Abstract

This chapter explains macro cultural psychology as a psychological theory and discipline. It conceptualizes psychological phenomena as part of macro cultural factors -- social institutions, artifacts, and cultural concepts. Specifically, macro cultural psychology explains how psychological phenomena originate in macro cultural factors, embody their features, represent macro cultural factors, solidify and sustain macro cultural factors, and are objectified in them. The chapter presents examples of these points with regard to emotions, adolescence, mental illness, agency, sensory processes, and self concept.

Macro cultural psychology is shown to be a coherent general psychological theory that encompasses biological processes and individual variations within macro cultural cornerstones, in logically consistent ways. The theory draws on the pioneering work of Vygotsky, Luria, and Leontiev.
Keywords: macro culture, interpersonal interactions, social structure, mental illness, agency, emotions, adolescence, Vygotsky, sensory processes

Introduction (h1)

The central tenet of macro cultural psychology is that psychological phenomena are elements, or parts, of macro cultural factors. Macro cultural factors are social institutions, artifacts, and cultural concepts. They are the broad, enduring cornerstones of social life. As such, macro cultural factors are crucial to our survival and fulfillment. Human psychology is intrinsic to this scenario. Psychology evolved to plan and implement macro cultural phenomena, thereby enhancing our survival and fulfillment. Psychology is the motivation, perception, emotions, self-concept, reasoning, and memory of cultural behavior which forms artifacts, concepts, and institutions. The discipline of macro cultural psychology explores the cultural origins, locus, characteristics, and function of psychological phenomena. The term macro cultural psychology may be traced to Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model. He enumerates a set of social contexts (levels, layers) from the micro, interpersonal level, to broader levels, some of which are indirectly experienced -- such as children being affected by parents’ working conditions as these affect parents’ interactions with children. The broadest level, which forms the framework of parameters for all the other narrower levels, is the macro social structure:

the complex of nested, interconnected systems is viewed as a manifestation of overarching patterns of ideology and organization of the social institutions common to a particular culture or subculture. Such generalized patterns are referred to
as macrosystems. Within a given society or social group, the structure and substance of micro-, meso-, and exosystems tend to be similar, as if they were constructed from the same master model (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 8; Ratner, 1991, pp. 172-178).

The macro level is the core of, and key to, all the layers and factors in a society. “Public policy is a part of the macro system determining the specific properties of exo-, meso-, and microsystems that occur at the level of everyday life and steer the course of behavior and development” (ibid., p. 9).

Cultural psychology was originally conceived as macro cultural psychology. This emphasis was maintained by Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal in their journal Zeitschrift fur Volkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft [Journal of Cultural Psychology and Linguistics] which was inaugurated in 1860. It seems that the term Volkerpsychologie was coined by Wilhelm Humboldt at the turn of the 19th century. It was continued by Wundt who believed that macro cultural factors are more conducive sites for psychological research and analysis than variable individual consciousness: “Speech, myths and customs constitute a series of closely related subjects which are of great importance to general psychology for the reason that the relatively permanent character of speech, myths, and customs renders it relatively easy to recognize clearly through them certain psychical processes, and to carry out through them certain psychological analyses. Such recognition of general processes and such analyses are much easier here than in the case of transient compounds of individual consciousness” (cited in Ferrari, et al., 2010, p. 97). Studying psychical processes in macro cultural factors is also advantageous for understanding cultural components and features of psychology.

Macro cultural psychology utilizes these understandings of psychology in culture and culture in psychology to conduct empirical research on the cultural psychology of individuals.
The macro aspect of culture and cultural psychology was also emphasized by psychological anthropologists such as Shweder in the 1980s. However, it was displaced by more personal and interpersonal notions of culture. I have worked to expand the original macro emphasis of cultural psychologists.

Vygotsky, Luria, and Leontiev developed the most interesting, original, thorough, and central principles of macro cultural psychology. Vygotsky said, "Higher mental functions [are] the product of the historical development of humanity" (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 34, my emphasis). “Once we acknowledge the historical character of verbal thought, we must consider it subject to all the premises of historical materialism, which are valid for any historical phenomenon in human society. It is only to be expected that on this level the development of behavior will be governed essentially by the general laws of the historical development of human society” (Vygotsky 1986, pp. 94-95).

“Already in primitive societies...the entire psychological makeup of individuals can be seen to depend directly on the development, the degree of development of the production forces, and on the structure of that social group to which the individual belongs...Both of these factors, whose intrinsic interdependence has been established by the theory of historical materialism, are the decisive factors of the whole psychology of primitive man” (Vygotsky, 1994b, p. 176).

A.N. Leontiev (1977) further explains this perspective in his article “Activity and Consciousness” (available online: http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1977/leon1977.htm) in his book Problems of Dialectical Materialism: “Despite all its diversity, all its special features, the activity [Tätigkeit] of the human individual is a system that obeys the system of relations of society. Outside these relations human activity does not exist. How it exists is determined by the forms and
means of material and spiritual communication that are generated by the development of production and that cannot be realised except in the activity of specific individuals. It stands to reason that the activity of every individual depends on his place in society, on his conditions of life.” For instance, Leontiev speaks of “the objective contradictions of commodity production, which generates a contradiction between concrete and abstract labour and leads to the alienation of human activity” (ibid.).

Leontiev goes on to say that activity is fostered by social labor: “Historically, the appearance in activity of goal-oriented action processes was the result of the emergence of a society based on labour.” Activity is not a natural impulse of human beings that originates within the individual. Leontiev adds a historical note that “The method of scientific analysis of the generation and functioning of human consciousness – social and individual – was discovered by Marx.”

Of course, internal conscious activity is reciprocally the subjectivity that animates external activity. “the phenomena of consciousness constitute a real element in the motion of activity“ (ibid.) Therefore, both arise and function interdependently. The point is that internal subjectivity activity does not arise on its own (“first”) but only under the stimulus of external social activity. “Once we acknowledge the common structure of external, practical activity and internal, mental activity we can understand the exchange of elements that constantly takes place between them, we can understand that certain mental actions may become part of the structure of direct practical, material activity and, conversely, external-motor operations may serve the performance of mental action in the structure of purely cognitive activity“ (ibid.).

Leontiev provides an important discussion of personal meanings in relation to social activity and collective representations. He acknowledges personal meanings as an idiosyncratic sense of the complex of experiences that comprise one’s personal life. “Whereas external sensuousness associates objective meanings with the reality of the objective world in the
subject’s consciousness, the personal meaning associates them with the reality of his own life in this world, with its motivations. It is the personal meaning that gives human consciousness its partiality.” However, personal meanings about one’s own life are not free inventions. They interpret personal life in social terms, through social values and concepts. Individuals draw upon society in order to interpret the specificity of their personal lives: “In contrast to society the individual has no special language of his own with meanings that he has evolved himself. His comprehension of reality can take place only by means of the “ready-made” meanings he assimilates from without – the knowledge, concepts, and views he receives through intercourse, in the various forms of individual and mass communication. This is what makes it possible to introduce into his consciousness or even impose upon that consciousness distorted or fantastic notions and ideas, including those that have no basis in his real, practical life experience.” Social meanings are so powerful that they distort people’s lived experiences. This is obvious today as oppressed people routinely define their problems in terms of conservative social ideology that mystifies the sources and solutions of their lived problems. I have termed this the psychology of oppression (Ratner, 2011d).

Indeed, societies struggle to structure personal meanings so as to steer people toward a political position. Various political interests struggle mightily to capture people’s personal meanings to their side so that people will interpret their personal experiences in ways that support the political position: “this transformation of personal meanings into adequate (or more adequate) objective meanings shows that this occurs in the context of the struggle for people’s consciousness that is waged in society.” This struggle is evident in American media stations.

Social structuring of personal meanings is not always successful and complete. Discrepancies erupt. “There is no disappearance (nor could there be) of the constantly proliferating discrepancy between personal meanings which carry the intentionality, the partiality of the subject’s consciousness,
and the **objective meanings**, which though ‘indifferent’ to them are the sole means by which personal meanings can be expressed. This is why the internal movement of the developed system of the individual's consciousness is full of dramatic moments. These moments are created by personal meanings that cannot “express themselves” in adequate objective meanings, meanings that have been deprived of their basis in life and therefore, sometimes agonisingly, discredit themselves in the consciousness of the subject” (ibid., my emphasis).

For instance, despite the active efforts of banks and right wing media to blame American individuals for the Great Recession that began in 2008 (by accusing them of borrowing credit that they could not afford), many people realize that they were often the victim of financial fraud on the part of financial institutions. However, these breakthroughs are few and far between.

Leontiev concludes this important article with a key statement that distinguishes macro cultural psychology from mainstream psychology: “although a scientific psychology must never lose sight of man's inner world, the study of this inner world cannot be divorced from a study of his activity and does not constitute any special trend of scientific psychological investigation.”

This sentiment gives an entirely new meaning to psychological phenomena. They are rooted in historical forces such as government policy, wars, immigration, mode of production, technology, art, industrialization, nuclear family, religious beliefs. Psychological phenomena are subjective aspects of these cultural-historical phenomena; psychology is not a realm of its own, independent of these.

In an unpublished paper written in 1929, entitled “Concrete Psychology” -- a term he took from the French Marxist philosopher-psychologist Georges Politzer -- Vygotsky said, “We derive individual functions from forms of collective life.
Development proceeds not toward socialization, but toward individualization of social functions (transformation of social functions into psychological functions)” (Vygotsky, 1989, p. 61). I shall demonstrate that the original social forms that generate psychological functions are macro cultural factors. Of course, history is made by people, however when we speak of historical activity we refer to individuals acting, often social leaders and spokespeople (government officials, business leaders, leaders of community organizations), operating at the macro cultural level to shape social policy and community opinion through cultural media such as legislation, news reports, magazine articles, and art forms. History does not refer to personal history or individuals expressing some personal inclination of their own.

A central tenet of macro cultural psychology is that macro cultural factors generate abstract and concrete features of psychology. Macro cultural factors have abstract features that generate abstract features of psychology; and macro cultural factors have concrete features that generate concrete features of psychology.

Examples of abstract psychological features are “people think, remember, have self-concepts, use language.” “People remember and think in symbols.” These are what mainstream psychologists generally study. They study “memory, “perception,” “emotions,” “language acquisition,” “mental illness.” They are rarely interested in concrete forms of these such as an individualistic self, romantic love, contextual memory, ancient Greek sexuality, Victorian maternal love. Even when mainstream psychologists do address culturally concrete forms of psychology they typically misconstrue them as abstract, universal, natural forms.
Examples of abstract features of macro cultural factors are: macro cultural factors are socially organized and involve symbolic communication; macro cultural factors involve positions of leadership; schools are organized into different grades, and they measure students' learning. These features are abstract because they are indefinite and lack any specific substance. The mere fact that cultural factors are socially organized leaves open what kind of organization it is. Similarly, grades could be determined and measured by various criteria. Similarly, the fact that society has positions of leadership is abstract because leadership could take many forms. We would expect that these abstract features of macro cultural factors generate the abstract features of psychology we just mentioned.

Examples of concrete features of macro cultural factors are: leadership in society X is dominated by the feudal aristocracy; or learning is measured by paper and pencil tests of rote memory. We would expect these concrete features of macro cultural factors to generate correspondingly concrete features of psychology.

Macro cultural psychologists would trace “symbolic thinking” (in general) to abstract social interaction and communication. We would trace specific forms of symbolic thinking -- e.g., deductive logic -- to particular features of macro cultural factors. For instance, Goldman (1992, pp. 15, 17, 18, 83) examines the potential impact of the commodity form on consciousness by looking at advertising which transforms our meaning systems as well as our desires into commodities. Goldman examines the effects on consciousness of “the commodity-sign” -- which is a commoditized kind of symbol, a sign that misrepresents products by associating them with false and irrelevant situations (e.g., cigarettes with nature, deodorant with popularity, cereal
with a star athlete). The commodity-sign is a new kind of symbol that is specifically organized by Capital to serve its interest of stimulating sales and profit. Capitalism is built into the commodity-sign and into our meaning systems. This takes the form of building misrepresentation into the commodity-sign. Since humans think in symbols (an abstract characteristic of thinking) if symbols are commodified then our concrete thinking is that we think in commodity-signs. Commodity-signs structure consciousness in concrete ways, such as accepting false associations and appearances as true, generating strong emotional desires for mundane products, stimulating impulsive action (consumerism), and defining human events (social popularity, good motherhood, happy children, love) in terms of consumer products. Improving (demystifying) consciousness therefore requires critiquing and altering the commodity-sign that mystifies consciousness.

If consciousness/agency is mystified by commodity-signs, then it can only be demystified by critiquing and altering commodity-signs. This requires a specific social analysis of the cultural mediational means that people use to understand things. Consciousness cannot demystify itself by an abstract cognitive act -- e.g., “try to be more open to information” -- which ignores the concrete capitalist form that symbols have. Concrete cultural problems cannot be solved by abstract acts.

In this example, we see that abstract and concrete aspects of psychology stem from abstract and concrete aspects of macro cultural factors. The abstract and concrete are interdependent and call for each other. When we examine abstract aspects of cultural factors and psychology, we are led to examining their concrete features which fill them out. Conversely, when we examine concrete aspects, we are led to identify abstractions.
E.g., when we examine why concrete commodity-signs affect consciousness, the answer lies in the abstraction that “thinking occurs in symbols.”

Macro cultural psychology is a comprehensive theory which explains both abstract and concrete aspects of human psychology as resulting from and residing in macro cultural factors. We dispute the contention that natural processes generate abstract features of psychology while only concrete features are generated by cultural factors; for this would dichotomize psychology into two distinct and antithetical orders of reality with different mechanisms and processes.

Let us examine how abstract and concrete features of macro cultural factors generate correspondingly abstract and concrete features of psychology.

Macro Cultural Factors Generate Abstract Features of Psychology

Burke & Ornstein (1995) explain that tools, cooperation, and communication in general -- not any particular form of these -- spurred general human advances in thinking -- not any particular kind of thinking. Hunting in groups requires “the ability to plan, communicate, and cooperate. These communicative abilities...laid down the mental matrix necessary for thought and reason, language and culture” (p. 11). “To cut a tool demands a set of operations carried out in a specific order. The instructions for toolmaking might have been serial sounds specifying the sequence of physical manipulation necessary to make the tool. So It might be that the first noises accompanying the ‘grammar’ of sequential toolmaking might have also laid down the basics of the grammar of language, because grammar is based on sounds that only make sense (as do successful tool-making actions) if they are done in the correct sequence. The tool and the sentence would be one and the same thing. As the tools refined and proliferated, so did the signs and sounds that described them and their
Burke & Ornstein are speaking about “thought and “grammar” in general, not the grammar of a particular language. The authors observe how food production changed human social organization and psychology. Food cultivation allowed a relatively great deal of food to be produced in a small area, compared with hunting and gathering which required large areas. This allowed for larger populations to live in concentrated areas, allowing for communities. “Where it had once taken 15 square miles to support a hunter-gatherer, a settler now needed only three” (p. 38).

Producing Nature Stimulates Consciousness, Will, Agency, Self (h3)

In addition, cultivating food entailed artificially duplicating nature. Seeds or roots were collected and artificially planted, instead of growing naturally from plants. Nature was divided into elements (seeds, roots) and then duplicated by human action. This led to a stupendous breakthrough in consciousness. Consciousness came to represent nature and redesign it according to human purpose. According to this analysis, thinking was generated by rudimentary agricultural production. The artificial duplication of nature in production generated a corresponding artificial duplication of nature in thought. Economic production generated thought (pp. 39-40). This is why symbolic consciousness, expressed in artistic representations of things, developed during the rise of agriculture in the Neolithic Revolution 10,000 years ago (Ratner, 2006).

Of course, this development was dialectical, not linear. Rudimentary, accidental/spontaneous collecting and planting of a few seeds generated rudimentary representational thinking of seeds as representing plants. This advance of thinking led to more deliberate understanding of seeds and to more careful gathering and planting them. This stimulated more advanced thinking, and so on.

Humans’ reproducing nature led to another breakthrough in consciousness, namely, will or agency. In reproducing nature humans made
nature happen (made plants grow) and this expanded their agency and sense of self.

Social interaction that mediates responses to objects, also provides the differentiation of individual from nature that is vital to forming a distinguishable self. Social mediation also generates the cognitive mediation of behavior through planning, deliberating, and imagining. All of these activity-generated psychological functions and self then furthered the activity of reproducing nature.

Nature was no longer received as it stood. It was reorganized by humans. This marked the break of humans from natural existence. Tools greatly expanded humans’ ability to rearrange nature. “Tools released the tool-users forever from the slow development of natural processes. Now tools could supplant biological evolution as the main source of change” (Burke & Ornstein, p. 10). Paradoxically, the more humans could artificially reproduce the world according to their own needs, the more deeply they understood the world as it exists. The development of human subjectivity entailed a development of objectivity. Conversely, animal’s natural existence, submerged in nature and following its cycles and dictates, results in limited, superficial consciousness of the world.

Social Cooperation/Coordination Stimulates Thought, Will, Agency, Purpose (h3)

Thinking was another psychological capacity that was fostered by social cooperation and communication. Social cooperation spurred communication which spurred symbolic meaning which spurred symbolic thinking. Let us examine each of these three steps.

a) Social cooperation requires precise communication about the social activity. This makes social interchange the object of communication; communication is a social act that involves sharing of information to further social coordination. This social act and social objective is what makes human language distinctive from animal utterances. Animal utterances are
essentially automatic individual expressions of feeling. A fearful animal involuntarily shrieks. This individual expression may coincidentally alert other conspecific individuals to the danger, however, the shriek is not essentially a social act directed at other individuals for the purpose of engaging in a social activity that unites them. The absence of these social features distinguishes animal calls from human language.

b) Language needs to be precise, complex, organized, and symbolic about particular objects and social interchanges in order to pass specific information to other members. Linguistic symbols must contain information in symbolic form which can be transported back and forth among interlocutors. The social interchange of information requires that it be encoded in a vessel of transportation. This is language. Animals which lack this social interchange of information never develop a linguistic system for encoding and transmitting it. Animal communication is primarily animated by one individual’s reaction to an object -- e.g., a predator. In contrast, human language is primarily animated by social interchange, i.e., the desire to share information with other humans to decide how to collectively deal with objects.

Human language is part of humans’ social mediation of their reaction to objects. We do not react immediately and individually to things. We react to things by engaging in a social process. We utilize the collective strength of a social group as the basis of reacting. This involves sharing information about objects we are dealing with before we act. Language serves this purpose of facilitating social mediation of our responses to objects. This is why language is primarily directed toward social interchange, it is not primarily a direct expression of an individual encounter with an object, as animal sounds are.

The social purpose of language is what stimulates it to be a symbolic vessel (representative) of information. The need for such a vessel is to convey information to others to mediate their reactions to nature, it is not to encode information for one’s individual, immediate use. Mere encoding of
objects is not the basis of symbols and language. It is the social transmission of information that is the basis of language which takes the form of encoding objects in symbols. Symbolization is a cognitive means to achieve a social end. Symbolization is a socially-inspired, socially-required, and socially-informed cognitive process.

c) As many scholars have observed, social symbols that constitute language become the means of thought. Thought rests upon language which rests upon social cooperation and coordination. Thought is thus a product of social activity. The social communicative basis of thought is reflected in the etymology of "conscious." It is derived from Latin conscius meaning having joint or common knowledge with another person.

Because culture offers such enormous advantages over individual behavior governed by natural mechanisms, all psychological functions such as intentionality, will, self, agency, purpose, understanding, and interpretation developed primarily to effect social activity. Psychological functions did not develop as individual functions to facilitate individual reactions to objects.

Will, purpose, and agency only exist where the actor can construct or produce behavior. This situation is characteristic of society. Society is humanly constructed; it is not natural. People have wide latitude in the kind of society they can construct. It can be cooperative or competitive, frugal or profligate (speculative), monogamous or polygamous, gender equal or unequal, autocratic or democratic, structured into classes or relatively egalitarian, militaristic or pacifistic, sexually permissive or sexually punitive, permissive child-rearing or strict child-rearing, education through apprenticeship or formal teaching in schools, religious or atheistic, state religion or secular state. This latitude of choice (which is not equivalent to free, capricious, or random choice) is fertile ground for developing will and purpose.

Animals that graze on naturally occurring grass do not, and cannot,
construct/produce their conditions; they find them ready made and are beholden to them. When grass is plentiful the animal is well-fed, when grass is scarce the animal is hungry. The animal cannot do anything about its life-conditions. It lacks will and purpose because it is a natural creature that passively endures its natural environment and is governed by automatic, involuntary, natural processes suitable to natural existence. Natural determinants of behavior are inversely related to agency, will, self, and purpose.

Burke and Ornstein are correct to identify rudimentary acts on nature -- such as gathering and planting seeds -- as contributing to the sense of producing and the capacity to produce. However, the opportunities for this kind of production were undoubtedly few and far between, given the independence of natural processes from man. Far more conducive to regular, sustained construction was social organization. That is why I theorize that social construction was the primary impetus to the human capacity to produce and to develop will and purpose.

The Cultural Basis and Character of Emotions (h3)

Vygotsky emphasized that cultural factors and cultural operating mechanisms elevate and expand consciousness beyond animal consciousness. Human consciousness is more active and agentive because it has a cultural operating mechanism that deals with complex, vast, dynamic cultural stimuli. Culture is the most complex, changeable, abstract, symbolized environment and it requires complex, modulated, flexible, willful subjectivity to envision, maintain, and process these features of culture. For example, when students are anxious about an impending test, the students' anxiety is based upon an understanding of the educational system's rule that test scores are indicators of intelligence, and that future opportunities in education and work depend upon high test scores. Test anxiety is thus based upon understanding of social systems and future possibilities --
“there’s a good chance that the admissions committee of Harvard would like my GPA four years from now.”

Emotions cannot be based upon a simple, immediate, animalistic sensitivity to physical colors and odors. Such simple, natural, animalistic processes are designed to deal with relatively simple, circumscribed, stable, overt, physical stimuli. As such, they cannot rise to the level of macro cultural emotions we have been describing. A fundamentally new and different kind of emotionology and operating mechanism must exist for emotions to be appropriate to complex, variable, symbolic cultural environments and factors.

To love a country is not simply a matter of associating an animalistic emotion of pleasure to “country.” Loving a country requires a different kind of love than an animal is capable of experiencing. Loving a country is loving a general abstraction that has no physical sensory attributes. With human emotion, it is not simply the object that is different from animal stimuli; the quality of love that relates to this different kind of object is also different from what animals experience. The form or quality of love adjusts to the form and quality of the object being loved. If the object of love is a massive abstraction like Russia, the love for that object is abstract. Macro cultural factors generate distinctive psychological attributes that are geared to the macro cultural level.

These macro attributes of psychology extend to micro level stimuli and to natural stimuli such as physical sounds, smells, and colors. For example, we become afraid of an animal in the woods because we utilize the macro properties of emotions that originated on the macro level to deal with macro cultural factors. We become afraid of the bear because we recognize it to be “a bear,” not simply a form of a certain size, color, and odor. The
physical features trigger conceptual knowledge and this is the basis of our emotion. Physical features do not directly generate our emotions. They are mediated by cultural knowledge of the physical features.

We utilize our conceptual knowledge of bears to construe it as dangerous. We do not simply become afraid because of its size or gestures. If we didn't believe it to be dangerous, or if we had a gun with which we could kill it if necessary, we would not fear the bear. Our emotion depends on abstract, conceptual cultural knowledge about things ("bears are dangerous," "this gun will kill the bear"), which is required by cultural life. Animal fear is not generated by this process or operating mechanism. It is a different kind of fear from what humans experience.

The emotions we employ in face-to-face interactions similarly originate at the macro level. Anger and guilt are based upon ethical and legal values of macro culture. If Jill injures John by mistake, John would typically understand this and not become angry. But if Jill deliberately injures him, he legitimately becomes incensed. The reason is that anger is triggered by the ethical and legal principle that deliberate, willful injury is wrong. Western legal principle distinguishes between willful and accidental injury, condones different responses to them, and dispenses different punishments for them. Anger is a legally sanctioned reaction to deliberate harm but not to accidental or incidental injury. (If John did become angry at an unintentional injury, this would be a sign that he lacked the social competence to assess whether a particular injury to him was intentionally or unintentionally caused by Jill -- which is the cultural-legal criterion for experiencing anger.) Research shows that cultures devoid of the concept of personal responsibility experience little anger. Injury is attributed to fate or accident, and it generates frustration and

Interpersonal guilt similarly rests upon a cultural-legal criterion that one is directly responsible for an injury. If someone feels guilty after unintentionally inflicting harm, other people will console her by saying, “Don’t feel guilty, it wasn’t your fault, you couldn’t have helped it.” They help alter her emotion of guilt by explaining that the social basis for it -- namely, personal responsibility -- did not exist. This revised social understanding of her action lessens her emotional feeling of guilt.

The Darwinian Basis of Macro Cultural Psychology (h3)

My argument for macro cultural psychology is Darwinian -- new environments require new behavioral mechanisms and anatomical features. When psychologists attempt to reduce human psychology to animal mechanisms they are violating this Darwinian principle. They postulate similar behavioral mechanisms in radically distinct environments. They are ignoring the fact that the human cultural environment is qualitatively different from animal physical environments and therefore requires distinctive behavioral mechanisms and anatomical features.

Gordon explained the distinctive, emergent macro cultural character of psychology with respect to emotions: "Social life produces emergent dimensions of emotion that resist reduction to properties inherent in the human organism...Socially emergent dimensions of emotion transcend psychological and physiological levels of analysis in terms of (1) origin, (2) temporal framework, (3) structure, and (4) change" (Gordon, 1981, p. 562).

Psychological Phenomena Maintain/Solidify Culture (h3)
Returning to our macro cultural psychological analysis of test anxiety in school, we observe that it not only reflects an understanding of the educational system, it reciprocally reinforces the system. It motivates students to adhere to the system’s requirements to study material that social authorities mandate. This is an important way in which psychology is cultural. It can only direct individuals to culturally appropriate behavior if it is infused with cultural content. Anxiety must be generated by a culturally-formed concern for test scores if it is to direct students to learn material that is on tests.

Intelligence is similarly socially defined by test scores so that it motivates students to study test material in order to demonstrate their intelligence.

Psychological Phenomena Are Socially Shared and Distributed (h3) Because culturally-formed emotions (and other psychological processes) sustain social systems, they must be socially shared among masses of people in order to generate mass participation in the culture. If culturally formed psychological processes were limited to a few individuals, or if they were shot through with idiosyncratic meanings, they would lose their ability to promote culturally-appropriate action necessary to sustain the social system. “Although each person's experience of emotion has idiosyncratic features, culture shapes the occasion, meaning, and expression of affective experience. Love, pity, indignation, and other sentiments are socially shared patterns of feeling, gesture, and meaning” (Gordon, 1981, p. 563). Oyserman & Markus (1998, pp. 123, 109, 107) explain why this must be true.
"Although individuals are highly active in the process of self-making, the materials available for writing one's own story are a function of our public and shared notions of personhood. American accounts of the self, for example, involve a set of culture-confirming ideas and images of success, competence, ability, and the need to `feel good'" "The public representations of selfhood that characterize a given sociocultural niche function as common denominators -- they provide the primary structure of the selves of those who live within these contexts. These shared ideas produce necessary, although often unseen, commonalities in the selves of people within a given context." "Although making a self appears to be an individual and individualizing pursuit, it is also a collective and collectivizing one." "From a societal perspective, self-construction is too important to be left as a personal project. Social integration and the social order require that individuals of a given group have reasonably similar answers to the `who am I' and `where do I belong' questions."

These remarks apply equally to all psychological phenomena. From a societal perspective, motivation, emotions, perception, reasoning, and memory are too important to be left as personal projects. They must all be congruent with macro factors in order to ensure the endurance of these factors.

The social sharing of psychology is qualified by the heterogeneity of cultural factors. Cultural factors are neither homogeneous singly or collectively. Any one factor is heterogeneous, and there are differences among them as well. This heterogeneity of macro cultural factors introduces heterogeneity into psychology as well. Education, for example, is only functional for a select strata of the population for whom intellectual competencies are required. For
the masses of people for whom intellectual competencies are not demanded, educational success is not useful. Society does not encourage them to acquire the educational psychology of worrying about tests and studying hard to pass them. Of course, official propaganda proclaims that all students should try as hard as they can to score well. But this is pure rhetoric which pretends that the social system is open to all applicants. In fact, it is not, and it has no room to accommodate the masses of people who would ideally like to go on for higher education and high-skilled jobs. Consequently, the social system implicitly discourages masses of students from acquiring the cultural psychology that would animate their demands for higher education and high-skilled jobs. Of course, educators do not acknowledge their role in discouraging (cooling-out) students from studying hard and experiencing test anxiety. They pretend that this failure is the students’ own disinterest, rather than the system’s. This is a classic case of blaming the victim. Macro cultural psychology corrects this distortion by exposing the cultural basis of the psychology of people who are frozen out of the upper levels of the social hierarchy.

Macro Cultural Factors Generate Concrete Features of Psychology (h2)

Macro cultural factors generate concrete features of psychology just as they generate abstract psychological features. This is a Darwinian argument. Darwin’s environmentalism was specific regarding physical features such as particular kinds of food and predators with specific characteristics which selected for specific anatomical traits of species. Social environments of humans are equally specific and their characteristics
must be enumerated in order to understand particular psychological characteristics. To remain tied to cultural abstractions would be as inadequate as if Darwin had referred to environments as “composed of living matter” without enumerating specific forms and features.

Situating psychological phenomena in macro cultural factors enables us to transition easily from abstract features to concrete ones for both are present in the same locus of macro cultural factors. This avoids the common problem of remaining stuck in abstractions and ignoring concrete culture and concrete psychology.

In our case of emotions, our analysis of abstract features of macro cultural factors leads to asking additional questions about their concrete features that foster concrete aspects of emotions. We can move from abstractions about success in school affecting future social positions and therefore generating test anxiety, to inquiring into the competitive structure of grades and future educational and occupational opportunities, and the differential rewards that accrue to them, which place great pressure on test scores and augment test anxiety for those students striving for the opportunities. We can inquire into a school’s specific policies, requirements, pedagogy, differential treatment of students of different classes and gender, budget, quality of physical infrastructure, bureaucracy, and decision-making process.

Emotional regulation (h3)

Historian Peter Stearns (1989) describes concrete historical aspects of emotions. He talks about three styles of emotional control – during the American colonial era, Victorian era, and late 20th century. These are broadly shared cultural patterns of emotional regulation that were instigated by social leaders to facilitate new macro cultural factors. For example, as the modern capitalistic
system uprooted community structures and their corresponding religious values, the family unity and individual privacy were emphasized, and they combined to push for the creation of internalized emotional standards that would not depend on outsiders’ judgment or enforcement (pp. 236, 248). The 20th century push for new emotionology was spearheaded by leaders of the Protestant middle class in the United States who were social pioneers of new macro cultural factors. The new, internally regulated emotionology was also spearheaded by American industrial psychologists and other personnel authorities in the 1920s who launched a new effort to limit anger expressed in the workplace and to develop appropriate mechanisms to accomplish this end....Secretarial training also shifted toward insistence on firm emotional control. Foremen were taught that anger control was a key part of their jobs, and by the 1940s, an array of retraining programs attempted to inculcate the lesson that smooth human relations constituted an end in itself. not a random, personal uprising. To achieve the new goals of anger control, a series of strategies were devised...They involved a ventilationist tactic when anger boiled up: Have an aggrieved worker repeat his angry complaint several times, so that the emotion would wear off and be replaced, hopefully, by an embarrassed willingness to drop the whole affair (p. 243).

Workplace anger drew attention after a period of rising labor unrest; suppression had obvious social control functions [to subordinate workers to capitalists]...Middle class personnel specialists like Frederick Taylor and Elton Mayo were truly appalled by the amount of open anger they found among workers. They therefore amended their own original agendas to
build in explicit attempts to banish anger from the workplace (pp. 248, 249).

These macro cultural requirements, features, and functions of emotional regulation were then incorporated into family emotionology by the 1940s. Parents were urged by specialists and authors to employ ventilationist techniques with their children. “Let children talk it out, label it, but in the process defuse the whole emotion. Gone was the idea that anger could be disciplined but channeled” (p. 243).

Stearns’ description reveals that emotional regulation was a social issue; it was publicly discussed and organized by social leaders of macro cultural factors in order to facilitate those factors. It was not a spontaneous, personal expression; it did not originate in the interpersonal domain of the family. It occurred at a particular historical time for historical reasons. It was a necessary subjectivity for particular cultural-historical activities. “By the 1930s and 1940s, alterations in business climate that stressed bureaucratic or sales skills over entrepreneurship placed a growing premium on the kind of emotional control that could assure smooth personal relationships outside (as well, at least ideally, within) the home” (p. 251).

This research on the style of emotional regulation demonstrates that, as Vygotsky and Luria said, the form and mechanisms of psychological phenomena are historically shaped as much as the content is.

Concrete cultural features of emotions: Mother love (h3).
The cultural-historical organization of the content of maternal love is a fascinating example of macro cultural psychology. Lewis (1989, p. 210) explains that

the idealization of mother’s love [in the United States] was brewed in the same cauldron as Revolutionary political thought...The Revolutionary brew was seasoned by a variety of ingredients – republicanism, liberalism, evangelical Protestantism, sensationalist psychology, and just as each of these strands of thought would contribute to political thought, so too would they affect the conceptualization of family roles. The late-eighteenth century revolt against patriarchy dethroned both fathers and kings; and it said that citizens in a society, like members of a family, should be bound together by affection rather than duty...The Revolution...made of affection a political virtue.

This is a pregnant statement because it shows how psychology is brewed in cultural-historical-political factors and also supports them, thus being a political phenomenon. Affection was additionally political in that it tended to appreciate women’s gender role which emphasized affection. Valuing a psychological element that is organized by a social role validates the social role.

The cultural-historical organization of mother’s love was a cultural prop for the entire social structure that included separate gender spheres. “The 19th century’s description of woman’s nature and role derived from seemingly incontrovertible assumptions about the nature of a mother’s love” (Lewis, 1989, p. 209). Psychology is thus a cultural linchpin. Psychology is a subjective cultural factor, or the subjective side of cultural factors.
Plant (2010) deepens this description of the cultural-historical nature of maternal love. She explains how it dramatically changed -- not simply that it changed -- over the first half of the 20th century in the United States. She demonstrates that this psychological change was necessary to the development of capitalism, and how capitalism worked to adapt maternal love to its changing practices. Her book traces the repudiation of [19th century, Victorian] moral motherhood, and the rise of a new maternal ideal that both reflected and facilitated white, middle-class women's gradual incorporation into the political and economic order as individuals rather than as wives and mothers. It argues that the interwar period witnessed the emergence of an antimaternalist critique that ultimately helped to discredit four long-standing precepts that had defined late Victorian motherhood: the belief that the mother/homemaker role was a full-time, lifelong role, incompatible with the demands of wage earning; the notion that motherhood was not simply a private, familial role, but also the foundation of female citizenship; the conviction that mothers should bind their children (especially their boys) to the home with “silver cords” of love in order to ensure their proper moral development; and the assumption that motherhood involved immense physical suffering and self-sacrifice. Of course, such ideas have not entirely lost currency in American culture today. In the early 20th century, however, most middle-class Americans shared a conception of motherhood based on these principles; by the 1960, most did not...Instead, motherhood came to be conceived as a deeply fulfilling but fundamentally private experience and a single (thought central) component of a more multifaceted self (pp. 2-3).
Plant’s statement reveals how the psychology of motherhood is vital to a social order of family relations, work, and politics. Traditional motherhood, and maternal love, anchored an entire social order in Victorian times. Traditional psychology of motherhood and maternal love ensconced women in the home, away from work and politics, and it tied their children to them and to restrictive moral codes. This is a crucial point about the cultural function of psychology. The sentiment that maternal love is the purest and deepest sacrifice known to mankind is not a simple, natural, circumscribed emotion; it is fraught with political origins and repercussions. It implies that women have no other social function beyond raising children. Women are to sacrifice themselves for the good of the country to rear model citizens. The notion that maternal love was sentimental also objectified psychologically women’s exclusion from the masculine realm of calculated rationality. The notion that mothers were pure and were the watchdogs of moral purity similarly reflected and reinforced their exclusion from the materialistic, political, commercial “impure,” “immoral” world. Every psychological element of Victorian maternal love compounded middle class women’s domestic role and their exclusion from public positions of political and economic power.

Culture is objectified in psychological attributes just as psychology is objectified in cultural artifacts, concepts, and institutions. Culture is objectified in psychological attributes because these attributes are designed to accomplish cultural purposes. Because psychology is a cultural linchpin, a new modern form of motherhood and maternal love was necessary for anchoring and facilitating a new social order in which women worked and purchased products outside the home, and in which children had
to be free to cope with demands of free market jobs, consumerism, and politics. Traditional psychology of motherhood had to be undone if mothers and children were to participate in the burgeoning consumer capitalism. Attacking or defending it is a political act that has political repercussions (see Susman, 1979 for similar cultural changes in personality).

Traditional motherhood-maternal love was undone by the social demands of consumer capitalism, and also by its spokespeople who explicitly attacked it and urged more consumer capitalist-friendly forms. “The demystification of mother love should be seen as part of a much broader transformation of gender ideology and sexual relations” (p. 8). “The sheer pervasiveness of consumer culture, its increasingly blatant commercialization...led many to view...sentimentalism in increasingly alarmist terms” (p. 43). Sentimentalism was an obstacle to the expansion of the materialistic, commercialized free market.

The most severe critics of American motherhood were not conservatives but liberals (p. 5). “Initially, the attacks on American motherhood emanated primarily from psychological professionals and the cultural avant-garde. By the 1940s, however, antimaternalism had gone mainstream” (p. 8). In addition, the Office of War Information began urging cultural producers (of media) to support its Woman power campaign which sought to draw women into the workforce (p. 41). As a result of all this, “The New Woman who demanded a career, the vote, and even sexual satisfaction directly challenged accepted notions of female nature” (p. 9).

Between World War I and World War II, momism was attacked as emasculating the nation, rather than upholding its moral fiber. Sentimental maternal love was denounced as unnatural and
unhealthy for mother and child. Motherhood was shifted to a private relation between individuals rather than a cultural duty. This accorded with the expansion of the individualistic free market and consumerism. The doting mother was chastised as interfering with the individual development of children. Maternal attachment was rejected as narcissistic; it should be controlled and displaced by a love that encouraged children’s independence and emotional separation (p. 88). New emotional norms (feeling rules) were promulgated. “Wherever young couples looked -- in popular magazines, Hollywood films, or professional literature -- they found their desires for autonomy validated and their ambivalence and antagonism toward their parents, especially their mothers, legitimized” (p. 109). Maternal morality was condemned as restrictive of individual’s freedom -- as it was on the economic marketplace. “Experts in the 1940s and 1950s repeatedly condemned ‘self-sacrificing’ mothers who concentrated all of their energies on their children” (p. 115). Mothers were urged to diversify their energies and activities as they participated in the economy and politics. Abandoning maternal self-sacrifice was tantamount to abandoning the Victorian middle class gender role! “The decline of the iconic mother [and sentimental maternal love] reflected a fundamental transformation of the gendered structure of American political culture” (p. 56). The mother was redefined as just another individual rather than possessing distinctive capabilities outside the hustle and bustle of commercial society. “No longer a sacred calling and duty, motherhood and homemaking came to be construed as an emotionally fulfilling ‘job’ -- one that would ultimately end” (p. 116).

A fascinating corollary to the change in women’s maternal role and psychology of love was the change in the conception and
experience of childbirth. The traditional Victorian conception and experience was one of intense, irremediable pain and suffering. This incarnated and expressed (and reinforced) the feminine social psychology of frailty, sacrifice, pitiable, and in need of condolence and protection. Women were supposed to be sickly in daily life and in childbirth. A pale complexion was regarded as beautiful because it objectified this social psychology.

“By the late 1930s, a growing number of obstetricians, writers, and mothers themselves had begun to challenge this view of childbirth by depicting it as a wholly normal and natural event” (p. 119). The new dictum was that pregnancy should be as normal for a woman as wage-earning is. “The normalization of childbirth in the 1940s and 1950s helped to fuel, but was also fueled by, the broad cultural shifts this book has traced” (p. 119). This is a keen statement of the dialectical role that psychology plays in culture. “For motherhood to be truly modernized, with the emphasis shifted from self-sacrifice toward self-realization, childbirth itself had to be transformed from a dangerous and dreaded ordeal into an exhilarating experience” (p. 120). Even the term for childbirth -- labor -- lost its earlier meaning of travail (pain, strenuous, self-sacrificing effort) and became a nondescript term. The association of frailty with middle class status changed to sensuous experience representing middle class status for women (pp. 121-122). Culture was objectified in new psychological attributes that functioned to maintain that culture.

As childbirth was reconceptualized away from suffering and sacrifice, and in need of chivalrous male protection, it came to be regarded as enjoyable and normal for the individual mother. And most interesting is that this reconceptualization of childbirth (in line with new social roles) led to a real change in the experience
of childbirth. Childbirth was experienced as less painful than before. Of course, it was physically uncomfortable; however, as cognitive theories of emotion explain, the discomfort was modulated by the sense of individual prowess and agency and physical satisfaction of the mother -- just as athletes minimize discomfort of injury as they concentrate on the importance of the game. Childbirth was no longer regarded as a complicated, sacrificial, mystical experience. This altered the sensation of childbirth. Middle class mothers endorsed the normal easy childbirth associated with peasant women who were known to resume work immediately after birth. The French obstetrician Fernand Lamaze popularized the sense of natural childbirth. “Now the woman who suffered least -- who thrived during pregnancy and experienced little if any pain during childbirth and its aftermath -- came to be deemed most worthy of that increasingly coveted adjective, ‘feminine’” (p. 145).

Plant’s analysis reveals that maternal love was a product of historical forces, as Vygotsky stated. Modern maternal love was fostered by modern capitalist social institutions in combination with cultural concepts that were articulated by social leaders (experts, professionals, government policies, business and community leaders). Changing opportunities and requirements of social institutions generated a sense of new maternal love among the middle class which was articulated by social leaders. This pincer movement was exemplified in the writing of Betty Friedan in The Feminine Mystique (1963). “By giving voice to the inchoate frustrations of countless middle-class women, Friedan helped to spark the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s” (p. 147). In other words, the institutional pressures such as economic needs for women to work and consume products generated popular inchoate frustrations and desires for a new
social psychology including maternal love. Friedan articulated these and congealed them into an outlook and a cultural psychology. Women embraced this perspective and utilized it as their “mediational means” for dealing with contemporary events and relationships and their own self-concept.iii

This kind of macro cultural psychological analysis illuminates the cultural origins of psychology, and it importantly illuminates the cultural limits to psychology, e.g., in consumer capitalism or Victorian domesticity. It enables us to evaluate the liberatory potential of psychology/behavior so that we do not idealize psychology/behavior as more transcendent of society than it actually is. We apply a macro cultural psychological critique to the psychology of people as well as to psychological doctrines that articulate this psychology.

The macro cultural psychology of maternal love can be summarized in the following principles of macro cultural psychology (a full list of the principles will be compiled after additional examples):

1) Abstract aspects of maternal love are rooted in macro cultural factors such as social institutions and cultural concepts. Maternal love for children is a cultural phenomenon just as love for a country is, or just as fear of failing a school test is. Mother love involves concern for the child as a social being, with moral character, appropriate social skills for succeeding in society, even an attractive physique and health. Mother love includes a view of the child’s future and preparing her for it. All of these aspects of maternal love involve conscious thought, planning, reason. Maternal love is not natural; it is not analogous to a mother dog nuzzling her puppies, whose protective sense involves none of these concerns, mental processes, and activities.
2) The abstract aspects of maternal love are concretized by concrete aspects of macro cultural factors. The cultural psychology of maternal love is necessary to a social system. It generates socially-appropriate behavior. Psychology is an active element of society, it is not a passive by-product. Maternal love generated social relations.

3) A social system strives to organize a culturally-appropriate form of maternal love in order to sustain itself. Failure to organize this kind of sentiment would undermine the social system. New social opportunities and requirements for new skills generate the incentive for new psychological competencies in parents and children. In addition, spokesmen of the society explicitly attack traditional cultural forms of maternal love to discredit them and move people to adopt new cultural forms. These exhortations fall on receptive ears because people felt the need for new competencies from changing opportunities and requirements of macro cultural factors.

4) Within the social structure that organizes the concrete psychology of maternal love, the dominant cultural factor is the political economy. The capitalist political economy is commodity production. Commoditization and commercialization were dominant influences on Western maternal love.

5) Maternal love is a complex of cultural-psychological elements which share common features while being distinct. The complex is a unity of differences, as Hegel said. Each feature contributes its distinctive character to the complex. Each feature also expresses/represents/refracts the entire complex of motherhood through its own distinctive position. For example, Victorian, middle class childbirth possessed the distinctive psychology of suffering that crystallized other aspects -- sentimental, dutiful, frail, accepting, needy -- and added to them.
6) Psychology -- e.g., maternal love -- is formed on the macro cultural level for macro cultural purposes, it is objectified in macro cultural factors, it objectifies culture, supports culture, it is socialized by macro cultural factors, it represents a social position within society, it represents membership within society, and it gains access to social positions.

The manner in which maternal love incarnates, and expresses macro cultural factors may be depicted as in figure one.

Figure One
Cultural Constitution (Determinations) of Maternal Love
7) Maternal love was not formed as a personal invention to express personal desires. On the contrary, the personal desire and quality of maternal love was fostered by macro cultural factors.

8) Personal variations in the quality of maternal love are internal to the culturally-circumscribed parameters. They must not violate these parameters or the cultural quality of maternal love will be subverted, and this would undermine the social structure which requires an appropriate maternal love to generate appropriate social behavior.
9) Psychological phenomena such as sensations of childbirth depend on cultural concepts. They are higher social mental functions, as Vygotsky said. The pain of childbirth incarnated, crystallized, and objectified the social psychology (role) of motherhood in sensory experience. The feeling state is only apprehended through a cultural-hermeneutical analysis that elucidates the social psychology (role) which it expresses.

We are concerned to demonstrate that macro cultural psychology is a general psychological theory that explains all psychological phenomena. The example of maternal love represents how all psychological phenomena originate in macro cultural factors, embody these factors, are objectified in them, objectify/represent them, and also sustain macro cultural factors. To demonstrate the general applicability of macro cultural psychology, it will be helpful to present a few additional examples of psychological phenomena.

Adolescence (h3)
Condon (1987, pp. 7-8) explains how changes in technology and social institutions among the Inuit Eskimos fostered adolescence and adolescent psychology.

In traditional times, before Euro-Canadian contact, the transition from childhood to adulthood was rapid and unaccompanied by a prolonged period of adolescence. The harsh arctic climate and scarcity of resources forced children to quickly acquire adult skills for survival. They did so in the isolated nuclear family which was dispersed over a wide area with little inter-familial contact. Interactions with parents far outweighed in importance
interactions with peers. This complex of factors precluded an adolescent social and psychological stage in between childhood and adulthood.

In the modern period, interlocking technological and institutional changes have dramatically changed the progression of Inuit life stages. Increased economic prosperity and security allow parents to earn a living without the contribution of their children. This allows children to attend school instead of working. In addition, the population is concentrated into settlements which enables children to form a peer culture. This peer culture adopted many of the styles portrayed on television, which became affordable with the new standard of living. These interlocking factors place children in a separate social position from their parents, which was impossible earlier. They contribute to the elaboration of a stage of life now referred to as the "teenage" years.

This description reveals how adolescence was formed by interrelated changes in institutions, artifacts, and physical demography of the population. Adolescence is a social role, a social stage of life, a social space, and a social psychology. It does not originate inside individuals from intra-organismic processes -- whether natural or personal. Adolescence is a complex cultural phenomenon that includes social positions, social organization, technology, and psychology. The psychological element is part of the macro cultural complex. It is qualitatively distinguishable from concentrated population settlements, economic prosperity, and attending school, and it can be studied as a distinctive element and promoted as such. We can reasonably talk about the psychology of adolescence and understand the subjective experience as such; It is not eliminable or reducible to the other cultural elements. In fact we must talk about it to have a
complete picture of adolescence. However, it is always an element of the macro cultural complex on which it depends (originates), which it expresses, represents, embodies, and supports. The subjectivity of adolescence cannot exist without the objective conditions. Psychological dispositions would be impossible without the social position, as Bourdieu emphasizes. It is the macro cultural complex that drives adolescence, creates the space for it, fosters it, demands it, is its telos, and forms its attributes.

**Self** (h3)

The modern Western self is a historical product that was spawned by economic changes in England during the 16th and 17th centuries. These changes entailed activities which increased the reliance on personal judgment, initiative, and responsibility. Businessmen made business decisions on their own, and to maximize their own profit. They did not follow traditional community business practices, consult with community members, or act for the benefit of the community. An individualistic self was therefore built into the economic changes.

The culture of modern individualism emerged most prominently and pervasively in England in the century leading to the English Revolution. It began with the rise of a Puritan opposition in the 1560's...Its constituents were the product of profound changes in the English economy. During that century, the privatization of agricultural holdings and the emergence of a national market had stimulated widespread commercialization with incentives for specialized production, technological improvements, and a
consolidation of holdings. The increasing role of individual initiative, business acumen, and responsibility for success in this new market economy generated a rising group of enterprising rural gentry, yeomen, and artisans... The dependence of fortune on an individual's own actions increased the reliance on personal judgment and initiative (Block, cited in Ratner, 2006a, pp. 82-83; cf. Ratner, 2002, pp. 41-42).

This description highlights the continuity between macro culture and psychology. The economic revolution consisted of economic privatization which entailed and necessitated individual initiative and responsibility. The individual self was an integral part of the capitalist economic revolution. Capitalist business required an individualistic self that took individual initiative and responsibility for actions. Capitalism and individualism went hand in hand – macro culture and psychology. They were two sides of the same coin, they were continuous with each other, on the same plane, indispensable for each other.

Within this spiral, capitalist development was the leading element. This is what businessmen sought to achieve. Individualistic self was the subjectivity necessary to implement capitalism. The self was functional for capitalism, it did not arise on its own, in a vacuum. Businessmen did not one day just decide to develop a new form of self. They did so in order to realize a socioeconomic objective. Incipient capitalist development was the stimulus and telos of the individualistic self. It also provided the constituents of the self, its concrete qualities. (The individualistic self is not an abstraction, as cross-cultural psychologists construe it; Ratner, 2012c.) Reciprocally, the individualistic self provided the subjectivity to develop capitalist businesses. In order for subjectivity (e.g., the self) to implement capitalist business
practices, it had to adjust itself to them and take their form. The dialectical opposite of consciousness’s forming capitalism is that it conformed to the needs of capitalism.

These points are true for all psychological phenomena. Psychology evolved as the behavioral mechanism for constructing and maintaining macro cultural factors. Culture was the stimulus and telos of psychology, and both the general and specific properties of culture provided the constituents of psychological phenomena.

**Agency** (h3)

Since cultural issues underlie psychology and behavior, agency is actually social agency. One’s ability to affect one’s own behavior and that of others is socially determined by the institutional structure of society. This structure mediates agency and augments or restricts it. Agency is formed by and in macro cultural factors; it is not an attribute of an individual who freely exercises it. This must be true for agency to engage in culturally-appropriate behavior which is necessary for cultural maintenance. This point is demonstrated by considering the agency of a corporate manager and an employee in a capitalist firm.

The manager has enormous power to realize her goals and to affect her employees and the community at large. This power stems from the institutional structure of the corporation and its relation to other institutions. The manager has the power to summarily terminate the employment of her employees. They, in turn, must obediently leave the premises when she orders them to. If they do not, the police will forcibly remove them. Both behaviors are mediated by the legal structure of the institution. The manager’s power to terminate employees is not a personal power based on personal qualities. If she walked up to employees
as an individual, not as a manager, and told them to leave the premises at once, they would laugh at her. Her power to dismiss them is a legal, institutional power. Anyone who occupied the manager’s position, or role, would have the same power by virtue of the position, not their individuality. The workers’ response is also determined by the legal structure of the institution. Their agency is reduced by the institutional structure (in proportion to the degree to which the manager’s agency is augmented by it). This is a function of the organization of the institution. It is not a function of leadership in general.

A different institutional structure would elicit different kinds of agency from both manager and workers. The manager and workers would jointly discuss management-proposed layoff plans and investment plans in a worker-owned cooperative.

The corporate manager’s agency extends far beyond her employees in her firm. It affects the education of children who she has never met. This effect results from the institutional structure of society: Education is funded by tax revenue, which is taken from wages, which depend upon corporate hiring policies, which depend upon investment strategies.

The corporate manager does not directly affect your education by interacting with you (or with tax collectors, or policy makers) personally, as one individual to another individual. Rather, she affects your education through the network of social institutions that are linked to her corporation. It is the institutional connection between wages, taxes, educational budgets, training and hiring of teachers, and building of schools that gives her business action the ability to affect your education, and the education of millions of students (see Ratner, 2006, p. 60).

She could never have such vast effect over so many students individually. She could never meet and influence so many
students on an interpersonal basis. As an individual she would have no power to make you attend a school with many resources and small classes, or a poor school with few resources and large classes. But she can make your school, and many schools, rich or poor, good or bad, through her wage and investment policy as corporate manager. Her agency is far greater through impersonal institutional connections than it is through personal, individual connections.

Likewise, middle class people have more powerful agency than poor people because of the intellectual and social capital they have acquired through their class position. It is naive to believe that every individual has agency in an equivalent form without specifying its cultural organization.

Nor does agency have any intrinsic capacity to understand, resist, and transform unfulfilling conditions and behaviors. Agency can take any number of forms. Nazis and slave owners had agency. Prisoners do also. Agency does not necessarily lead any of these individuals to transcend their conditions and behavior (Ratner, 2009). Agency has cultural origins, characteristics, mechanisms, and function just as all psychology does. Agency only becomes truly fulfilled when it pointedly adopts a critical cultural perspective and works to transform the macro cultural factors that oppress people. Agency only becomes fulfilled and critical through the social standpoint it adopts. It is not critical and fulfilling in and of itself. Agency does have the ability to reflect on behavior and conditions, however, this is an abstract ability which must be concretized by specific social analysis and action.\textsuperscript{iv}

Sensory Processes: Olfaction (h3)
Chiang explains how our sense of smell is organized by cultural and political factors. Her account dovetails our earlier discussion of pain associated with childbirth. “Odors are invested with cultural values and employed by societies as a means of and model for defining and interacting with the world” (Chiang, 2008, p. 407). The perception and evaluation of odors is part of culture, expresses culture, and is a window into culture. What smells we are sensitive to, and the sensory quality of smells, depend upon the social practices they are associated with. “In deciding what smelled good and what smelled bad, people were making decisions about what activities and people they valued” (ibid). The natural smell did not determine the value assigned to it. E.g., smells associated racial and ethnic minorities and the working class – the smells of their bodies, homes, and labor – were evaluated negatively because these activities and their actors were socially disparaged. Wealthy people surrounded themselves with different odors – e.g., perfumes – in order to distinguish themselves socially. Perfumed scents were perceived as pleasant because of their social association – just as bodily appearances were infused with cultural significances which determined their attractiveness. “The social and material dimensions of odors became inseparable” (ibid). Odor became a proxy of social standing. “Zoning laws in contemporary Western cities have created ‘domains of smell’ that separate industrial and residential areas and their respective scents” (ibid.). “Indeed, because most smells were subject to interpretation, they were incredibly malleable and could be used to advance several agendas, whether concerning the social makeup of a community or the development of its natural environment. Using their noses, Americans thus developed an alternative way of understanding the world and of wielding power, one that responded quickly to variable circumstances and emotions” (ibid).

Olfaction, perception in general, and psychology in general, is a proxy for culture, represents culture, and promulgates/reinforces culture.
Interestingly, third world cities such as Bangkok have developed different categories of odors to signify different social values/distinctions. Thais developed an "olfactory dualism" in which the public stench of refuse was not bothersome, but body odors were. This reflected the "personalistic" nature of Thai society which required the utmost cleanliness of individuals.

A complete cultural psychology of olfaction must emphasize that individuals invest odors with cultural meanings which define odors as pleasant, unpleasant, refined, gross. This cultural content (significance) of olfaction is one source of evaluating a group of people who are associated with a particular odor. However, people are unaware of this acculturating of odor. People erroneously assume that their perception of smell is natural and that the reason they dislike an odor and the people and activities associated with it is natural, not cultural. People thus reify their psychology – their perception – as natural and use it to explain their social behavior – e.g., individuals justify their abhorrence of manual labor and laborers as having a natural basis in olfaction (“Of course I loathe them, they smell so foul”).

Macro cultural psychology negates the reification of psychology and social categories by explaining that cultural practices, status, and values define the physical odor and the social activities and actors who partake of an odor. It is not the case that odors have naturally unpleasant qualities which define people who emit them. Naturalistic conceptions of psychology generate naturalistic, reified conceptions of social distinctions, while cultural conceptions of psychology generate cultural, changeable conceptions of society.

Mental Illness (h3)
Forms (symptoms) of mental illness are cultural phenomena (Ratner & El-Badwi, 2011). Consider the remarkable parallel between Kraepelin’s description of schizophrenia (dementia praecox), and T.S. Eliot’s description of modern society. Kraepelin defined
schizophrenia as “a loss of inner unity of intellect, emotion, and volition;” T.S. Eliot diagnosed the modern condition as a widening rift between thought and emotion, intellect and sensation, and a general failure to achieve unity of sensibility” (Sass, 1992, p. 357). It could not be coincidental that the inner, psychological loss of unity and the outer, social rift arouse simultaneously. The “modern condition” clearly fosters psychological dis-integration. The psychological and the social are continuous with one another on the same plane. Psychologists and psychiatrists try to break the unitary plane and place psychology and society in separate realms. The unity (homology) of psychological disturbance and social relations is seen in historical accounts of mental illness. (Sass, 1992, p. 362).

The feeling of personal worthlessness (i.e., the "inferiority complex") is a historical construct of recent origin. Previously, individuals felt a sense of sinfulness but not personal inadequacy. The notion of personal worthlessness only arose during the past century, evidently reflect a rising individualistic concern over personal inadequacy which is bred by intense competition (Ratner, 1991, p. 270). This is a momentous fact for macro cultural psychology. For it says that even a sense of personal worthlessness is a historical construct, not a personal one. If anything seems to qualify as a personal construct it is the haunting sense that one is worthless. Yet the possibility of this feeling is itself historical. While people have always suffered misfortune and defeat, the psychological response to this, and interpretation of it, as blaming oneself and feeling worthless, is historically cultivated.

Another pathological symptom, the schizophrenic divided self, only emerged in the late nineteenth century in conjunction with multiple, disjunctive social roles. While earlier views recognized
distinct functions or components of self such as soul and body, these all revolved around one self. The nineteenth century marked a new conception of different selves or personalities within one individual. This was reflected in Robert Louis Stevenson’s *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886). This cultural-historical fragmentation is recapitulated in the symptomatology of mental disorder. As one patient said,

“It is as if something is thrown in me, bursts me asunder. Why do I divide myself in different pieces? I feel that I am without poise, that my personality is melting and that my ego disappears and that I do not exist anymore. Everything pulls me apart. The skin is the only possible means of keeping the different pieces together. There is no connection between the different parts of my body (Sass, 1992, p. 15).

The symptoms of schizophrenia -- withdrawal, highly idiosyncratic and abstract patterns of thinking, and a preoccupation with hidden meanings -- bear unmistakable congruence with the broad social relations and concepts of capitalism (such as individualism, privacy, privatized meaning). Sass (pp. 369-371) explains it well:

Consider the emphasis on disengagement and self-consciousness that was fostered by the ideas of philosophers like Descartes, Locke, and Kant (as well as by patterns of socialization in daily life)...This turned modern human beings away from the search for an objective external order, enjoining us instead to turn inward and become aware of our own activity...to take charge of constructing our own representation of the world...Central to these tendencies is a pervasive detachment, a disengagement that demands that we stop simply living in the body or within our
traditions and habits, and by making them objects for us, subject them to radical scrutiny and remaking.

Related currents, more closely associated with romanticism and its aftermath, have tended to glorify the inner self, by implying that human fulfillment lies in discovering one’s own uniqueness and recognizing the central role of one’s own subjectivity. (It is only with romanticism that autobiographies come to be filled with forms of self-reflection focused on the drama and idiosyncrasies of one’s own inner life...)

If schizoids and schizophrenics, like other human beings, are subject to the influences of their social milieu, it is not hard to see how a number of their core traits (the asocial turning inward, the lack of spontaneity, the detachment from emotions, the hyperabstractness, the anxious deliberation and cognitive slippage, and the exquisitely vulnerable sense of self-esteem, for example) might be exaggerations of tendencies fostered by this civilization...

[This is why] what evidence there is suggests that schizophrenic illness did not even appear, at least in any significant quantity, before the end of the 18th or beginning of the nineteenth...Catatonia was not described until after 1850. Even more telling is the absence or extreme rarity of descriptions of clear instances of individual cases of schizophrenia, at least of the chronic, autistic form, in either medical books or general literature prior to the 19th century. The first clinical descriptions are those of Haslam and Pinel in 1809; the first literary descriptions that definitely qualify are those of the main characters in George Buccaneer’s story “Lenz” and Honore de Balzac’s “Louis Lambert,” both written in the 1830s -- and this despite the fact that easily recognizable descriptions of all other major mental diseases, including affective psychoses, can be
found in ancient as well as Renaissance and 18th century texts. Many writers in the 18th century made systematic attempts to describe the known forms of mental illness, which resulted in works like Pinel’s diagnostic system (1901). But despite the striking clinical picture that schizophrenia presents (at least in its acute and florid forms), one can find no account of it in these or any earlier works. (ibid, pp. 364-365). Even Eugen Bleuler, who coined the term schizophrenia in 1908, described a “specific type of alteration of thinking, feeling, and relation to the external world which appears nowhere else in this particular fashion” (ibid., p. 14).

Sass (1992, p. 10) explores “one of the great ironies of modern thought: the madness of schizophrenia -- so often imagined as being antithetical to the modern malaise, even as offering a potential escape from its dilemmas of hyperconsciousness and self-control -- may, in fact be an extreme manifestation of what is in essence a very similar condition.” Sass explains the methodology necessary to elucidate the congruence between macro culture and psychological symptoms:

A comprehensive model of the social origin both of schizophrenia and of the modernist sensibility would need to go beyond this discussion of abstract ideas and mentality and to acknowledge as well how each of these conditions is intricated with the modern social order -- with patterns of political and bureaucratic organization, family structures, economic practices, and technological developments of modernity. The most influential descriptions of these aspects of modernity come from the founding fathers of sociology: Karl Marx -- on the alienating consequences of certain economic structures and relationships;
Max Weber -- on the growing rationalization, technologization, secularization, and bureaucratization of modern life; and Emile Durkheim -- on the juggernaut of industrialization and the growing reflectiveness that cause traditional values to lose their quasi-natural status ibid., p. 371).

Mental Illness and Capitalism (h4)
Foucault describes the structural congruence between symptoms of mental illness and the alienated, exploitive character of capitalism. He debunks the idea that mental illness is a separate realm from society. In fact, the phenomenological sense of separateness and delusion that many patients experience is caused by and recapitulates the alienation, self obfuscation, and contradictions of capitalism. It is not caused by a deficit in consciousness itself. “It is not because one is ill that one is alienated, but insofar as one is alienated that one ill” (Foucault, 1987, p. xxvi).

It would be absurd to say that the sick man machinizes his world because he projects a schizophrenic world in which he is lost... In fact, when man remains alienated from what takes place in his language, when he cannot recognize any human, living signification in the productions of his activity, when economic and social determinations place constraints upon him and he is unable to feel at home in this world, he lives in a culture that makes a pathological form like schizophrenia possible...Only the real conflict of the conditions of existence may serve as a structural model for the paradoxes of the schizophrenic world.

To sum up, it might be said that the psychological dimensions of mental illness cannot, without recourse to sophistry, be regarded...
as autonomous...In fact, it is only in history that one can discover the sole concrete apriori from which mental illness draws...its necessary figures (Foucault, 1987, pp. 83-85, my emphasis).

In sum, while individuals construct morbid symptoms, their construction is shaped by macro cultural factors and it is made from cultural factors. Detachment, skepticism, subjectivism, and other psychological mechanisms of mental illness were objective constructs objectified on the macro cultural level by novelists and philosophers. They were not spontaneously constructed by mental patients. This is an important tenet of macro cultural psychology, that psychological constructs are macro level constructs which are widely known in a population. These are the mediational means that individuals draw on as their psychological mechanisms for dealing with stress and other social factors. Of course, not all individuals draw on the same cultural tools, however, they draw on some cultural tool for their psychological operations. This makes these operations cultural. Macro factors generate mental illness by exerting specific stressors and stresses on people -- e.g., alienation, detachment, insecurity of unemployment and competition (which were not prevalent in other societies) -- and unique models for coping with these stresses -- e.g., fragmentation, skepticism, detachment, subjectivism. This two-pronged cultural influence can be diagrammed as in figure two.

Figure Two
Two-pronged Cultural Shaping of Mental Illness
Biological explanations of mental illness. (h4)

The fact that mental illness is generated by cultural pressures such as alienation, oppression, social contradictions and utilizes cultural concepts such as detachment, skepticism, and subjectivism as its operating mechanism makes mental illness a cultural phenomenon that is not reducible to biochemical
processes. The latter cannot determine-generate the symptoms of mental illness because they are not sensitive to the cultural stressors Sass and Foucault enumerated, nor are they capable of generating culturally specific symptoms such as detachment, depression, schizophrenia.

An operating mechanism is required in humans that is sensitive to social stress and generates cultural-psychological symptoms to it. Biological processes must be invested with cultural sensitivity before they can detect and respond to complex, symbolic cultural events. Biology must be raised to the cultural level, it must be acculturated, in order to process cultural events and behavior. Biology, per se, e.g., the biochemistry of testosterone or a neurotransmitter, does not naturally have the ability to detect, understand, and respond to cultural events in a predefined manner (see Joseph & Ratner, 2012). The operating mechanism of mental illness is no more a simple, automatic, biological response to stress than maternal love is a simple, automatic, biological response to color, odor, and size of physical stimuli.

Demographic variations in mental illness. (h4)

The fact that not everyone in a culture becomes mentally ill does not negate the fact that mental illness is cultural. Society, especially modern society, is complex and diverse, and not everyone in it is exposed to the same stressors in the same degree. The fact that some people escape it simply means that they occupy more sheltered social positions. People who are exposed to stressors intensely and extensively will suffer more illness than those exposed in lesser degrees. Detailed research has proven that mental illness is monotonically related to the
number of social stressors encountered (Ratner, 1991, chap. 6). This is why mental illness is over represented in the lower classes where stressors are greater.

What is remarkable about the cultural content and historical specificity of forms of mental illness is that they exist among people in the depths of despair and disorientation. One might expect estranged, confused, anxious, isolated individuals to strike out with random, idiosyncratic responses that lack social significance and commonality. However, the fact is that the victims draw upon cultural models (values, concepts, practices) as their mediational means for coping with adversity. Even in their misery and confusion, they display social sensitivity to, and social dependence on, macro cultural factors to guide their psychological reactions. This is why there is social coherence to mental illness in particular historical epochs. Our epoch has schizophrenia, eating disorders, and hyperactivity which other eras lacked. Conversely, the Victorian era had thousands of cases of hysteria which has disappeared today because the cultural-historical stressors, stresses, and coping mechanisms have changed.

North American and European symptoms of disturbance rest upon Protestant values of individualism, self-control, rationalism, activism, and introspection. Catholic societies which value communalism, fateful acceptance of destiny and higher authority, manifest quite different symptomatology. Whereas American patients tend toward active symptomatology with ideational distortion and elaboration, Catholic Latin patients tend toward passive symptomatology with a suspension of cognitive effort. Americans tend toward obsessional thoughts, intellectualization, guilt, and self-blame, while Latinos suffer more somatic complaints, sleeplessness, and obesity. Americans are more lonely and suspicious than Latinos, while Latinos are more dependent (Ratner, 1991,
pp. 268-278; see Marsella & Yamada, 2007 for cultural variations in mental illness).

Anorexia and bulimia manifest demographic variations. These implicate cultural stressors, stresses, and coping skills in the disorders. A demographic analysis reveals that 90% of anorectics are women. In addition, these eating disorders become prevalent among non-Western women to the extent that non-Western countries adopt capitalistic social relations. Eating disorders have increased six fold in the past 25 years in Japan with increasing industrialization, urbanization, and the fraying of traditional family forms following World War II. Additional macro cultural factors that spurred eating disorders include middle class gender roles for Japanese women and slim body ideals of beauty.

Anorexia is rare on the Caribbean island of Curacao. The few cases that exist are confined to well-educated, high-income women of light skin, who have lived abroad. No cases of anorexia are found among the majority black population. Macro cultural psychology accounts for this demographic fact. Curacao women who become anorexic were middle class, light-skinned individuals. As such they adopted light-skinned, Western, middle class ideals of thinness. This class significance of slimness is what accounts for the “tyranny of slenderness” in modern society. Achieving the thin body that represents middle class status (as a collective representation) was a means to gaining middle class identity. Black, lower class women had no hope of entering the middle class so they did not strive to adopt its proxies such as slim body form. Body image and eating disorders to achieve it are objective, objectified, objectifying cultural means (coping strategies) to achieve cultural objectives under particular cultural stressors and stresses (cf. Ratner, 2002, pp. 39-40, 49-50; Ratner, 2006, pp. 100-101).

The Normativity of Non-normal Psychology (h4)
Non-normative psychology is actually normative because its causes, constituents, meanings, social consequences, and demographics are cultural. Individuals utilize cultural means to cope with cultural stressors even in non-normative manners. Individual activity does not make mental illness an individual creation. Its causes and constituents are cultural. Unhappy individuals did not spontaneously invent the thin body image as an ideal for feeling successful; they appropriated it from the macro cultural level where it (recognizably, commonly) represented middle class identity and success.

Jackson (1993, p. 212) explained this well:

Our subjectivities, including that aspect of them we understand as our emotions, are shaped by social and cultural processes and structures, but are not simply passively accepted by us. We actively participate in working ourselves into structures, and this, in part, explains the strength of our subjection to them. We create for ourselves a sense of what emotions are, of what being in love is. We do this by participating in sets of meanings constructed, interpreted, propagated, and deployed throughout our culture, through learning scripts, positioning ourselves within discourses, constructing narratives of self. We make sense of feelings and relationships in terms of love because a set of discourses around love pre-exists us as individuals and through these we have learnt what love means.

Mainstream Psychology vs. Macro Cultural Psychology Regarding Mental Illness (h4)
Psychologists and psychiatrists are insensitive to these social origins, mechanisms, characteristics, and function of mental illness.

In North America, especially in the United States, the discussion of social factors in the development of psychotic disorders has changed profoundly over the last 40 years. Whereas macrosocial factors (such as migration and poverty) were once the subject of study and discussion, they have fallen from prominence and have given way to a preoccupation with microsocial issues; the social environment has been reduced to the clinic, and research efforts have focused on how clinicians diagnose psychosis in minority populations (Jarvis, 2007, p. 291).

Macro culture and micro family in mental illness. (h4)

A great deal of mental illness occurs in destructive family interactions (Ratner & El-Badwi, 2011). However, these are precipitated by broader macro stresses that Sass and Foucault enumerated. Indeed, this point is the crux of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model which situates micro level interactions within the sphere of macro processes. Bronfenbrenner terms micro level interactions “proximal processes” which are reflections of distal macro cultural processes, as moonlight reflects sunlight. Shared, unifying macro cultural factors explain why so many families in a country are so dysfunctional as to produce mental illness in their children. A purely family analysis cannot explain varying prevalences and forms of dysfunction in different societies.

Micro, proximal processes cannot be the primary source of mental illness which is historically specific and variable. Individual,
separate interactions cannot explain the cultural coherence and similarity that it manifests. The millions of families in one country that generate particular forms of mental illness in their children do not coordinate with each other to produce similar stresses and coping mechanisms. The similarity in symptoms across millions of separate patients must be explained by broader cultural similarities at the macro level. These radiate down to micro level family interactions and unify them with shared characteristics.

Mental illness testifies to an important principle of macro cultural psychology: seemingly personal, marginal psychological reactions are actually macro level phenomena.

Interpersonal behavior and Macro Cultural Psychology (h2)

The case of mental illness demonstrates that individual, interpersonal psychological phenomena are uncannily shaped by macro cultural factors and reflect their politics, despite the fact that the phenomena are not directly controlled by social leaders. Other personal acts are equally socially distributed “psychographics.” A striking example is the fact that Australia’s homicide rate is around 1 per 100,000 population, while the U.S. homicide rate is around 6/100,000, or 6 times higher. Clearly, central macro cultural factors are at work in shaping individual decisions to kill each other (and themselves in suicides).

Similarly, the quality of children’s interpersonal relationships (with peers and family members) varies enormously among countries with different macro cultural factors. A compilation of measures, by the United Nations, that include single parent households, number of times the family eats together per week, talks together, and how kind and helpful peers are to children among
OECD countries, found Italy having the best interpersonal relations (score of 115) while the U.S. and United Kingdom had the lowest score of 80. Only 40% of German 15 year olds spend time chatting with their parents several times a week, while 90% of Hungarian children do so. Only 60% of Finnish 15 year olds eat the main meal with their parents several times a week, in contrast to 93% of Italians. Other personal eating habits are equally structured by society. Whereas 80% of Portuguese 11-15 year olds eat breakfast every school day, only 46% of American children do. Where 25% of American 13-15 year olds report being overweight, only 6% of Polish peers do. (UNICEF, Child poverty in perspective: An overview of child well-being in rich countries, Innocenti Report Card 7, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, 2007). Demographic distribution of personal behaviors demonstrates that they are shaped by cultural factors, they are not purely personal choices. Purely personal choices and idiosyncratic behavior would not manifest systematic group differences.

Obviously, the majority of German children did not spontaneously, i.e., personally, decide to forego chatting with their parents. Nor did this new norm arise through sequences of interpersonal dialogues among children across Germany. Broad macro factors, which German children do not control or even understand, structured their lives, aspirations, values, expectations, and practices impersonally, in ways that interfered with family chatting. (This kind of impersonal structuring-socializing of individual psychology by macro cultural factors, is an important topic in macro cultural psychology.)

An important macro cultural factor in this regard is consumerism. Consumer capitalism presses children -- through numerous macro cultural pressures, stimuli, inducements, affordances, and models
to separate from restrictive parental authority in order to be “free” to accept consumer pressures for impulsive shopping. (We saw that this pressure was important in loosening the bonds of maternal love for one’s children.) Tight-knit families, including eating and chatting together, keep the child within the sphere of parental authority and resist the pull of consumerism. Such behaviors on a wide social scale are only possible where consumer capitalism is weak. Cook documents the commodification of childhood by consumer capitalism, and how it pressures and requires freedom from family restraints.

It is not useful to think of children -- or persons generally --along the lines posed by neoclassical economic thought, as initially independent, encapsulated beings who confront an equally identifiable `market sphere' and who thereby make discrete choices within it or become merely socialized into it. Consumption has become a necessary and indispensable context -- though not sufficient in itself -- in which the person's self develops because commerce produces most of the material world with which a child comes into contact...It is around consumption and display -- in the interaction with the material world -- that personhood and agency tend to crystallize. (Cook, 2004, p. 145).

Cook explains that psychology is built into macro cultural factors -- e.g., individualism is built into the free market -- and that psychology crystallizes around the characteristics of macro cultural factors -- e.g., personhood embodies the material of consumer capitalism.
Macro Cultural Psychology is A Unitary, Consistent, Parsimonious, Comprehensive Psychological Theory (h2)

The foregoing discussion of macro cultural psychology can be summarized in the following theoretical principles (which is more complete than the selected principles I listed in summarizing Plant’s historical analysis of maternal love):

Principles of Macro Cultural Psychology (h3)

1. Macro culture and psychology are mutually constitutive and interdependent; two forms of the same distinctive human order. Psychology energizes cultural factors and it dialectically acquires their cultural features.

2. Within this spiral of culture and psychology, macro cultural factors are dominant. They are the impetus of psychological formation, and they organize the form and content of psychological phenomena.

3. Psychological phenomena are formed in macro cultural practices on the macro cultural level to serve macro cultural purposes.

4. Psychological phenomena are public, objective, objectified cultural phenomena; collective representations.

5. Public, objective, objectified psychological phenomena serve as templates/scripts for
   a. acquiring psychology
   b. expressing psychology

Psychological phenomena are thus objectified, objective, objectifying cultural phenomena.
6. Psychological phenomena embody features of macro cultural factors as their constituent operating mechanisms and content. This is true for abstract and concrete features of psychological phenomena. Abstract features of psychology embody abstract features of macro cultural factors; concrete features of psychology embody concrete features of culture. Macro cultural psychology parsimoniously explains abstract and concrete aspects of psychology.

7. Macro cultural factors are political, formed through political struggle, and impart their politics to psychological phenomena.

8. Psychological phenomena recapitulate the politics of macro cultural factors in the subjectivity of individuals. Psychological phenomena animate politically appropriate behavior. Psychological phenomena are objectives of political struggle. Groups struggle over concepts of self, masculinity, childhood, motherhood, sexual freedom, rote memory in school, conceptions of mental illness.

9. Psychological phenomena are cultural means (cultural capital) for achieving cultural objectives/success by individuals.

10. Psychology is a cultural state of being, a cultural state of mind, a cultural identity and membership. Psychology objectifies culture -- e.g., sentimental maternal love objectifies Victorian culture and women’s domestic position, while modern maternal love objectifies women’s roles as workers and consumers in the free market; just as the recent sexual revolution among Chinese urban young women objectifies their changing work and family roles.

11. The fact that psychology is cultural and political – i.e., reflects the cultural-political features of macro cultural factors -- does not mean that
people’s psychology understands the cultural politics of macro cultural factors. Typically, the cultural politics of macro cultural factors mystifies these factors – to prevent people from critically evaluating and transforming them – and this mystification is recapitulated in psychological phenomena. The individualistic self is a primary example of a fictitious ideology that is recapitulated in fictitious self-understanding of people as independent of society, masters of their own action, and governed by individual mechanisms such as genes. Reincarnation is another fictitious cultural concept that mystifies people about the real origins of their personality and social position.

People’s cultural psychology may be a stunted, mystified psychology which I call the psychology of oppression. It can only be comprehended as such by adopting an external, critical perspective on the social origins, characteristics, and function of psychological phenomena (Ratner, 2011b).

12. Psychological phenomena are macro cultural factors. They represent and solidify cultural factors through animating culturally appropriate behavior. Historian Warren Susman (1979, pp. 212-213) shows how personality is a macro cultural factor in the sense that it characterizes and represents a society: “One of the things that makes the modern world ‘modern’ is the development of consciousness of self...Consciousness itself became a key word in the 17th century...It is striking to see the interest as early as the 17th century in what was called ‘character.’” These psychological phenomena were clearly cultural features.

Psychological phenomena solidify cultural coherence through culturally structured, shared subjectivity. Psychology binds individuals to culture through imparting cultural features of consciousness/subjectivity.

13. Psychology is embodied in macro cultural factors, transmitted, and socialized by them. As Oyserman and Lee (2008, p. 331) put it, “one of the
ways in which meaning is organized in context is through the meaning
provided by salient and accessible culture and that once a particular cultural
focus is cued, it is likely to carry with it relevant goals, motives, actions,
ways of interpreting information, and processing strategies.”

Clothing, for example, socializes sexuality. The American Psychological
Association’s Task Force on the Sexualization of Girls, 2007, studied the
ways that artifacts such as clothing sexualize girls -- i.e., make them sexual
and structure their sexuality in particular forms (sexualization is a form of
making subjectivity, or subjectification in Foucault’s term). Goodin, et al.
(2011) looked at sexualizing clothing available to preteen girls as a possible
socializing influence that may contribute to the development of self-
objectification in preteen girls. Sexualizing clothing was defined as clothing
that revealed or emphasized a sexualized body part, had characteristics
associated with sexiness, and/or had sexually suggestive writing. E.g.
Abercrombie thong underwear in children’s sizes with “wink wink” and “eye
candy” printed across the front. Or Abercrombie’s “cute butt sweatpants”
and “skinny” jeans that are “fitted with a little stretch for a sexy look to
give you the perfect butt”

“We propose that sexualizing girls’ clothing is an important socializing
agent in which the social role of the objectified female is perhaps
innocuously presented, ‘put onto’ girls, associated with popularity and
‘coolness,’ and then eventually endorsed by the girls themselves. Clothing
can function as both a contributor to and a sign of the process by which
some girls begin to think and evaluate themselves according to a narrow,
sexualized model of feminine attractiveness” (ibid, p. 10). Evidence for this
is the fact that Girls as young as age six are critical of their bodies,
extpressing body dissatisfaction and interest in dieting.

Girls define themselves in terms of the macro cultural factor, they do
not define the macro cultural factor in terms of their “own” idiosyncratic
desires. This conforms to Vygotsky’s and Leontie v’s conception that
individual psychology depends upon social psychology.
An additional example of macro cultural factors containing, expressing, and socializing cultural psychological meanings is reported by Shepherd (2011, p. 129).

Participants who had been shown a video of black Americans in a park had less negative associations with blacks than did participants who had been shown a video of black Americans in a gang-related context. They had similar results when blacks were shown in a sequence with a church as opposed to in a sequence with a city street. The traditional interpretation of these results is that contextual cues activate automatic stereotypes, which are assumed to be stable and unrelated to context. In this version, local context perturbs stable associations; the representation of the target is the same but the context within which the target is located varies, thus shaping activation. We could also read these results as evidence of how the types of associations (both the content and the emotional valence, positive or negative) individuals have with a member of a particular social group depend on the particular context or set of cues and there is no baseline representation of a social group apart from the context. [Thus, no fixed meaning that people have to minorities, e.g.] The meaning of a social group member is given through interaction with the context. Concepts of place (park, church, and street) carry sets of relevant associations that alter the cognitive associations of the perceiver.

14. These aspects of cultural psychology comprise a general psychological theory -- macro cultural psychology -- that explains all psychological phenomena.
15. Macro cultural psychology is an ideal type of the main parameters of human psychology. Individual and group variations/transformations issue from this framework.

16. The discipline of psychology is a macro cultural factor that represents and solidifies cultural factors. Vygotsky (1933/1994) spoke of bourgeois psychology, the psychology of fascism, and Soviet psychology to express this.

17. Although approaches to psychology reflect and reinforce macro cultural factors, they do not necessarily understand these factors or psychological phenomena. (Just as psychological phenomena do not necessarily understand their own cultural characteristics, origins, and function – as stated in #11 above.) Approaches to psychology are often unscientific and ideological, and overlook and obscure important aspects of human psychology. Not all approaches are equally scientific and penetrating. Epistemological relativism and pluralism are false concepts.

For instance, Vygotsky regarded bourgeois academic psychology as bogged down in a profound crisis: “the profound crisis which has afflicted bourgeois psychology during the past few decades….a process of degeneration and decay which had previously been woven into [its] general fabric” (Vygotsky, 1994a, p. 327). In other words, bourgeois academic psychology reflects and reinforces bourgeois society (as the name implies), yet it fails to scientifically understand bourgeois society and the psychology of its people. Psychology is in crisis precisely because it reflects and reinforces the mystifications of capitalism! One of the primary mystifications of capitalism is to deny its coercive affect on human behavior and to pretend that individuals are free to construct their own behavior. This prevents recognizing the social elements of capitalism which organize behavior/psychology. Recapitulating this mystification prevents bourgeois
psychology from comprehending the psychology of people which is, in fact, organized by capitalist social relations. (Bourgeois psychology reinforces capitalism by insulating it from criticism as a social system, and attributing problems to individual deficiencies.)

Academic psychology can only become scientific if it ceases to reflect and reinforce capitalism and instead adopts an external critical perspective on capitalism – an anti-capitalist perspective. Then it can free itself of the mystifications inherent in bourgeois society and it can recognize the cultural character of psychological phenomena.

Vygotsky goes so far as to identify the errors of bourgeois (academic) psychology as the basis of fascistic (academic) psychology that took root in Nazi Germany:

> It would be naïve to think that these absurd structures [of fascistic Psychology] are in no way connected with the general crisis occurring in bourgeois psychology and that bourgeois psychology is in no way responsible for these constructions ...Essentially, Jaensch’s system [of Nazi psychology] is built on the same methodological foundations as all the rest of bourgeois psychology. It represents an integration of idealism and mechanism...In the majority of psychological schools these elements, unknown to the authors themselves, are intertwined with one another...

> Sociology is completely left out of Jaensch’s system. It is only race and blood which immediately determine the structure of personality and through it politics as well. Here too, all that Jaensch has done is to push to the extreme and treat with cynical bluntness that which is already part of the very foundation of bourgeois scientific research (ibid., p. 334).
Vygotsky counterpoised Soviet psychology to bourgeois psychology and fascist psychology in terms of their scientific merit, and the political interests they represent. The latter two approaches are scientifically dubious and politically conservative. In contrast, Vygotsky argues that Soviet Marxist psychology is scientifically superior to the other two approaches, and it also represents the political struggle for humanity against the forces of reaction that are bolstered by bourgeois and fascist psychology (ibid. p. 335). Social scientific adequacy depends upon adopting a progressive political standpoint. Similarly, social scientific inadequacy and political conservativism go hand in hand. In this way, social science is thoroughly political.

The theoretical character of macro cultural psychology. (h3)

Macro cultural psychology is not simply an acknowledgement of cultural “influences” on psychology. It explains the nature of psychological phenomena, their origins, constituents, mechanisms, characteristics, loci, and function. Macro cultural psychology explains psychology as a cultural phenomenon. Macro cultural psychology explains why and how psychology is cultural. Macro cultural psychology develops methodology for evaluating and refining this perspective -- i.e., for identifying the extent to which macro cultural factors are the origins, constituents, mechanisms, characteristics, loci, and function of psychology. Macro cultural psychology takes macro level forms and processes of psychological phenomena as the basis (i.e., prototype) of human psychology. Rather than these cultural forms and processes being extensions of simpler, natural, universal, or personal ones, the cultural forms are the basic, primary, original prototypes.
which are the basis of intrapersonal and interpersonal psychological expressions.

For instance, the prototype of human emotions is macro level emotions such as love for one's country, anger at injustice, love of art, national shame, dejection about political trends, resentment of a rival country's technical superiority, fear of economic depression, and admiration for a form of government. These emotions, informed by consciousness of abstract phenomena, are the basis of our personal love for our spouses, children, and pets. They are also the basis of our fear of bears in the woods.

Macro cultural psychology is a Copernican shift in our understanding of psychology. Whereas mainstream psychology explains culture in terms of the individual, adults in terms of childhood experiences, the human in terms of animal processes, the large in terms of the small, the complex in terms of the simple, and the extrinsic (culture) in terms of the internal (mind, biology), macro cultural psychology explains the small, the simple the individual, the child, and the internal in terms of stimulation and organization by the large, the complex, the adult, and the extrinsic (culture).

Macro cultural psychology utilizes its tenets as the foundation of a comprehensive, coherent, general psychological theory that explains, describes, and predicts all psychological phenomena. In addition, macro cultural psychology incorporates biological and personal processes into its rubric in a principled, logically consistent fashion. It does not simply add macro cultural principles to independent biological and personal processes. This kind of algorithmic addition of factors or variables is characteristic of interactionist models. Macro cultural psychology is not an interactionist model. It is a unified, integrated model in
which all elements are modified so as to be congruent with macro cultural factors. Macro cultural factors are the dominant element because they are the cornerstones of society which is the basis of our civilization, humanity, and consciousness. Because mainstream psychology and psychiatry oppose this view and regard psychology as heavily determined by biological processes, we must explain how the latter are in fact subsumed within macro cultural psychology.

Natural, Biological Processes and Cultural Psychological Phenomena

(h3)

Being a public, socially constructed phenomenon at the macro cultural level for cultural purposes, and possessing cultural features and mechanisms, psychology cannot logically be simultaneously governed, by natural, biological processes. Of course, psychology involves and includes natural, biological processes, such as neuronal and hormonal activity, just as it involves breathing air. However, just as breathing air is merely a precondition of psychology which plays no specific determining role in the form, content, origins, locus, mechanisms, and function of psychology, so other natural biological processes play no specific determining role either. Their role is analogous to that of breathing. Without breathing, hormones, and the brain, psychological activity would cease; however with them it is only potentiated, not determined. Vygotsky and Luria cleverly argued that biology changes its role in behavior from animals to humans. It does determine animal behavior in natural environments; however biology changes to a potentiating, energizing function with regard to human social behavior. This is only logical, and it is Darwinian, for we have
seen that the fundamental principle of Darwinism is that organismic behavior is a function of environment. Culture is a radically different environment from nature; therefore cultural behavior and its mechanisms must be radically different from natural behavioral mechanisms of animals. Vygotsky & Luria (1993, pp. 170) explained this important point as follows: "behavior becomes social and cultural not only in its contents [i.e., what we think about] but also in its mechanisms, in its means...A huge inventory of psychological mechanisms -- skills, forms of behavior, cultural signs and devices -- has evolved in the process of cultural development."

“Higher mental functions are not simply a continuation of elementary functions and are not their mechanical combination, but a qualitatively new formation that develops according to completely special laws and is subject to completely different patterns.” “Thus, it is difficult to expect that evolution of higher mental functions would proceed parallel to the development of the brain” (Vygotsky, 1998, pp. 34, 36). Vygotsky and Luria make the important point that elementary natural processes operate in different ways from cultural conscious processes. This is why the former cannot govern the latter. They cannot even serve as the basis of the latter.

Elementary natural processes are actually inimical to cultural conscious processes. Elementary natural processes are automatic, mechanical, involuntary, physical processes; they possess natural properties which directly impel behavior. Natural processes, for example, operate in hummingbirds to automatically impel them to fly toward red colored flowers; or they impel male dogs to involuntarily and mechanically mount and mate with a female dog who emits a particular scent during her fertile period. Hummingbirds and dogs do not think about
what they are doing, they cannot control it, they cannot plan it or imagine it, or remember (relive) it in specific detail; they do not appreciate the object of their behavior, as a human male appreciates his sexual partner or appreciates a beautiful sunset or painting. This is why elementary natural processes cannot determine psychology in the way that they determine behavior of birds and dogs.

It is oxymoronic to claim that intelligence is biologically determined because biologically determined behavior has the form of mechanical, automatic, simple acts such as a hummingbird flying toward a red flower. This sort of behavior is not intelligent. It is the antithesis of thoughtful, insightful intelligence. To claim that intelligence is biologically determined, even in part, is to ignore the nature of intelligence and the nature of biologically determined behavior.

Psychobiologists claim that biology determines “part of” intelligence through increasing the speed of neuronal conductivity, or the complexity of dendritic branching. However, this is unintelligible. Intelligence is a matter of profoundly understanding relationships and underlying causes and implications of things. It is a matter of insight and knowledge. It has nothing to do with the speed of conducting neural impulses. Einstein was not a great physicist because his neurons worked quickly. That did not contribute to his knowledge and insight. And dendritic complexity is well-known to be the result of experience, not its cause. No biological reductionism of intelligence to physical processes as determinants, adequately explains intelligence.

Altering and subsuming biological processes to fit within the unitary framework of macro cultural psychological theory preserves the essentially cultural character of psychology by subordinating all other elements to it. Natural, biological processes are rendered
congruent with culture and supportive of culture. They are eliminated as countervailing forces with their own determining mechanisms that could challenge and weaken – through “interacting” with – culture and mitigate its influence. Interactionism is pluralistic in that it postulates diverse factors/variables which each contribute a certain independent percentage of “variance” to the resultant psychology. Interactionism thus weakens the influence of each factor by counteringposing different factors. For instance, intelligence or personality are said to be X% culturally based and Y% biologically based. Whatever % is attributed to biology is subtracted from cultural influence. This denies the essential cultural nature of psychology. It reduces culture to just another aspect of psychology. Biological determinism or reductionism is not compatible with cultural organization of psychology. Interactionism is factually wrong (cf. Ratner 1998, 2004, 2006, 2011a), and it is also illogical because it juxtaposes incompatible mechanisms. Contemporary maternal love, for example, cannot be socially constructed amidst fierce political struggle to serve cultural purposes and social positions, and also simultaneously be mechanically, involuntarily impelled by biochemical properties of hormones. This is obvious from the fact that Victorian women possessed the same biochemical hormones as modern women, yet their quality and experience of maternal love were qualitatively different. Hormones are certainly involved in both kinds of maternal love, but only as energizing mechanisms of behavior, thoughts, feelings, and experiences whose content is culturally determined and variable. It is illogical to claim that 40% of the quality of contemporary maternal love is “biological,” i.e., biologically determined. None of it is biologically determined. Biology has lost its determining function in human behavior,
which is only “natural” given the unique cultural environment in which people live that calls for socially constructed, designed, voluntary, changeable behavior. Culture determines the form, content, and conditions of behavior. In contrast, the form, content, and conditions of animal behavior are determined by natural, biochemical elements. There is no way that these two discrepant mechanisms could jointly determine the features of psychological phenomena. Elementary, natural mechanisms would impede the development of psychological features because natural mechanisms are antithetical to cultural-psychological mechanisms and features. The only way that biological processes can participate with cultural processes is for them to bequeath their determining properties over behavior to culture, and for biological processes to recede into the background as a general potentiating substratum of behavior.

Vygotsky (1994b, p. 175) put it thusly: ”The struggle for existence and natural selection, the two driving forces of biological evolution within the animal world, lose their decisive importance as soon as we pass on to the historical development of man. New laws, which regulate the course of human history and which cover the entire process of the material and mental development of human society, now take their place.”

Personal expression and communication are similarly derivative functions of macro cultural emotions. The latter are capable of explaining the former because broader, more complex phenomena can explain smaller, simpler ones. The converse is not possible. Simple, natural, physical, or personal processes do not have the scope -- e.g., the great abstraction and depth of knowledge -- to generate emotions that are necessary to initiate, sustain, and reform broad macro cultural factors such as “country.”
Conclusion: Restoring the macro cultural basis and character of psychology (h2)

Because psychology is part of macro cultural factors -- and is a macro cultural factor, in that it objectifies, represents, and consolidates culture -- it must be comprehended by “zooming out” from the individual and family to the social system.

Unfortunately, most of psychological science has been devoted to “zooming in” on the individual and marginalizing the cultural complex of which he is a part (see Michaels, 2008 for political examples of this problem). Vygotsky (1994/1933, p. 334) decried this in the strongest terms: “Another mistake...which is, essentially, inherent in a greater or lesser degree in all flaws of bourgeois psychology is the rejection of the social nature of man.”

Zinchenko (1984, p. 73) also acknowledges the overlooking of cultural psychology as a profound error: "The exclusion of the real process of the subject's life, of the activity that relates him to objective reality, is the underlying cause of all misinterpretations of the nature of consciousness. This is the basis of both mechanistic and idealistic misunderstandings of consciousness."

Moscovici (2001, pp. 109-110) explained this error as follows:

Society has its own structure, which is not definable in terms of the characteristics of individuals; this structure is determined by the processes of production and consumption, by rituals, symbols, institutions, and dynamics that cannot be derived from the laws of other systems. When the "social" is studied in terms of the presence of other individuals it is not really the fundamental characteristics of the system that are explored but rather one of
its subsystems -- the subsystem of interindividual relationships. The kind of social psychology that emerges from this approach is a "private" social psychology which does not include within its scope the distinctiveness of most of the genuine collective phenomena. It can therefore be argued that ... social psychology has not been truly concerned either with social behavior as a product of society or with behavior in society...For these reasons it is ambiguous to maintain that social behavior is currently the real object of our science.

This avoidance of concrete social behavior – whether intentional or not -- impedes the scientific development of psychology as a science. It also renders psychological science politically impotent as a force for social critique and change, and for psychological enrichment. For the academic discipline of psychology to become scientific, and to improve the social environment in ways that will enrich psychological functions and social relations, it must elucidate the macro cultural origins, characteristics, mechanisms, and function of psychological phenomena. This is what macro cultural psychology aims to do (Ratner, 2006, 2008, 2011a, b; Ratner, 2012a, b).

Future Directions (h1)

Elucidating the general features of macro culture. Elucidating the dominant factors, marginal factors, the structural organization of macro cultural factors in general.

Elucidating specific features of culture, such as the particular principles that govern macro cultural factors in a particular society (e.g., how capitalist economic relations permeate educational institutions, the media, social science, religion, entertainment, and news reporting). Elucidating the
politics of who controls macro cultural factors and for what interests (e.g., is the society dominated by an aristocracy, capitalist leaders, a political party -- the Communist Party?) Is the social structure egalitarian and cooperative or pyramidal; autocratic or autocratic?

Researching ways that psychological phenomena embody abstract and concrete features of macro cultural factors.

Researching whether psychological phenomena transcend macro cultural factors. What other kinds of factors do they reflect?

Identifying positive and negative psychological effects of the specific features of macro cultural factors.

Identifying how positive effects be enhanced and negative effects diminished. What changes in macro cultural factors are necessary to accomplish these changes?

What is the actual (concrete) power/agency that individuals have to control their social institutions in particular social systems?

Researching the extent to which people comprehend the macro cultural factors that form their social relations and psychology?

Researching ways that macro cultural factors organize psychological phenomena – which is different from interpersonal influence/socialization.

Developing methodology to answer these questions. How can we study the concrete features of macro cultural factors and their psychological correlates? The same for abstract features.

Identifying ways that people with a given cultural psychology can critically evaluate it and the macro cultural factors that shape it.


Notes

\[\text{\textsuperscript{i} Human artifacts eliminate any short-term natural balance humans have with nature. (Our population is not immediately dependent on what nature naturally provides us.). We must learn the limits of how much we can distress nature and still survive. We must plan and regulate our use of nature because we are not immediately consumed by our excesses as animals are. (E.g., animal overpopulation quickly results in starvation to restore natural population levels.)} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{ii} Community colleges in the United States were structured to perform this cultural function, as Brint & Karabel (1987, p. 11) document in a brilliant historical study.} \]

The United States was, after all, a class-stratified society, and there was something potentially threatening to the established order about organizing the educational system so as to arouse high hopes, only to shatter them later. At the same time, however, the political costs of turning back the popular demand for expanded schooling were prohibitive in a nation placing so much stress on equality of opportunity. What vocationalism promised to do was to resolve this dilemma by, on the one hand, accepting the democratic pressure from below to provide access to new levels of education while, on the other hand, differentiating the curriculum to accommodate the realities of the economic division of labor. The aspirations of the masses for upward mobility through education would not, advocates of vocationalization claimed, thereby be dashed; instead, they would be rechanneled in more “realistic” directions.
Because Friedan articulated frustrations and desires that had been stimulated by consumer capitalism, her feminist agenda was not radical. It opposed traditional social roles for women, however, only to support consumer capitalist roles. For example, Friedan emphasized that women’s work should be paid in accordance with market commodification of labor, and she condemned volunteer work for the community. And Friedan did so implicitly without acknowledging that her feminist agenda of women’s social psychology, social relations, and social activity derived from and reinforced consumer capitalism. Consequently, “Friedan’s fans conceptualized motherhood in highly individualistic terms [of personal happiness, self-fulfillment, and involvement in work], drawing few if any connections between their maternal responsibilities and the broader social and political world” (Plant, 2009, p. 161). Friedan’s critique focused on attacking traditional psychology/behavior of women – e.g., sexual passivity, limited career ambitions, and identity crises (which she called the feminine mystique) -- and urging new forms of behavior/psychology without an analysis of the political economic basis of either. “Friedan portrayed [traditional] American mothers as parasitical and pathological...She blamed them for the mental problems of WW II servicemen, the difficulties of children suffering from severe mental illnesses like autism and schizophrenia, and ‘the homosexuality that
is spreading like a murky fog over the American scene.” (p. 147). This is hardly a radical social critique.

Friedan insisted that “the feminine mystique was a mental construct and as such something women could change with equally powerful ideas. Friedan argued that women could discover the answers in themselves and not through religious, economic, political, or social change. If they had the wrong ideas, all they needed was the right ones, which her book provided” (Horowitz, 1998, p. 221).

Friedan did not articulate a critique of consumer capitalism that was necessary for women to achieve a truly more democratic, cooperative, humane social structure, social relations, and social psychology. Friedan’s work “promotes solutions (advanced education and self-realization) that tended to be feasible only for middle-class and upper-middle-class women” (Plant, 2010, p. 150). Years later, Friedan did help to found the National Organization for Women which worked to pass the Equal Rights Amendment, however, this was primarily a middle class movement to enable middle class women to join mainstream society (a la Condoleezza Rice and Margaret Thatcher), not to transform its structure (cf Michaels, 2008).

Horowitz keenly observes how far Friedan’s middle class feminism departed from her earlier political work and class analysis. From her studies in psychology at Smith College and Berkeley under left wingers such as Tolman, James Gibson, Koffka, Erikson, and also Lewin in Iowa, she was inspired to join labor struggles, anti-fascist,
and anti-capitalist struggles during the 1930s & 40s. Yet her feminism incorporated none of this political class analysis. “In opposition to all that she knew as a labor journalist, she apparently believed that America had become a middle-class society...The way Friedan minimized race [and class] as a factor in women’s history and in contemporary society is striking” (Horowitz, 1998, p. 211). “In addition, she ignored the efforts of working-class and Popular Front (left-wing) feminists in labor unions and in the Congress of American Women [to advance the political movement for the feminist agenda]” (Horowitz, 1998, p. 213). She made it seem that feminism was made by and for middle class women, and could be independent of broader political struggles for change in the class structure. Friedan even denied the political origins of her own social consciousness. She claimed that she came to political consciousness out of a disillusionment with her life as a suburban housewife (Horowitz, 1998, pp. 2, 237ff). Horowitz’s external analysis of her life and work confirms an important point that self-presentation in narratives cannot be accepted at face value in social scientific research (Ratner, 2002, chap. 4).

iv With agency being socially constituted, it cannot necessarily be held responsible for its actions. Under conditions of oppression, alienation, and mystification, where people’s agency is organized by social forces beyond their
control and awareness, people cannot be held responsible for their behavior. (This is recognized in American law.) Responsibility presupposes awareness of, and control over, the factors that organize behavior. To hold people responsible for their behavior under conditions of oppression, alienation, and mystification is to insidiously divorce behavior from social conditions. It implies that people can control their behavior regardless of conditions. Holding people responsible for behavior they do not comprehend or control is also to blame the victim of external forces. To blame people for being poor when they are deprived of work by corporate investment decisions is clearly to blame the victim. To blame consumers for borrowing credit and consuming many products is also to blame the victim. And to blame students for maintaining segregated social groups when they are recapitulating broad cultural segregation in housing, schooling, and employment, is to blame the victim.

Responsibility for behavior is cultural just as agency and all psychology are. Responsibility must be achieved just as genuine agency and fulfilling psychology must be achieved through creating cultural conditions which enable them. They are not abstract, natural universals independent of concrete culture. People will only be responsible for their behavior when they live in genuinely democratic institutions which they can control. This is the same condition that enables genuine agency and fulfilling psychology.

\[\text{This kind of reification is the essence of religion as well. People invent a concept of god(s) but they pretend that it was god who invented them and guides their behavior.}\]
Most women do not achieve the slender ideal. This generates enormous anxiety and self-deprecation. By 8 years of age, 40% of American girls wish to be thinner than they are, and this percentage doubles in only three years, as 79% of 11 year old girls wish to be thinner than they are. This testifies to the power which social ideals have over individual psychology, and the difficulty of renouncing them. Most women who are dissatisfied with their weight are objectively of normal weight (75% of the women) or even underweight (30% of the women) according to health charts.

The reason for the failure to achieve slimness is that the ideal is contradicted by another aspect of consumer capitalism, the constant stimulating of consumption to increase sales and profit. One form this takes is the stimulating of constant food consumption, especially profitable, processed, addictive food such as junk food. This culminates in obesity among one third of the American population. The clash of competing cultural pressures and collective representations generates intrapsychic struggle over which one to pursue.

Achieving the cultural ideal of slimness requires controlling oneself to abstain from the opposite culture pressure to constantly consume. This is why anorectics report intense struggles to control and renounce their urge to eat. Contradictory cultural pressures generate the need to control and renounce one in favor of the other. External pressures make control and renunciation central issues in anorexia. This is often portrayed as a struggle between good and evil, mind and body, purity and contamination. However, these metaphysical
notions mask the cultural clash of slenderness vs. consumption that is rooted in consumer capitalism.

Vygotsky says that capitalism not only impedes the development of scientific psychology, it also impedes the development of fulfilling psychological phenomena of people: “the source of the degradation of the personality [lies] in the capitalist form of manufacturing” (Vygotsky, 1994b, p. 180). Vygotsky links psychological fulfillment to social change in his 1930 essay, “The Socialist Alteration [Transformation] of Man.” He says the contradictions of capitalist political economy are “being resolved by the socialist revolution...Alongside this process, a change in the human personality and an alteration of man himself must inevitably take place (Vygotsky, 1994b, p. 181).

Here we see that Vygotsky explains personal degradation and degeneration of academic psychology in the same terms. Capitalism is the root of both, and socialism is necessary for scientific psychology and for fulfilling psychological phenomena. Psychological fulfillment and psychological science both depend upon critique and transformation of society. The converse is also true as scientific psychology and psychological change contribute to social critique and transformation. Psychological fulfillment, psychological science, and progressive political change are interdependent and inseparable.