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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-otis-dkim-adsp-02" ipr="full3978">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="ADSP">DKIM Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP)</title>
    <author fullname="Douglas Otis" initials="D." surname="Otis">
      <organization>Trend Micro, NSSG</organization>
      <address>
         <postal>
           <street>10101 N. De Anza Blvd</street>
           <city>Cupertino</city>
           <region>CA</region>
           <code>95014</code>
           <country>USA</country>
         </postal>
         <phone>+1.408.257-1500</phone>
         <email>doug_otis@trendmicro.com</email>
       </address>
    </author>

    <date day="24" month="May" year="2008"/>
    <area>Internet Area</area>
    <workgroup>DKIM Working Group</workgroup>

    <keyword>email, e-mail, rfc2822, rfc 2822, rfc822, rfc 822, rfc2821, rfc 2821, rfc821, rfc 821,
      rfc4871, rfc 4871, DKIM, domain keys, ADSP, architecture, mta, user, delivery, smtp,
      submission, Internet, mailfrom, author, return address, key domain, author key domain, author
      address, author domain</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP) advertises the adoption level of DomainKeys
        Identified Mail (DKIM), as described in <xref target="RFC4871"/>, for outbound messages
        publicly exchanged using SMTP, as described in <xref target="RFC2821"/>. Application of ADSP
        by Mail User Agents (MUAs) might need to be offered as an option, to accommodate messages
        exchanged over different public protocols. This document describes records that authors'
        domains can publish to advertise their DKIM practices for outgoing messages containing the
        Author Domain. ADSP will not dictate any specific use of DKIM identity parameters. Such
        identity restrictions go beyond the charter and unnecessarily limit ADSP applicability.
        Confirmation of an individual author's identity is orthogonal to and fully independent of
        ADSP.</t>
    </abstract>

  </front>
  <middle>
    <section title="Introduction">
      <t>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a mechanism by which email messages can be
        cryptographically signed, permitting a Key Domain to claim responsibility for the
        introduction of a message into the mail stream. Receiving hosts can verify the signature by
        querying the Key Domain to retrieve the appropriate public key, and thereby confirm that the
        message was attested to by a party in possession of the private key and in control of a
        portion of the Key Domain.</t>

      <t>However, the legacy of the Internet is such that not all messages will be signed, and the
        absence of a signature on a message is not an a priori indication of forgery. In fact,
        during early phases of deployment it is likely that most messages will remain unsigned.
        However, some domains might decide to sign all of their outgoing mail, for example, to
        better protect their brand name. It is desirable such domains be able to advertise that fact
        to other hosts. This is the premise of Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP).</t>

      <t>Hosts implementing this specification can inquire what Author Domain Signing Practices an
        Author Domain advertises. This inquiry is called an Author Domain Signing Practices
        discovery.</t>

      <t>The detailed requirements for Author Domain Signing Practices are given in <xref
          target="RFC5016"/>. This document refers extensively to <xref target="RFC4871"/> and
        assumes the reader is familiar with it.</t>

      <t>
        <list style="hanging">
          <t hangText="Requirements Notation:"> The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
            "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
            this document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119"/>
          </t>
        </list>
      </t>
    </section>

    <section title="Language and Terminology">
      <section title="Terms Imported from DKIM Signatures Specification">
        <t>Some terminology used herein is derived directly from <xref target="RFC4871"/>. In
          several cases, references in that document to Sender have been changed to Author here, to
          emphasize the relationship to the Author address(es) in the From: header field described
          in <xref target="RFC2822"/>. Briefly, <list style="symbols">

            <t>A "Local-part" is the part of an address preceding the @ sign, as defined in <xref
                target="RFC2822"/> and used in <xref target="RFC4871"/>.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>

      <section title="Valid Signature">
        <t>A <spanx style="verb">Valid Signature</spanx> is any message signature which correctly
          verifies using procedures described in section 6.1 of <xref target="RFC4871"/>.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Key Domain">
        <t>The <spanx style="verb">Key Domain</spanx> is the domain listed in the <spanx
            style="verb">d=</spanx> tag of a Valid Signature.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Author Key Domain">
        <t>The <spanx style="verb">Author Key Domain</spanx> is the domain listed in the <spanx
            style="verb">d=</spanx> tag of a Valid Signature that is at or above the Author Domain.
          The Author Key Domain must match all of its domain components with that of the Author
          Domain. When a referenced Key contains a <spanx style="verb">t=s</spanx> tag and value,
          the Author Key Domain will match with the entire Author Domain. ADSP does not require the
            <spanx style="verb">i=</spanx> tag to match with any local-parts, and can include
          subdomains of the Author Domain.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Author Address">
        <t>An "Author Address" is an email address in the From header field of a message <xref
            target="RFC2822"/>. If the From header field contains multiple addresses, the message
          has multiple Author Addresses.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Author Domain">
        <t>An "Author Domain" is determined by the entire right-hand-side of the Author Address (the
          portion that is to the right of the "@", excluding the "@" itself).</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Author Domain Signing Practices">
        <t>"Author Domain Signing Practices" (or just "practices") consist of a machine-readable
          record published at the <spanx style="verb">_adsp.</spanx> subdomain of the Author Domain.
          The ADSP record includes statements about the outgoing mail practices for messages
          containing the Author Domain.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section title="Operation Overview">
      <t>Domain owners can publish Author Domain Signing Practices via a distribution service, such
        as the Domain Name System; specific details are given in <xref target="dnsrep"/>.</t>

      <t>Hosts can obtain Author Domain Signing Practices of the domain(s) specified by the Author
        Domain as described in <xref target="checkproc"/>. If a message has multiple Author
        Addresses, ADSP discoveries SHOULD be performed independently. This standard will not cover
        the consolidation of combined ADSP results.</t>

      <section title="ADSP Usage">
        <t>A receiving host might obtain varying amounts of useful information through ADSP
            transactions.<list style="symbols">

            <t>If a message has no Valid Signature, ADSP results at the Author Domain are directly
              relevant to the message.</t>

            <t>If a message has a Valid Signature from an Author Key Domain, ADSP provides no
              benefit since the message is compliant with any possible ADSP assertion.</t>

            <t>If a message has a Valid Signature not at an Author Key Domain, the receiver can use
              both the Key Domain and ADSP results in its evaluation of the message.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>

      <section title="ADSP Results">
        <t>Author Domain Signing Practices discovery at an Author Domain provides four possible
            results:<list style="symbols">

            <t>Messages containing the Author Domain may not have an Author Key Domain signature.</t>

            <t>All messages containing the Author Domain are initially signed by an Author Key
              Domain.</t>

            <t>All messages containing the Author Domain not signed by an Author Key Domain are to
              be dismissed.</t>

            <t>The Author Domain can not support SMTP.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section title="Detailed Description">
      <section title="DNS Representation" anchor="dnsrep">
        <t>Author Signing Practices records are published using the DNS TXT resource record type.</t>

        <t>NON-NORMATIVE DISCUSSION [to be removed before publication]: There has been considerable
          discussion on the DKIM WG mailing list regarding the relative advantages of TXT and a new
          resource record (RR) type. Read the archive for details.</t>

        <t>The RDATA for ADSP resource records is textual in format, with specific syntax and
          semantics relating to their role in describing Author Domain Signing Practices. The
          "Tag=Value List" syntax described in section 3.2 of <xref target="RFC4871"/> is used.
          Records not in compliance with that syntax or the syntax of individual tags described in
          Section 4.3 MUST be ignored, although they MAY cause the logging of warning messages via
          an appropriate system logging mechanism. If the RDATA contains multiple character strings,
          the strings are to be logically concatenated with no delimiters placed between the
          strings.</t>

        <t>The ADSP record for an Author Domain is published at a <spanx style="verb">_adsp.</spanx>
          subdomain directly below the Author Domain; e.g., the ADSP record for <spanx style="verb"
            >example.com</spanx> would be a TXT record that is published at <spanx style="verb"
            >_adsp.example.com</spanx>. A domain MUST NOT publish more than one ADSP record; the
          semantics of an ADSP transaction returning multiple ADSP records for a single domain are
          undefined. (Note that <spanx style="verb">example.com</spanx> and <spanx style="verb"
            >mail.example.com</spanx> are different domains.)</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Publication of ADSP Records">
        <t>Author Domain Signing Practices are intended to apply to all mail containing the Author
          Domain. As an optional defensive strategy against subdomain spoofing, ADSP records could
          also be placed at domains that might appear to support SMTP.</t>

        <t>Wildcards within a domain publishing ADSP records will not pose a problem. This is
          discussed in more detail in <xref target="wildcards"/>.</t>

        <section title="Record Syntax" anchor="syntax">
          <t>ADSP records use the "tag=value" syntax described in section 3.2 of <xref
              target="RFC4871"/>.</t>

          <t>Tags used in ADSP records are described below. Unrecognized tags MUST be ignored. In
            the ABNF below, the WSP token is imported from <xref target="RFC2822"/>. The ALPHA and
            DIGIT tokens are imported from <xref target="RFC5234"/>. <vspace blankLines="100"/>
            <list style="hanging">

              <t hangText="dkim="> practices (plain-text; REQUIRED). Possible values are as follows:
                  <list style="hanging">
                  <t hangText="OPEN"> (Default) The Author Domain permits unsigned outbound mail.</t>

                  <t hangText="CLOSED"> All mail containing the Author Domain is initially signed by
                    an Author Key Domain.</t>

                  <t hangText="LOCKED"> All mail containing the Author Domain is signed by an Author
                    Key Domain. Furthermore, if a message arrives without a valid Author Key Domain
                    signature, receiving hosts are encouraged to dismiss the message.</t>
                </list>
                <figure>
                  <preamble>ABNF:</preamble>
                  <artwork name="" type="" height="" width="" xml:space="preserve">
      adsp-dkim-tag = %x64.6b.69.6d *WSP "=" 
          *WSP ("OPEN" / "CLOSED" / "LOCKED")
                  </artwork>
                </figure>
              </t>

              <t hangText="t="> Flags, represented as a colon-separated list of names (plain-text;
                OPTIONAL, default is that no flags are set). Flag values are: <list style="hanging">
                  <t hangText="s"> The practices are not to be applied to subdomains of the Author
                    Domain. This information might assist receiving hosts to better classify
                    subdomains lacking MX or ADSP, but that have A records during an MX mandate
                    transitional phase.</t>
                </list>
                <figure>
                  <preamble>ABNF:</preamble>
                  <artwork name="" type="" height="" width="" xml:space="preserve">
      adsp-t-tag = %x74 *WSP "="
          *WSP adsp-t-tag-flag 0*( *WSP ":" *WSP adsp-t-tag-flag )

      adsp-t-tag-flag = "s" / hyphenated-word ; for future extension

      hyphenated-word = ALPHA [ *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") (ALPHA / DIGIT) ]
                  </artwork>
                </figure>
              </t>
              <t>Unrecognized flags MUST be ignored.</t>
            </list></t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="checkproc" title="Author Signing Practices Discovery Procedure">
          <t>Hosts discovering an ADSP record SHOULD produce a result semantically equivalent to
            applying the following steps in the order listed below. In practice, several of these
            steps can be performed in parallel to improve performance. However, implementations
            SHOULD avoid unnecessary DNS transactions. For the purposes of this section a "valid
            ADSP record" is one that is both syntactically and semantically correct; in particular,
            it matches the ABNF for a <spanx style="verb">tag-list</spanx> and includes a defined
              <spanx style="verb">dkim=</spanx> tag. <list style="numbers">
              <t><spanx>Verify Domain Exists.</spanx> The host SHOULD perform a DNS query for an MX
                record at the Author Domain (with no prefix). If a non-existent domain error is
                returned, the discovery algorithm MUST terminate with an error indicating SMTP is
                not supported by the Author Domain.<list style="empty">
                  <t>NON-NORMATIVE DISCUSSION: To better protect domains not supporting SMTP, an
                    initial query for an MX record is a reasonable choice since this record is
                    predominately published by domains supporting SMTP and is more readily cached
                    than a negative result. Whenever SMTP mandates MX records to support public
                    exchanges, then not obtaining an MX record will terminate the discovery
                    algorithm with an appropriate error.</t>
                </list></t>
              <t><spanx>Fetch ADSP Record.</spanx> The host SHOULD query DNS for a TXT record
                corresponding to the Author Domain prefixed by <spanx style="verb">_adsp.</spanx>
                (note the trailing dot). If a valid ADSP record is obtained, use that record;
                otherwise, continue to the next step.<vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
              <t><spanx>Verify Support of SMTP.</spanx> When an MX record has not been found at the
                Author Domain, the host SHOULD query DNS for an A record at the Author Domain. When
                no A records exist at this location, the discovery algorithm terminates with a
                result indicating SMTP is not supported by the Author Domain. <list style="empty">
                  <t>NON-NORMATIVE DISCUSSION: Whenever SMTP mandates MX records to support public
                    exchanges, subsequent checks for A records should not be made, since the
                    discovery process would conclude at the first step.</t>
                </list></t>
            </list></t>

          <t>If any of the DNS transactions involved in Author Signing Practices discovery result in
            a temporary error condition, the algorithm terminates without returning a result;
            possible actions include queuing the message or returning an SMTP error indicating a
            temporary failure.</t>
          <t>
            <list style="empty">
              <t>NOTE: Within a DNS transaction, as defined by <xref target="RFC1034"/> section
                5.2.2 and <xref target="RFC4034"/> section 3, when a CNAME is returned, the alias
                name is to be processed as if it were the initial name. <xref target="RFC2181"/>
                section 10.3 makes an exception for Exchange host names returned by MX records. An
                Exchange host name must not return a CNAME.</t>
            </list>
          </t>
        </section>

      </section>
    </section>
    <section title="IANA Considerations">
      <t>ADSP introduces some new namespaces that have been registered with IANA. In all cases, new
        values are assigned only for values that have been documented in a published RFC that has
        IETF Consensus <xref target="RFC2434"/>.</t>

      <t>INFORMATIVE NOTE [to be removed before publication]: Per the <xref target="RFC2822"/>
        definition, a domain must start with a letter or digit. Hence names such as <spanx
          style="verb">_adsp.</spanx> that start with an underscore cannot collide with host names
        and domains used by <xref target="RFC2821"/> and <xref target="RFC2822"/>.</t>

      <section title="ADSP Specification Tag Registry">
        <t>An ADSP record provides for a list of specification tags. IANA has established the ADSP
          Specification Tag Registry for specification tags that can be used in ADSP fields.</t>

        <t>The initial entries in the registry comprise: <figure>
            <artwork name="" type="" height="" width="" xml:space="preserve"> 
      +------+-----------------+
      | TYPE | REFERENCE       |
      +------+-----------------+
      | dkim | (this document) |
      | t    | (this document) |
      +------+-----------------+
             </artwork>
            <postamble>ADSP Specification Tag Registry Initial Values</postamble>
          </figure>
        </t>
      </section>

      <section title="ADSP Outbound Signing Practices Registry">
        <t>The <spanx style="verb">dkim=</spanx> tag spec, defined in <xref target="syntax"/>,
          provides for a value specifying Outbound Signing Practices. IANA has established the ADSP
          Outbound Signing Practices Registry for Outbound Signing Practices.</t>

        <t>The initial entries in the registry comprise: <figure>
            <artwork name="" type="" height="" width="" xml:space="preserve">
      +-----------+-----------------+
      | TYPE      | REFERENCE       |
      +-----------+-----------------+
      | OPEN      | (this document) |
      | CLOSED    | (this document) |
      | LOCKED    | (this document) |
      +-----------+-----------------+
             </artwork>
            <postamble>ADSP Outbound Signing Practices Registry Initial Values</postamble>
          </figure>
        </t>
      </section>

      <section title="ADSP Flags Registry">
        <t>The <spanx style="verb">t=</spanx> tag spec, defined in <xref target="syntax"/>, provides
          for a value specifying Flags. IANA has established the ADSP Flags Registry for ADSP
            Flags.<vspace blankLines="100"/></t>


        <t>The initial entries in the registry comprise: <figure>
            <artwork name="" type="" height="" width="" xml:space="preserve">
      +------+-----------------+
      | TYPE | REFERENCE       |
      +------+-----------------+
      | s    | (this document) |
      +------+-----------------+
             </artwork>
            <postamble>ADSP Flags Registry Initial Values</postamble>
          </figure>
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section title="Security Considerations">
      <t>Security considerations in the Author Domain Signing Practices are mostly related to
        attempts on the part of malicious senders to represent themselves as authors for whom they
        are not authorized to send mail, often in an attempt to defraud recipients of the message.</t>

      <t>Messages signed by keys having a <spanx style="verb">g=</spanx> tag restricting the range
        of valid local-parts are likely applied by systems that are beyond the direct control of the
        Author Key Domain. As a result, additional care should be taken when the restricted
        local-part is not within an Author Address. Acceptance of <spanx style="verb">g=</spanx>
        keys signing messages on behalf of non-Author Addresses is discouraged.</t>

      <t>Additional security considerations regarding Author Domain Signing Practices are found in
          <xref target="RFC4686">the DKIM threat analysis</xref>.</t>

      <section title="ADSP Threat Model">
        <t>Email recipients often have a core set of content authors that they already trust. Common
          examples include financial institutions with which they have an existing relationship and
          Internet web transaction sites with which they conduct business.</t>

        <t>Email abuse often seeks to exploit the name-recognition that recipients will have, for a
          legitimate email author, by using its domain name in the From: header field. Especially
          since many popular MUAs do not display the author's email address, there is no empirical
          evidence of the extent that this particular unauthorized use of a domain name contributes
          to recipient deception or that eliminating it will have significant effect.</t>

        <t>However, closing this exploit could facilitate some types of optimized processing by
          receive-side message filtering engines, since it could permit them to maintain
          higher-confidence assertions based upon trusted Author Key Domains.</t>

        <t>Unauthorized uses of domain names occur elsewhere in messages, as do unauthorized uses of
          organizations' names. These attacks are outside the scope of this specification.</t>

        <t>ADSP does not provide any benefit unless receiving host systems act upon ADSP results,
          either by treating the message differently during the delivery process or by showing some
          indicator to the end recipient. Such a system is out of scope for this specification.</t>

        <t>The ADSP discovery algorithm performs up to three DNS transactions per Author Domain.
          Since these transactions are driven by domain names in email message headers of possibly
          fraudulent email, receiving hosts attempting to discover ADSP records can become
          participants in traffic multiplication attacks.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="DNS Attacks">
        <t>An attack might be waged against DNS infrastructure in an attempt to disable services
          dependent upon DNS. Such attacks could be made worse by receiving hosts employing ADSP
          discovery. For this reason, SMTP should consider making MX records mandatory for public
          exchanges. The ADSP discovery process is not expected to impact the likelihood of an
          attacker being successful at poisoning local DNS resolvers. In addition, such DNS security
          issues are addressed by <xref target="RFC4033">DNSSEC</xref>.</t>

        <t>Because ADSP operates within the framework of the legacy e-mail system, the default
          result in the absence of an ADSP record is for the Author Domain to be considered <spanx
            style="verb">OPEN</spanx> where not all messages are expected to be signed by a Author
          Key Domain. It is therefore important that the ADSP clients distinguish a DNS failure such
          as <spanx style="verb">SERVFAIL</spanx> from other DNS errors so that appropriate actions
          can be taken.</t>

        <t>To ensure message reception remains viable for crucial systems when DNS fails, IP
          addresses of crucial SMTP clients should be white listed to allow ADSP and DKIM to be
          selectively bypassed during such events.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="DNS Wildcards" anchor="wildcards">
        <t>Wildcards within a domain, excluding wildcard MX records, that also publish ADSP records,
          do not pose a significant problem. While referencing SMTP related records will not provide
            <spanx style="verb">NXDOMAIN</spanx> results, either an MX or A record is still obtained
          as evidence of SMTP support. <vspace blankLines="1"/>NON-NORMATIVE NOTE: Complete ADSP
          coverage for all subdomains of a domain remains possible. However, ADSP records must be
          published at every subdomain containing A records, in addition to subdomains containing MX
          records. When SMTP adopts an MX record mandate for public exchanges, ADSP records would be
          required only at subdomains containing MX records.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references title="References - Normative"> &rfc1034; &rfc2119; &rfc2181;
      &rfc2434; &rfc2821; &rfc2822; &rfc4033; &rfc4034; &rfc4686;
      &rfc4871; &rfc5234; </references>
    <references title="References - Informative"> &rfc5016; </references>

    <section title="Usage Examples">
      <t>These examples are intended to illustrate typical uses of ADSP. They are not intended to be
        exhaustive, nor to apply to every domain's or mail system's individual situation.</t>

      <t>Administrators are advised to consider the ways that mail processing can modify messages in
        a manner that will invalidate existing DKIM signatures, such as mailing lists, courtesy
        forwarders, and other paths that could add or modify headers, or modify the message body. In
        that case, if these modifications invalidate DKIM signatures, receiving hosts will consider
        the mail not to have an Author Key Domain signature, even though a Valid Signature was
        present when the mail was originally sent.</t>

      <section title="Single Location Domains">
        <t>A common mail system configuration handles all of a domain's users' incoming and outgoing
          mail through a single MTA or group of MTAs. In that case, the MTA(s) can be configured to
          sign outgoing mail with an Author Key Domain signature.</t>

        <t>In this situation it might be appropriate to publish a <spanx style="verb">CLOSED</spanx>
          ADSP record for the Author Domain, depending on whether users also send mail through other
          paths that do not apply an Author Key Domain signature. Such paths could include MTAs at
          hotels or hotspot networks used by travelling users, or web sites that provide "mail an
          article" features.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Bulk Mailing Domains">
        <t>Another common configuration uses a domain solely for bulk or broadcast mail, with no
          individual human users, again typically sending all the mail through a single MTA or group
          of MTAs that can apply an Author Key Domain signature. In this case, before publishing a
            <spanx style="verb">CLOSED</spanx> ADSP record, the domain's management should be
          confident that all of its outgoing mail will be sent through signing MTAs. Lacking
          individual users, the domain is unlikely to participate in mailing lists, but could still
          send mail through other paths that might invalidate signatures.</t>

        <t>Domain owners also often use specialist mailing providers to send their bulk mail. In
          that case, the mailing provider needs access to a suitable signing key in order to apply
          an Author Key Domain signature. One possible route would be for the Author Key Domain
          owner to generate the key and give it to the mailing provider. Another would be for the
          Author Key Domain to delegate a subdomain below the <spanx style="verb"
          >_domainkey.</spanx> label to the mailing provider. For example, <spanx style="verb"
            >bigbank.example</spanx> might delegate <spanx style="verb"
            >esp-00._domainkey.bigbank.example</spanx> to such a provider. In that case, the
          provider could generate keys and DKIM DNS records itself and provide Author Key Domain
          signatures.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Commonly Forged Transactional Messages">
        <t>In some cases, a domain might sign all its outgoing mail with an Author Key Domain
          signature, but prefers that receiving host systems dismiss mail without a valid Author Key
          Domain signature to avoid confusion with mail sent from fraudulent sources unable to apply
          an Author Key Domain signature. (This latter kind of mail is sometimes loosely called
          "forgeries".) In that case, it might be appropriate to publish a "LOCKED" ADSP record.
          Note that a domain SHOULD NOT publish a <spanx style="verb">LOCKED</spanx> ADSP record
          when it wishes to maximize the likelihood that its mail is delivered, since it could cause
          some fraction of the mail to be discarded.</t>
        <t>As a special case, if a domain sends no mail at all, it can safely publish a <spanx
            style="verb">LOCKED</spanx> ADSP record, since any mail with an Author Address for this
          domain is a forgery.</t>
      </section>
      <section title="Third Party Senders">
        <t>Another common use case is for a third party to enter into an agreement whereby that
          third party will send bulk or other mail on behalf of a designated Author Domain, using
          that domain in the RFC2822 From: or other headers. Due to the many and varied complexities
          of such agreements, third party signing is not addressed in this specification.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section title="Acknowledgements">
      <t>This document was based upon the draft-ietf-dkim-ssp-003.</t>
    </section>

    <section title="Changes in draft-otis-dkim-adsp-00">
      <t>
        <list style="symbols">
          <t>Conditioned Author Signing Practices Discovery Procedure SMTP verification step to be
            made only when an MX record had not been found.</t>
        </list>
      </t>
    </section>
    <section title="Changes in draft-otis-dkim-adsp-01">
      <t>
        <list style="symbols">
          <t>Modified the Author Signing Practices Discovery Procedure to better conform with terms
            in RFC2821. In addition, a note now covers the issue of CNAMEs.</t>
        </list>
      </t>
    </section>

  </back>
</rfc>

