ISBN 0-275-96521-X
219 pages

Introduction; Notes; Bibliography; Index

   Although its bibliography and chapter notes include some unpublished manuscripts and microfilms from the Center for Air Force History and the National Archives, the new book from Alan J. Levine is assembled for the most part from relatively accessible published sources (such as the US, British, and Italian official histories). What it lacks in originality is more than compensated with an unblinking focus on the subject, an exhaustive investigation of the relevant sources, and a careful evaluation of the evidence. While many books have been written about the Tunisian campaign and plenty of other accounts include material on the air-sea aspect of the campaign, no single book can match Levine's thorough examination of the Allied efforts to interdict the Axis supply route to Tunisia with fighters, fighter-bombers, torpedo bombers, medium bombers, heavy bombers, submarines, surface warships, and mines. Similarly, Levine has provided fresh insights on the mechanics of that interdiction, including the timing and coordination of air strikes, how escorts learned to protect bombers, the evolution in bombing tactics as the Allies tried new combinations of formations, altitudes, approaches, and ordnance, and the obstacles to taking full advantage of Ultra and other Sigint to actually find and sink enemy shipping.
   The author opens the book with a review of British and Italian positions and forces in the Mediterranean in mid-1940 and (as he does on more than one occasion) reminds readers that, despite some glaring inadequacies, the Italian armed forces were far from the comical blunderers often portrayed.
   He then discusses Italo-German supply problems in Libya from 1940-1942 including limited port capacities (which forced them to send many small convoys—"wasteful of escorts and fuel"—instead of a few larger ones). Similarly, as the larger Italian cargo ships were sunk, smaller and smaller ones were pressed into service. To avoid Malta, the Axis used longer and less efficient routes, sometimes sending ships and cargo via the Balkans. These developments all foreshadow the situation in Tunisia in 1942 and 1943.
   Levine explains the curious, convoluted position of Malta—difficult to defend but simultaneously invaluable as a base against Axis supply lines—and outlines the relationship between Malta and the Desert war as Axis forces aimed to suppress the island in order to allow supplies for their ground offensives to reach Africa while the Allied ground offensives always included plans to capture airbases in Cyrenaica for use in supporting convoys to sustain Malta.
   The opening pages also evaluate the techniques and effectiveness of aerial attacks against ships: high level bombing, "masthead" attacks, dive bombing, and torpedo attacks. Again, these tactical developments foreshadow later operations off Tunisia.
   Levine also expounds upon Enigma and Ultra and the Allied cracking of Italian codes in particular. Italian air force codes were read from September 1940 and the main Italian convoy code was read from June 1941. These, coupled with penetration of Luftwaffe codes used to arrange air cover for convoys, provided reliable, up-to-the-minute information on the Axis situation. As he shows, however, having this information and being able to take maximum advantage of it proved to be two entirely different issues.
   The next important aspect of the war in the Mediterranean surveyed by Levine is submarine warfare. In doing so, he reminds readers that the British undersea effort in the theater "was one of the only two successful submarine campaigns in history" and cost them 45 subs, "almost as many as the Americans lost to the Japanese." This is a very cogent analysis of British submarine types, doctrine, failures, and success which highlights how different was the underwater war in the Med from that in the Atlantic and Pacific.
   Next Levine outlines the course of the war in the Desert, paying careful attention to the interplay of air, submarine, and naval surface forces with the ground campaign. Concise thought it is, this summary manages to convey all the important, interlocking aspects of the campaign in the Mediterranean. Levine also introduces the USAAF in the Middle East.

   Since June 1942, the Royal Air Force in the Mediterranean and the Middle East had been joined by American units. Contrary to what is widely supposed, the first American air operations against the European Axis were not carried out by the Eighth Air Force from England but in the Mediterranean theater. In that area, the Army Air Force with the help of the RAF gained valuable experience, some of a sort quite different from anything it could have picked up in Britain. In the Middle East, the AAF learned much about tactical air support and keeping up with the ground forces in a rapid war of movement.

   In the second chapter, Levine reviews the Allied planning for the invasion of North Africa and details the formation of the Twelfth Air Force. He also evaluates American bombers and fighters, offering in-depth analysis of their performance in different environments and emphasizing the shortcomings of aircraft models and doctrinal limitations—as well as pilot inexperience—as they existed in late 1942 and early 1943 in North Africa. The author has clearly done his homework.
   With "The Invasion of North Africa and the Race for Tunis" Levine first sketches (in less than two pages) the amphibious landings, then segues quickly into the final portion of his lengthy prologue: the creation of Axis supply route into Tunisia and the Allied response.
   The Germans managed to bluff their way into Tunis and Bizerte and establish a bridgehead before the Vichy defenders could decide how to react. But the initial bridgehead was a fragile arc relying on a precarious transportation system of a few cargo ships and a small number of transport aircraft. Fortunately for the Axis, in the early days of the operation the Allied air-naval forces, still relatively weak and disorganized, continued to focus their efforts on interdicting the traditional routes into Tripoli, thus allowing the Axis air and sea transports to slip in and out of Bizerte and Tunis mostly with impunity. It soon became evident that the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica controlled the air above Tunisia.
   Levine goes on to describe the efforts of the Germans to push their defensive screen westward while the Allies labored to advance eastward. Much attention is given to the role and activities of the opposing air forces, but this is still ink devoted to setting the stage and providing the background for the real subject at hand, the attack against Axis supply lines.
   Finally, almost halfway through his book, Levine turns his attention to the main topic. Although the Axis high commands reasoned that it would be "possible, even easy, to maintain a long-term Axis bridgehead in Tunisia," the author provides a grim reality check:

   It soon became clear that hopes that Sicily's proximity to Tunisia assured an easy solution to the Axis' supply problems were illusory. To be sure, the Axis never could have supplied Tunisia without Sicilian ports and airfields, but most of their logistics effort had to be based much farther back. Indeed, most of the factors that had initially seemed to favor the Axis supply effort, even when real, proved wasting assets. The problem was basically insoluble. There were not enough ships nor escort craft or planes to defend them. But partly because of Allied mistakes, partly because of conditions beyond anyone's control, and also because the Axis used what they had intelligently, the struggle to cut the Axis supply route to Tunisia was neither short nor easy. The Axis managed to parry some sorts of attacks, even if they lost in the end.

   This Levine underlines with a thorough review and numerous statistics on Axis supply bottlenecks, shipping shortages, vulnerabilities to air attack, constraints on rail traffic in southern Italy, Sicilian civilian requirements for coal delivered by merchant shipping (which competed with the Tunisian route for ships and escorts), and the ongoing supply needs of Sardinia, Corsica, and the Aegean islands. Levine covers port facilities, unloading capacities, and other facets of the interdiction campaign in considerable detail:

   Minefields: The Germans and Italians laid two protective fields to provide a corridor for their transport routes to Tunisia, making them safe from Allied surface and submarine attacks. But the Allies gradually laid mines in the "safe" corridor to funnel shipping into very constricted and vulnerable lanes.

   Ferries: In addition to merchant vessels, the Axis employed a variety of "Kriegstransporter" (KT boats), "Marinefahrprahm" (MFP, or F-boats), Siebel ferries, and "motozattere". "By January 1943, the Germans had 3 KT ships, 45 MFPs, and 45 Siebel ferries on the Tunisian route.... The ferries were a nuisance to the Allies, but as valuable as they were, there were never more than a fourth of the number needed to supply Tunisia. Even if enough had been built to replace conventional ships, it seems unlikely that they could have been supplied with cargo, berthed, or fueled in the Sicilian ports."

   Airlift: The Axis assembled a plethora of aircraft of assorted models, including gigantic Me 323 transports, to fly troops and supplies to Africa. Although most supples and equipment reached Tunisia by sea, the aircraft were an important supplement, especially for troops. Of course, throughout most of this period the needs for airlift capacity to Africa competed with the need for airlift capacity to Stalingrad.

   Like the Allied forces as a whole, Malta-based air forces were slow to turn their attention from the Libyan routes to the new Tunisian ones, but they gradually began to intercept Axis transports bound from Tunisia.

   They scored their first big success on November 12; a half dozen Beaufighters ran into as many Savoia-Marchetti 75 transports near Pantellaria and wiped them out. The next day, eight of the big twin-engine fighters caught a Dornier 24 flying boat off the coast of Tunisia. They went on to shoot down six Ju-52s and SM 81 troop carriers, which were armed and far from sitting ducks; the soldiers aboard also fired from the windows. One Beaufighter went down, others were damaged; one had to be written off when it returned to Malta.

   However, for the most part the Axis retained air superiority near the African coast, making such attacks dangerous and costly.
   At the end of November, the Royal Navy re-established Force K at Malta with three cruisers and four destroyers. A few days later Force Q began operating from Bone on the African coast with three cruisers and two destroyers. These forces quickly began to make their presence felt, with Force K destroying convoy "H" on 2 December 1942. Following similar losses, the Axis promptly shifted all sea-lifted troops to the decks of fast warships, halted convoys to Libya, and imposed further safety restrictions on shipping bound for Tunisia.
   Despite the initial successes of the surface warships, the book explains, "It would be aircraft, aided by submarines, that would be decisive in the war against the Tunisian supply line."
   Levine follows the painful buildup of the U.S. Twelfth Air Force—flying around France and Spain to Gibraltar, then onward to Africa—as planes were shot down along the coast of Normandy and Brittany, intercepted over the Bay of Biscay, crash landed in Portugal, attacked by AA over Spanish Morocco, and lost to stormy weather. Little by little the growing American force, operating from muddy, poorly-supplied bases (such as Tafaroui, "where the mud was thick and gooey"), began to strike Axis airfields and ports. B-17 strikes were flown by, among many others, General Jimmy Doolittle and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Tibbets.
   The Luftwaffe and Allied air forces began trading effective blows against each other's planes on the ground while interceptors from each side tangled with bombers and escorts from the other side. Both sides varied targets and procedures; in particular, Allies and Axis alike needed to evolve new aerial tactics for escort and interception as the air war in the Mediterranean mutated rapidly and mushroomed beyond its relatively modest 1940-1942 patterns and intensity. In December the American heavy bombers switched targets completely to ports and shipping, leaving fighters, light bombers, and medium bombers to deal with airfields. Levine chronicles all this with day-by-day accounts of missions, claims, and losses. He also looks at air force command arrangements and the role of intelligence. The former proved atrocious; the latter inefficient to begin with, but increasingly valuable.
   In mid-December the U.S. Ninth Air Force began mounting raids from its Egyptian and Libyan airfields against Tunis, Sousse, and Sfax, then began to shift its attention to "the European end of the supply line" with attacks against Naples, Palermo, and Messina mounted by its B-24s.
   The Yanks weren't the only ones operating in the air against enemy supply lines. Toward the end of December two squadrons of Wellingtons arrived and began flying missions against Tunis from Blida. British Beauforts from Malta and Libya began flying radar-guided missions at night and attacking Axis shipping. Fleet Air Arm Albacores also flew patrols against shipping lanes.
   Similarly, British submarines stalked the sea routes to Tunisia.

   For the North African invasion, the Allied submarine force in the Mediterranean—which was overwhelmingly British—had been built up to a temporary peak of 31 boats (five more were on their way out); this was a strength that could not be continually maintained. The eastern Mediterranean flotilla, still based at Beirut, was operating in the Aegean. It thus contributed only indirectly to the African campaign. The Tenth Flotilla, based at Malta, and the Eighth, based at Gibraltar, were the main forces operating against the African supply route and accomplished most of the sinkings in the middle sea. After the landing, the Eighth Flotilla gradually moved to a new base at Algiers; submarines newly arrived in the Mediterranean, however, usually stopped at Gibraltar and carried out a full war patrol there before reaching the Algiers base.

   Despite Axis minefields, ASW air patrols, surface escorts, and unfavorable weather conditions, submarines were "the most effective single weapon the Allies had against the Tunisian supply line in late 1942." Levine provides much information about these submarine patrols, including adventures far afield such as landing SBS men near Genoa to blow up a train.

   By the end of 1942, the Allied effort to stop traffic between Italy and Tunisia had not been very successful, but it had not been negligible either. The Italians calculated that 23 percent of the material dispatched in December was lost en route to Tunisia, while the Twelfth Air Force, in particular, had delayed or destroyed much material after it was unloaded. German records report the loss of 54 tanks, 111 guns, and 964 vehicles at sea (although this may count some material on the fading Libyan route). Some 32 ships of over 500 tons were sunk at sea or in port in the whole of the Mediterranean, 16 of these, according to the Italians, had been sunk at sea on the Tunisian route—six by submarines, four by naval surface attack, and two by air torpedo attack. The performance of the air forces, however, had not been satisfactory, and it was worrisome that most sinkings in December were by forces that were a wasting asset or that the enemy could counter to some degree—surface ships and submarines. The submarines did remain an important factor, but only planes could stop the traffic in the Sicilian Strait.

   Following significant Allied air reinforcements and replacements in the second half of December and a reorganization of air assets along functional lines at the beginning of January, the Allies continued to intensify their air campaign as much as the weather allowed. Attacks against airfields also continued, now with relatively new and effective "frag cluster" bombs. Although costly to the attackers and less effective at strangling supply lines, the airfield missions provided better returns than the sea sweeps.
   These anti-shipping patrols were hampered by poor weather, unsuitable bombsights, and failure to provide delay fuses for aerial bombs. "Despite Ultra information, actually finding ships that were known to be at sea was not easy." Levine studies the methodology of aerial searches and attacks against ships by medium bombers; on more than one occasion, B-25 bombers on sea sweeps ended up intercepting and shooting down Axis air transports. The first confirmed American success in shipping strikes at sea did not come until 20 January (and it was shared with a British Wellington). These pages also discuss the ongoing problem with claiming hits against ships which actually sailed unscathed, and even reports of engagements with merchant convoys and surface escorts when Axis records indicate no ships were at sea. Indeed, as Levine compares Allied and Italian records, even when every available source has been consulted it is not always possible to reconcile conflicting accounts. In any event, by the end of January American performance was improving and the Allies continued to pressure the Axis supply line.
   In February, inclement weather and the Axis offensive at Kasserine Pass grounded the air forces much of the time and, when they could fly, diverted them from interdicting supplies to supporting ground troops. When the bombers shifted back to targets at sea, they met with some success but mounting losses.

   On the afternoon of February 23, another six-plane sweep set out. Near Cape Bon, it spotted seven Siebel ferries and six German motor torpedo boats en route from Marsala to Tunis. (The Americans thought all 13 craft were Siebels.) The attackers met terrific flak. The entire lead element of three B-25s was shot down. The lead crew managed to ditch. Lashing their two rafts together, they floated around until an Italian seaplane saved them the next day. The 310th Group claimed five ferries sunk and two damaged; in reality, two Siebels went down.

   The USAAF continued to try to find a way for B-17s to successfully attack convoys at sea, testing a number of tactical schemes, but without achieving much. "The relative inflexibility of heavy bomber missions, and the lengthy preparations they needed, however, militated against frequently using B-17s against ships at sea. Once a convoy was located, it took at least four hours to get B-17s over it."
   Submarine operations in January and February, including "chariot" attacks against vessels in Palermo harbor, scored better success rates by inflicting heavy losses on Axis shipping on the African routes at relatively light cost. Overall, the Allies destroyed 23 percent of the supplies bound for Africa in January and February, the same rate as December. But Allied forces, tactics, and determination were now in place to accelerate the pace of strangulation. "And they would have done better if the Kasserine battle had not diverted bombers from hitting ports."
   In March and April 1943 the Allies took the offensive on the ground, intensified interdiction operations, won air superiority, and effectively severed Axis supply lines. This was a campaign, Levine avers, that could have been won strictly with air and naval forces if the Allies had possessed enough time to simply let the interdiction campaign run its course.

   On February 26, von Arnim pointed out the newly formed Army Group Afrika was responsible for 350,000 personnel (including 120,000 combat troops). The Army Group's Chief of Supply and Transport had estimated its monthly consumption of supplies at 69,000 tons. To stop the Allies however would require an active defense involving major armored movements, which were costly in supplies, and a stockpile of an entire month's supplies in Tunisia. To wage a successful defense and to counter the expected disruption of the supply system by Allied action, no less than 140,000 tons a month had to be landed in Tunisia. Rommel concurred with this estimate. Kesselring, however, was still more optimistic, while Hitler's response was merely to order that the current rate be doubled or tripled, without disclosing how.... Kesselring promised to deliver 50,000 tons of supplies on the first fortnight in March, in the event only 32,500 tons were even scheduled to be forwarded.

   The Axis forces did manage to implement a number of measures to improve their supply effort during this period. Despite these measures, the Allies tightened their grip. On 7 March aircraft, with an assist from a minefield, wiped out an important convoy. On 10 March a submarine sank a tanker. In a battle from 12-14 March, Malta-based torpedo bombers, assisted in this case by the submarine Thunderbolt (which was itself sunk in the action), destroyed another convoy. In separate incidents, on 14 March two Axis vessels were sunk by subs. On 17 March the British submarine Splendid destroyed another tanker and on the same day Trooper scored a success. On 22 March, amid fierce air battles, Allied planes scored more successes including the spectacular explosion of an ammunition ship in Palermo harbor during a B-17 raid. On 23 March a submarine sank the tanker Zeila. On 24 March two Italian destroyers loaded with German troops hit mines and went down with over 600 soldiers. B-17s sank more ships in Cagliari harbor in Sardinia on 31 March. On 1 April, British motor torpedo boats and a mine knocked out four more vessels. At the same time, Allied medium bombers continued to attack Tunisian ports and airfields and occasionally "intercept" German transport aircraft while submarine victories continued to mount. In March, 41.5 percent of tonnage bound for Tunisia was lost and total arrivals fell to 43,125 tons—well under von Arnim's needs and Kesselring's promises.
   This reduced tonnage, far below the minimum required, forced the Axis to rely more heavily than ever on air transport. To throttle this airlift, on 5 April the Allies launched Operation Flax, a carefully orchestrated series of missions designed to slaughter the vulnerable transport planes. On the first day of Flax, the Allied air forces claimed over 200 enemy planes destroyed on the ground and in the air; although Axis records show considerably fewer lost, these victories were indicative of the way Allied air superiority was now choking off aerial supply efforts. Another Flax operation on 10 April was also highly successful and more kills were recorded on 11 April. After further smaller successes, on 18 April Allied fighters ripped apart three huge V's of Axis transports and downed as many as 70 planes. More victories followed almost every day, including the loss of sixteen or seventeen giant Me-323s on 22 April.
   Allied successes against Axis shipping—by aircraft and submarines—continued in April and May and reached a crescendo of sea sweeps by aircraft, bomber attacks on ships in port, sinkings by subs, interception of air transports, sorties from Malta by surface warships of Force K, and strikes on port facilities and airfields (such as one that destroyed 100 Axis aircraft on the ground in a single mission).
   By the time the final Allied ground offensive began on 22 April, the skeletal Axis forces in Africa were starved of fuel, ammunition, and replacements. Only 29,233 tons of supplies arrived by sea in April and only 4327 by air. In May, 77 percent of the tonnage dispatched by sea was lost.

   The war against the Axis supply line to Tunisia had contributed greatly to ensuring an early and relatively cheap victory there. The efforts of their planes and submarines enabled the Allies to exploit the enemy's fatal decision to fight at the end of a tenuous, vulnerable supply line on the wrong side of the Mediterranean. The Axis suffered enormous, one-sided losses that could not be replaced. In May 1943, the Allies destroyed an entire army group and took approximately 240,000 prisoners (perhaps 130,000 Germans). The German element of Army Group Afrika suffered 155,000 casualties during the entire Tunisian campaign. (All of the Allies together totaled 70,000 casualties.) The Luftwaffe alone had lost 2,422 planes—888 single-engine fighters, 117 twin-engine fighters, 128 dive-bombers, 734 bombers, and 371 transports—with heavy losses of pilots.

   While The War against Rommel's Supply Lines might not qualify as a spectacular, provocative, or groundbreaking blockbuster, Levine in workmanlike fashion achieves his goal of bringing together and comparing all the evidence on a vast and under-appreciated air-sea struggle. Readers might wish for more maps (of which there is only one), charts, diagrams, and photos (there are none of those latter three items), but overall this is a readable and informative account which should be welcomed by anyone with an interest in air-sea operations in World War II. Recommended.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the Praeger.
   Thanks to Praeger for providing this review copy.