Dunn jr., Walter S. Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

ISBN 0-275-95733-0
200 pages

Preface; Introduction; Bibliography; Index.

Walter Dunn is one the most overlooked and under-appreciated historians working in our field today. His previous books (including Hitler's Nemesis and Second Front Now) showcased his abilities to do original research in archival material, uncover previously unknown information, reveal connections between seemingly unrelated events, and draw fresh conclusions about familiar topics. He's also quite willing to cut across the grain of conventional wisdom when facts lead in contrary directions.

His new Kursk is another brilliant contribution to the historiography of the Russian Front. With its publication it becomes the new standard against which other English-language books on Operation Zitadelle must be measured. Unfortunately, coming from a little-known author and a publisher oriented toward academic libraries -- and accompanied by a high price tag -- it's not likely to garner the acclaim or sales figures of some lesser books from media-genic authors and mainstream publishing houses. That can't detract from the importance of Dunn's book or its unquestionable ranking as one of the year's best new works.

This is not a book about personalities or individual derring-do or interesting anecdotes. Instead, it is unabashedly a study of the factual, quantifiable events of the Battle of Kursk on the Russian Front in 1943.

From the opening pages, as he explains how the strategic position on the front arose in the aftermath of Stalingrad, Dunn sternly measures opposing capabilities and intentions against the hard, cold numbers of the rail capacities which limited all options. He very precisely measures the strength of opposing forces in early 1943 not only in terms of component units but also their effective strength in manpower and equipment, usually including numbers and types of AFVs within each formation on each side. (This measurement even includes Soviet battalions equipped with sleds powered by aircraft engines and propellers.)

More than half the book is devoted to setting the stage for the battle with a chapter each to the rebuilding of the Soviet and German armies.

He quotes population statistics, casualty figures, percentages of casualties returned to combat and other numbers to estimate and confirm overall Soviet strength and manpower reserves. He also discusses at some length the numbers and roles of women, especially in Soviet front line units-- something not often addressed elsewhere. The replacement system is discussed, as is the massive Soviet reorganization with its increase in rifle divisions but simultaneous decrease in the number of independent rifle brigades. Tank, artillery, AA, and antitank units receive similar scrutiny. Not only are detailed TOEs given, but the importance of doctrine is stressed.

   The Russians used a formula for the assignment of antitank guns based on the number of tanks expected, the number of rounds required to stop one enemy tank, the number of rounds a gun could fire per minute, the maximum distance at which each type of tank could be destroyed, and the distance a tank could move in one minute. This calculation indicated the number of guns required. Assuming that fifty Mk IV tanks would attack on a 1 km front, the formula determined that fifteen 76mm guns would be required per km. The heavier armor on the Panther, Tiger, and Ferdinand probably doubled the number of guns required because of the shorter range at which the 76mm gun would be effective. Using the 85mm gun as an antitank gun would lengthen the effective range and reduce the number of guns needed.
   To provide the required density of antitank guns, the new tank destroyer brigades were activated, providing central control of from sixty to seventy-two guns. By July 1, 1943, twenty-seven of the brigades (including eighty-one regiments) had been formed, and twenty-four were at the front.

For the German side, similarly relevant details are presented for organization, population statistics, manpower reserves, training, foreigners in German service, etc. In the first months of 1943 Germany undertook an ambitious program to find hundreds of thousands of combat troops among new recruits and from fit men released from other duties to replace losses on the Russian Front. Despite some extraordinary efforts -- figures stress the critical importance of teenagers, females, and foreigners in home-based AA units to permit reassignment of able-bodied men -- German manpower in the East continued to wane as Soviet strength waxed while Hitler postponed his 1943 offensive in the expectation of improving his strength. In the first half of 1943 the Germans suffered a net loss of 100,000 men compared to the Soviet net gain of 1,000,000. Although the Germans did manage to bring numbers of Panthers and Tigers into service, the relative balance of armored forces reveals a similar trend.

In the next chapters Dunn exhaustively enumerates the strength of every German and Soviet division at Kursk and their supporting units. He counts battalions and companies as well as tanks and guns, compares effectiveness, and discusses advantages and disadvantages of the two sides along the length of the Kursk salient. Among his more important points:

   Previously published totals of [Soviet] tanks at Kursk referred to the organization strength of the units in the immediate area and ignored the thousands available in reserve units and replacement depots, luxuries the Germans did not enjoy. In addition to the tanks and SUs in the organized units, the Russian tank depots had large stocks of replacements and hundreds of new tanks were coming off the assembly lines each week
   ...
   Although the Soviets had a preponderance of numbers, about 50% of their tanks at Kursk were light, and many of these were obsolete.

Dunn then devotes a chapter to a masterly analysis of German and Soviet (and Lend Lease) tank and AT development, doctrine, production, ratios, tank recovery, and effectiveness. His conclusions about the value of the Tigers at Kursk -- after Hitler delayed the battle to ensure the new panzers would be there in satisfactory numbers -- are at odds with other analysts.

Chapter seven, in the final section before the description of the actual battle, covers the defensive deployments of the Soviet at the tactical level, discussing layouts of trenches, bunkers, and barbed wire systems, AT and AA siting, the system of front and reserve lines, positioning of reserves, and the critical equations of time required for various reinforcing movements. Kursk brims with so much pre-battle information and analysis that it could have been successfully published without any operational accounts.

Fortunately, it wasn't. When the campaign actually commences, more than halfway through the book, the field has been carefully prepared and Dunn charges forward with day-by-day, division-by-division reporting of the moves and counter-moves. Little is said about command conferences or the decision-making process, and less about the adventures of individual combatants. This is decidedly not the place to learn about the claims of Rudel or Wittman or any of the posthumous Heroes of the Soviet Union. The entire focus is on the units, their strengths, their movements and engagements, their losses, and the cumulative course of the battle.

   The 19th Panzer Division attacked with thirty tanks, including some Tigers, from the bridgehead south of Belgorod at Michailovka encountering stiff Soviet resistance. By 11 A.M. the 19th Panzer had suffered heavy losses, but was firmly established on the east side of the Donets river. At 1 P.M. the 19th Panzer attacked with 100 tanks and lost nineteen to Soviet tank destroyer guns. However, elements of the 81st Guards Rifle Division were still delaying the 19th Panzer at Michailovka on the North Donets. During the night, the German engineers completed a bridge at Pushkarnoie, southwest of Belgorod, that enabled the 19th Panzer Division to bring its tanks across the river during the night of July 5-6.
   The 7th Panzer Division crossed the river and built a bridge west of Dorobushino, 12 km south of Belgorod. The 7th Panzer encountered stiff resistance and was stalled by the 78th Guards Rifle Division at the rail line that passed through Dorobushino. The 78th Guards Rifle Division was reinforced by the 73rd Guards Rifle Division, but by evening both divisions were driven back several km to Razumnoe on the rail line from the south, located on the east bank of the North Donets. The Germans occupied the town after heavy street fighting and breaking up a Soviet tank supported counterattack. By nightfall the 7th Panzer had a tank group on a hill near Krutoi Log, 5 km farther east.

Kursk unearths new facts and draws new conclusions about the battle and the combatants. For example, Albert Seaton writes that the long-awaited Tigers, for which the attack was delayed, were relatively ineffective because they were used in close combat where T34s could kill them. Dunn on the other hand shows that they were often used as stand-off weapons to destroy by fire Soviet antitank positions from beyond the range of the dug-in guns, and without them serving in that role the German offensive would have been even less successful as it came up against the thick belts of prepared defensive positions.

Of even more interest is Dunn's interpretation of the famed tank engagement at Prokorovka. Most previous historians have treated this rather like the ride of the Valkyries, and almost all use the same terms for the 12 July action: "a head-on collision of armor." Robin Cross describes "a confused free-for-all...like knights on a fifteenth-century battlefield." John Erickson speaks of a melee "at point blank range" where "burning Soviet tanks rammed the Tigers." Alan Clark calls it "the Death Ride of 4th Panzer Army" and describes the "clouds of dust" at Prokorovka. Actually, Dunn tells us, the facts were a little different. In the first place the day was damp and rainy. The engagement was not so compressed as usually cited: "It was not a battle with tanks charging on one huge field, but rather a series of attacks and counterattacks across a stretch of countryside ranging in an arc about 20 km wide south and west of Prokorovka, from the village of Ivanovka on the south to the south bank of the Psel River on the north." He estimates there were rather fewer AFVs on each side than usually reported. In addition, most of the earlier historians of the battle have passed along estimates of losses from unreliable sources. In particular, German losses were not as great at Prokorovka as generally reported and in fact were considerably lighter in the mobile fighting than in the grinding battles at the prepared positions.

In his conclusions, Dunn quantifies how the iron laws of time and space dictated from the first day of the offensive that the Germans could not win. The time required to chew through each Soviet position was simply more than the attackers could afford, providing ample opportunity for the Soviets to deploy strong reserves in new positions behind threatened sectors. The preponderance of Stalin's manpower and material was more than Hitler could realize or admit, and Manstein's assertion that he could still win a battle of attrition seems wildly naive in light of what Dunn reveals about the depth of the Soviet position and the availability of fresh men and machines. Dunn also downplays the effect of the Allied landings in Sicily on 10 July upon Hitler's decision to halt the attack, pointing out the much greater threat of the newly unleashed Soviet offensives. Perhaps the most important outcome of Kursk was what must have been for Josef Stalin the highly gratifying proof that his Red Army was now a sufficiently potent weapon to defeat Germany even without assistance from the Western Allies.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming excellence of the book, there are a few areas where it could have been improved. Most importantly, it cries out for maps, but not a single one is to be found. On some pages there is such an abundance of OB and TOE material that it might have been better presented -- and easier to digest -- in charts and tables. And the battle itself is narrated in such a relentless torrent of hours, numbers, tanks, sorties, casualties, and kilometers that it's almost impossible to assimilate the flood of information without slowly drawing a finger across each line of text; Dunn is not a bad writer by any means, but his prose can't always keep up with his material. Finally, the brief "Conclusions" chapter could have been expanded and improved.

Despite those few flaws, easily the best book available in English on the Battle of Kursk. Those with an interest in the Russian Front will certainly want it, and it is further recommended as one of the top WWII-related books to appear in 1997. Kursk deserves greater recognition and sales than it's likely to achieve.

As an aside, much of the minutiae of Dunn's Soviet OB material comes from his own painstakingly compiled order of battle database. This enormous computer file (I had to buy a new hard drive to make room for the copy he sent me) provides an exacting profile of every one of Stalin's units throughout the entire course of the war and must have been invaluable in compiling Kursk. Perhaps the entire contents of his database will someday be available to us on the pages of a thick book.

Kursk is available from online booksellers and local bookshops or directly from Praeger.

Thanks to Praeger for providing this review copy.