THE WAR AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA:
Now that the dust has settled, a close evaluation of the US/NATO attack on Yugoslavia is needed. A final, precise evaluation is impossible, for the reverberations of this war are still being felt. But we must address certain key questions: Was it wise to bomb Yugoslavia? Do we, the people, want the United States government to use its military might in that way again?
Both opponents and supporters of the war against Yugoslavia need to pause and reconsider their positions. Formed during the heat of battle, those opinions crystallized based in large part on predictions about the future course of events. Now that some time has passed, those predictions and conclusions can be reevaluated.
Critics of the war need to acknowledge that, at least in certain respects, US and NATO were successful. The US and NATO were able to stop Serb atrocities against Albanians. They did persuade Serb troops to withdraw. And Albanian refugees, even those in the United States, are now eagerly returning to their homeland.
Moreover, the United Nations may establish a functioning government in Kosovo that protects Albanians from Serb oppression. If they do so, and the new nations of the Balkans live together peacefully, future generations may judge this war favorably.
If only Albanians live in the new Kosovo, US/NATO will have failed to achieve its announced goal of multi-ethnic peace in Kosovo. As of early August, US/NATO continues to claim that its goal is to enable all ethnic groups in Kosovo to learn how to respect one another.
But these claims about desiring a tolerant Kosovo may be false (governments lie frequently) or may fade over time. US/NATO may accept a partition that strictly segregates ethnic groups in the region. This scenario could lead to relative stability for years to come, which would enable US/NATO to continue to claim victory (on new terms).
As of this writing, the declared objective of a peaceful, multi-ethnic society is hard to envision. The lead story in the July 29 New York Times reported that the crime-ridden, violent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had taken charge of Kosovo. Since the peace agreement authorized the KLA to keep their weapons until the end of September, the KLA took advantage of this arrangement to establish a de facto government. Under KLA auspices, most Serbs have already left Kosovo.
As described by the TIMES, KLA leaders "have as their political patron the Government of Albania and care little for the civilities of Western-style democracies."
Violence has been rising steadily, including violence against fellow Albanians. One Albanian editor reported, "Each day it is becoming more dangerous to think and speak independently."
The head of the "provisional government" is Hashim Thaci, a rebel commander who is reported to have assassinated opponents within the KLA. "Mr. Thaci's orders are usually delivered by small bands of sunburned young men, many of them carrying concealed pistols," according to the Times. "The orders are handed over with warnings that a failure to comply will lead to beatings or death." The Times also reported, "Most people say they are afraid to run afoul of the self-appointed authorities" and relent to "extortion." One Albanian business owner commented, "I survived Serb occupation to be destroyed by my own people."
On August 3, charging that the West's response to Albanian attacks on Serbs had been "belated and insufficient," Human Rights Watch reported, "There is little evidence of a firm commitment to a new and tolerant Kosovo." A few days earlier, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright paid a friendly visit to Kosovo. She was in an "ebullient mood" and did not forcefully criticize Albanian atrocities. In a private meeting with Thaci and others, she reportedly did not explicitly encourage them not to set up a parallel government, but only "implicitly encouraged" them not to do so.
Moreover, NATO forces have done little to investigate and arrest Serbs guilty of atrocities. Claiming that their forces aren't trained in "police work," they've arrested and charged only a handful of Albanians. When only 3,100 United Nations policemen replace the 35,000 NATO troops, it's hard to see how KLA atrocities will subside.
These facts suggest that US/NATO may be purposefully facilitating the expulsion of non-Albanians from Kosovo as a way to create short-term peace. Whether on purpose or not, a segregated Kosovo may be the result. US/NATO will likely still claim victory, even so. But after the civil rights struggles in this country, and after South Africans have demonstrated how a liberation movement can respect minority rights, do Americans want to spend billions of taxpayers' dollars to establish legalized segregation? Since violence (including "humanitarian violence") begets violence, is it any wonder that our allies, the KLA, are continuing to use force brutally?
Supporters of the war need to reconsider two interrelated questions: was there an alternative and was the war worth it?
Alternatives
The question of alternatives must begin with a look at Western policies after the death of Marshall Tito in 1987. With an authoritarian rule, for forty years Tito preserved the national boundaries of Yugoslavia that the West had established in 1918. Following his death, however, a series of ethnic groups within Yugoslavia wanted to secede and establish their own, independent nations, especially Slovenians, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians.
Previously, US/NATO generally had not supported similar independence movements. Rather, Western governments usually recognized the territorial integrity of existing nations and worked to advance Western norms through gradual integration into the global culture. But with Yugoslavia, US/NATO repeatedly took sides with each ethnic group in their respective campaigns against the Serbs, the dominant ethnic group within Yugoslavia.
While siding with anti-Serb groups, US/NATO has been relatively quiet about serious atrocities that have been inflicted on the Serbs. As the San Francisco Chronicle editorialized, in the Balkans, "Whoever has the power becomes the aggressor." But US/NATO officials have not been evenhanded in their judgments.
Neither have they been willing to acknowledge any significant legitimacy to the Serb point of view. Rather, US/NATO took sides in a civil war in which Albanians were attempting to seize control of land and resources owned by Yugoslavia with no offer of compensation.
In this war, US/NATO tried to demonize Milosevic and blame him for everything. This "one-man" theory of history may make for effective propaganda, but it distorts reality. Milosevic, for example, could never have simply given up Kosovo without a fight; the Serb people and the Serb military would never have allowed it.
In Kosovo, decades ago, Serbs were a majority of the population. Over time, migration and fertility patterns resulted in a majority Albanian population. Once in the majority, Albanians increasingly vented anger at Serbs, often violently. This maltreatment, including many atrocities, encouraged more Serbs to migrate away. Serbs remained in control of the government, however, and tried to maintain control of land they considered sacred, some of which was valuable economically. Their efforts were brutal, which provoked further violence by Albanians against Serbs, in a familiar spiral of escalation.
So, concerning alternatives, early on, rather than encouraging the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and consistently taking anti-Serb positions, US/NATO could have played the role of a neutral broker, supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and utilized nonviolent means to advance the cause of human rights within that nation. These methods included cultural exchanges, trade, the flow of information, conflict resolution teams, international observers, public rebukes, stronger support for nonviolent Albanian activists, negotiation, and patience.
Prior to the bombing, European observers in Kosovo were a major deterrent against atrocities. Increasing the number of those observers while negotiations continued was an obvious alternative to immediate warfare. Even Henry Kissinger, on April 5 in Newsweek, stated, "It was a grave error to abandon any effort to strengthen the observers already in Kosovo."
Moreover, Western governments could have increased moral and financial assistance to peace-oriented nongovernmental organizations, both directly and indirectly. It's hard to see how anyone can say now, after all the terror, that these options should not have been pursued.
During the war, proponents argued that Milosevic could not be trusted to negotiate, but this claim was mere rhetoric. He was trusted to negotiate a Bosnian settlement, for example. Milosevic is a politician; as such, he has always been willing to negotiate.
If anyone was unwilling to negotiate, it was US/NATO. A top-level Administration official admitted to the press off the record that US/NATO purposely "set the bar too high." They gave Milosevic an offer he had to refuse. These demands, the infamous Rambouillet accords, would have allowed Western troops free movement throughout Yugoslavia, which would have been an unacceptable sacrifice of sovereignty. Moreover, the Rambouillet plan would have allowed for a vote on Kosovar independence that would have almost certainly led to complete independence. For these reasons, US/NATO knew that Yugoslavia would reject their demands.
Before the war started, some forces within Serbia suggested relinquishing a portion of southern Kosovo to the Albanians. These hints should have been pursued with authentic negotiations. A rational process of secession would have been time-consuming and may have involved haggling over economic compensation to Yugoslavia for loss of territory. Instead, US/NATO tried to force immediate de facto independence for Kosovo.
Making non-negotiable demands is hardly the way to negotiate. Doesn't it seem odd that Kosovo moved so suddenly to the front burner? Why did US/NATO only give Yugoslavia a few days to accept or reject their final offer before bombing? For US/NATO to charge that Milosevic could not be trusted to negotiate is like the kettle calling the pot black. Couldn't and shouldn't US/NATO have devoted more time to negotiation?
The fact that US/NATO was not engaged in serious negotiations is also reflected in the fact that Western representatives brought no "carrots" to the table. When President Carter negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel, he offered enormous economic incentives. But with Yugoslavia, US/NATO was not even willing to consider the rapid lifting of the harmful economic embargo against Yugoslavia.
So, the second level of alternatives to the war is that US/NATO could have engaged in genuine negotiations to achieve a lasting solution. The fact that US/NATO never did negotiate seriously will make it impossible for anyone to ever justify the war.
The Practical Realities
The bombing backfired notoriously. It led to the departure of the observers (and the media), provoked Serb anger, and paved the way to the death of more than 10,000 people, including thousands of innocent Serbs (many of whom will die in the future from diseases and explosions inflicted by western bombs). Other known casualties of the war include:
·The economies of the region are in shambles.
·The pollution of the environment is horrifying.
·The western attack on Yugoslavia has weakened the credibility of the United Nations, in part because the war violated the UN charter.
·The war transformed NATO from a defensive posture into the world's policeman and judge, setting a dangerous precedent for possible future wars.
·In its use of anti-personnel weapons and bombs with depleted uranium, and its effort to impose "economic ruin" on the entire Yugoslav nation, the war violated international laws. Human Rights Watch wrote, ". . . we are writing to express our concern at the mounting civilian casualties in NATO's air war against Yugoslavia, particularly in circumstances that suggest possible violations of international humanitarian law." These violations undermine the moral authority of the West when it charges other nations with human rights violations.
·The war has strengthened and emboldened the KLA to wreak far more havoc in the region than it was able to do prior to the war.
·The war has aggravated suspicions and hostilities toward the United States throughout the world, especially in Russia and China, which will complicate future relations with these powerful countries.
·The war has helped to reinforce the dominant culture of vengeance and violence.
·The war has further militarized American society and boosted military spending. When Clinton declared "The era of big government is over," he was apparently talking about domestic programs, not the military-industrial complex. As Clinton and Congress only find crumbs for pressing human and environmental needs, the federal government plans to increase military spending by tens of billions of dollars.
·The war has moved the Democratic Party away from a relative commitment to peace. Since Vietnam, the Democratic Party offered considerable resistance to foreign military adventures-until the election of Bill Clinton and Al Gore. But the Clinton-Gore administration has bombed more countries than any in the history of the United States. Their rationale for violence has been to point their finger at the "demon of the year" and claim, in effect, "He is even worse."
·The war has established another example of how a violent faction within an ethnic group can provoke atrocities as a way to get international assistance-an example that could encourage other groups elsewhere to do the same.
These are some of the known costs. Yet other complications are likely. Even if one concludes that authentic negotiations were attempted but proven impossible, and even if Albanians eventually gain control of Kosovo and somehow learn to respect the rights of minorities within Kosovo, if one looks honestly at all of the costs worldwide, it's hard to see how the war was worth it. This conclusion is particularly compelling if one agrees that the prolonged, and/or increased, presence of international observers in Kosovo would almost certainly have kept a lid on the turmoil.
According to the peace agreement, Kosovo remains a part of Yugoslavia. Consequently, Yugoslavia could easily move to reassert its authority in Kosovo after NATO troops leave. Thus, claims of victory are premature at this point, if only because the future is extremely uncertain. Violence is often counterproductive in ways that manifest themselves only after considerable time has passed.
Following the First World War, the Allies punished Germany severely and drove the nation into economic ruin. The resentment among the German people resulted in the rise of Hitler. The vengeance that US/NATO is expressing in its treatment of Yugoslavia is similar. Yugoslavia is to the Balkans as Germany is to Europe. A peaceful and prosperous Balkans, which Europe desires, will never be possible if the West continues to treat Yugoslavia as it treated Germany after the First World War.
Do the Means Justify the End?
It is no wonder that President Clinton has been so restrained in his claim of victory. No ticker-tape parade down Wall Street announced the conclusion of this campaign. After the war was over, even some of his strongest supporters, in so many words, said, "Never again." This reticence comes in part from a moral discomfort about what we have just witnessed.
President Jimmy Carter concluded an op-ed piece in the New York Times, "Even for the world's only superpower, the ends don't always justify the means."
Even if future generations look back on the US/NATO decision to bomb Yugoslavia as a contribution to world peace, Carter's moral challenge will stand. A civilized world can never accept brutality. The rule of law strictly prohibits police torture, for example, even if it extracts a desperately needed confession from a dangerous criminal. Two wrongs never make a right.
Avoid any mistake. The US/NATO attack on Yugoslavia was a brutal, cowardly violation of international law. As President Clinton himself admitted, his aim was to inflict "economic ruin" on the entire nation, including innocent children and opponents of Milosevic. NATO airplanes dropped flyers that read "No Water, No Heat, No Electricity, No Food = Milosevic" as an attempt to direct popular anger at the Yugoslav President.
From 15,000 feet above ground, at virtually no risk to its own people, the most powerful nation in the world mobilized its air power against a tiny country no larger than the state of Ohio. In doing so, they almost bombed the country back to the stone age, forcing its people to live by candlelight in terror of bombs falling from the sky at night. Some mainstream media correctly described the war as a "psy op" campaign, short for "psychological operation," as in torture.
Do the people of the United States really want to accept responsibility for these crimes? As The Nation wrote, "If we are not prepared to defend the Kosovars with American lives, what moral right have we to make war on the Serbs?"
The US and NATO were able to persuade President Milosevic to negotiate seriously only by joining forces with the notorious KLA, a group recently described by the US State Department as a "terrorist organization." By coordinating actions, the KLA was able to draw Serb forces out of hiding, which exposed them to serious damage from US/NATO warplanes. Air power alone did not persuade Milosevic to relent.
Past US alliances with Saddam Hussein (who later invaded Kuwait) and the Afghan guerrillas (who later bombed the World Trade Center in New York City) are only two examples of how empowering unsavory characters is a dangerous affair. But more fundamental is President Carter's moral challenge: do we want the United States government to form close alliances with forces like Saddam Hussein, the Afghan guerrillas, and the KLA?
--Wade Hudson is editor of "Eonomic Security News
and Review," published periodically by the Economic Security Project, a project of The Tides Center, a nonprofit corporation, 1095 Market Street, Suite 812, San Francisco, CA 94103, Fax: 415/553-8735, <whudson@igc.org> <www.igc.org/esp>.