material as Yeide and Stout. All three of these titles are packed with excellent information about the operations of 6th Army Group (and some material covering German forces). If, the army group "...has languished in even greater obscurity," it can only be because readers are not availing themselves of these serious, valuable resources.
   Nevertheless, First to the Rhine succeeds on its own as a useful account of the fighting from the Riviera to the Rhine, especially for anyone not already familiar with earlier volumes on that topic.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Zenith Press.
   Thanks to Zenith for providing this review copy.